Marx "admired" Darwin; Gould admires Marx

James Farmelant farmelantj at juno.com
Sat Aug 22 08:07:02 PDT 1998


Ted Winslow's post raises the question of the relationship between freedom and necessity, between free will and determinism in Marxism. Winslows perceives a disjunction between the ways that Marxist materialism treats these issues and the ways they are treated by Darwinian materialism. Winslow cites the *Theses on Feuerbach* to support his position. I am not sure that this entirely the case. On the one hand Engels seems to have inclined towards views not unlike those embraced by the Darwinian materialists. Thus in *Anti-Duhring* Engels asserted that: "Freedom does not consist in the dream of independence from natural laws, but in the knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility of making them work towards definite ends." In other words Engels seems to have advanced a kind of compatibilism in which freedom including what is known as free will is conceived of as being compatible with and emergent from a deterministic universe. Most Darwinian materialists could embrace such a view.

On the other hand many philosophical interpreters of Darwinism see it as being less deterministic than Winslow seem to suppose. I would suggest that people re-read Rakesh's post on Darwin in the Darwin and Malthus thread from Wednesday. Rakesh cited Peirce's interpretation of Darwinism which focused on the role that chance and blind variation plays in the evolutionary process as understood by Darwinism. Other writers like Ernst Mach and John Dewey also emphasized the role of chance and pointed out that Darwinian explanations are necessarily probabilistic in character. One might say that in Darwinism there is a dialectic between necessity and contingency. Furthermore, Stephen Jay Gould has gone out of his way to emphasize the role of contingency in evolution (and he sees this as having implications for our understanding of history as well). In addition Darwinism can be interpreted as viewing the relations between organisms and their environments in dialectical terms. Environments shape the nature of organisms by exerting a selective effect over them but the organisms in turn reshape those very same environments through their life activities. A similar dialectic might be posited between people and the circumstances that shape them.

I think that for both Darwinism and Marxism what Winslow refers to as a "universally developed individual," ... an individual with a fully free will, a "Universal Will," a will which is "in accordance with Reason" is not an ontological given but is the result of a process of historical development within the "realm of necessity."

Jim Farmelant

On Sat, 22 Aug 1998 09:36:36 -0400 Ted Winslow <winslow at yorku.ca> writes:
>Doesn't Marx's materialism differ fundamentally from Darwin's?
>
>Marx's retains essential aspects of idealism. These allow for
>logically
>coherent inclusion of self-determination and final causation as
>essential
>aspects of human being and development. The materialism underpinning
>both
>the original and the modern Darwinian accounts of evolution doesn't
>allow
>for this.
>
>An illustration of the difference is provided by their respective
>treatments of the formation of human character. The Darwinianian kind
>excludes self-determination. Though there is an debate within modern
>Darwinism about the the relative weights to be assigned to genetic and
>environmental influences in the formation of character, all sides
>adopt
>materialist premises which implicitly exclude any role for
>self-determination in this process.
>
>Marx, in contrast, gives self-determination an essential and
>ultimately
>predominant role. His account of human development treats it as a
>process
>of "education," of "bildung," which has as its end point the
>"universally
>developed individual," a concept taken from Hegel and designating an
>individual with a fully free will, a "Universal Will," a will which is
>"in
>accordance with Reason." This individual is the basis of the fully
>developed "realm of freedom" characteristic of an ideal society.
>
>In the Theses on Feuerbach (a summary statement of the ways the kind
>of
>materialism underpinning Darwinian accounts of evolution must be
>altered so
>as to incorporate the positive content of idealism) Marx points to a
>logical problem faced by any attempt to understand education in terms
>of
>this kind of materialism.
>
>"The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and
>upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that the
>educator must himself be educated. This doctrine must, therefore,
>divide
>society into two parts, one of which is superior to society.
> "The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human
>activity
>or self-changing can be conceived and rationally understood only as
>revolutionary practice."
>
>Ted Winslow
>York University
>Toronto
>
>
>Ted Winslow E-MAIL: WINSLOW at YORKU.CA
>Division of Social Science VOICE: (416) 736-5054
>York University FAX: (416) 736-5615
>4700 Keele St.
>North York, Ont.
>CANADA M3J 1P3
>
>
>

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