below is review I wrote about Young's book some years ago...guess it doesn't get at what you are asking about, but I pass it along... Michael Hoover
Iris Marion Young has written an eclectic critique of what she calls the "distributive paradigm." Her analysis in JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE draws upon critical theory, new left social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, feminism, Marxism, postmodernism, participatory democracy, African-American philosophy, and analytical, political, and social philosophies. She takes the concepts of justice and politics to be coextensive. Her thesis, however, asserts that concepts of justice and distribution are not. Rather, the two are properly related as whole to part. Thus, Young challenges the reductionism of distributivist theories. Distribution is an aspect of justice that involves tangible material goods. Social justice is a broader and more comprehensive notion that includes opportunity, self-esteem, and power.
Young argues that oppression is something that happens to both individuals and to groups, but she maintains that most accounts of justice do not acknowledge the ontological status of social groups. Reminiscent of Jane Flax, Young sees postmodern philosophy making a contribution in this area by exposing "as illusory this metaphysic of a unified self-making subjectivity" (p. 45). In addition, she contends that critical theory offers groups ontological status as it challenges mainstream analysis focusing on "the given." Further, critical theory is historically and socially contextual. Therefore, critical theory can provide a useful account of justice that avoids the abstract quality of much normative theory.
Oppression and domination are, for Young, the primary means for understanding injustice. She identifies "five faces of oppression" - exploitation/ marginalization/powerlessness/cultural imperialism/ violence - that are generally ignored by distributive justice thinkers. According to Young, standard accounts of justice are concerned with "morally proper distribution of benefits and burdens among society members" (p. 15). In failing to consider social structure and/or institutional contexts, the distributive paradigm fails to address group oppressions that people experience. Young cites the work of John Rawls, Bruce Ackerman, William Galston, and Kai Nielsen as examples of the approach that she is critiquing.
Presupposing a social ontology of individuals rather than of social relations and processes, the distributive paradigm has no place for the claims of excluded groups. Plus, Young claims that atomism fails to consider three kinds of distributive issues - decisionmaking/division of labor/culture - that are more properly undertstood from a group perspective. Matters of justice are reduced to what Robert Nozick calls "patterns" and "end-states." In contrast, Young argues for group-differentiated politics and culturally plural social networks that will raise issues generally absent from liberal public discourse.
Young criticizes the "depoliticization" of welfare capitalist societies that have experienced the disappearance of distinctions between public and private realms. Social conflict is "restricted to competition over distributive shares of the total social product" (p. 70). Citizens are viewed as "client-consumers" and the realm of politics becomes analogous to the market mechanism. The distributive paradigm, also serves an ideological function since distributive issues tend to dominate public policy debates. For Young, a Marcusean "one-dimensionality" characterizes welfare capitalist societies that either absorb opposition or render it powerless.
Democracy, for Young, has both instrumental and intrinsic value. Justice requires "participation in public discussion and process of democratic decisionmaking" (p. 91). Contemporary democracy, based on formal equality, falls far short of this condition. Privatized unequal politics, dominated by a framework of interest- group pluralism, leaves many claims beyond the reach of popular action. Young cites the notion of impartial reasoning as a principal culprit. Seeing it as some kind of "transcendental view from nowhere," she holds this perspective responsible for two theoretical myths - the social contract and the neutral state. Young alludes to the authoritarian character of impartiality by arguing that its adherents desire to efface differences.
Despite the innovative contribution that JUSTICE makes, its analysis leaves two dilemmas inadequately addressed. First, under the influence of postmodernism and identity politics, Young disclaims any attempt at metatheorizing. She maintains that such attempts presume a homogeneity that excludes people not identified with white European male culture. Obviously admirable, this position is also problematic. If one is trying to prompt people toward thinking and acting in a meaningful way, it may be imperative that a case is made for one theoretical framework over its competitors. Secondly, Young's discussion of moral responsibility is driven by concern for "unintended actions." Extending the usual terms of this debate, Young argues that oppression persists partly through interactive habits/unconscious assumptions/stereotypes/group- related feelings of nervousness and aversion.
Group oppression, according to Young, operates primarily through informal, often unnoticed and unreflective speech, bodily reactions to others, conventional practices of everyday interaction and evaluation, aesthetic judgments, jokes, images, and stereotypes pervading the mass media (p. 148). She charges that those who write from the distributive framework restrict the purview of justice to deliberate, intentional, voluntary actions. She argues that you cannot blame people for actions that are unintentional, but this does not preclude holding them responsible for their actions. The relationship between changing behavior and altering attitude, however, is only partially realized. Legislation may conceivably accomplish the former, but it may not effectively confront the latter. And, there may be instances when state intervention is not the preferred route.