Against the Current editor on GM strike

[Louis Proyect]

The Stakes of the GM Strike 

by Dianne Feeley, Detroit

Thirty-four hundred GM workers at the Flint, Michigan Metal 
Fabricating Facility, a stamping plant, walked out June 5. The 
United Auto Workers (UAW) Local 659 voted to strike last January 
over health and safety issue, but the International union 
authorised the action only after management removed new dies 
(used to form parts for GM's 1999 pickup trucks) from the plant. 
They were spirited out over a traditional three-day holiday 
weekend and sent to GM's Mansfield, Ohio plant; at least one was 
damaged in transit.

Officials from the Canadian Auto Workers union (CAW), when faced 
with a similar problem last year, occupied GM's Oshawa, Ontario 
plant, disassembling and hiding the dies before negotiating with 
the company. But in Flint union officials at the local and 
regional level did not take pre-emptive action. Two days before 
the strike, however, when management attempted to move racks 
holding metal parts, 300 workers--including workers from nearby 
plants--blocked the loaded trucks. Later the racks were removed 
by train.

As soon as the dies were brought to Mansfield, the union local 
got in touch with Local 659. But they didn't launch a sympathy 
strike because under the UAW/GM contract those are outlawed. The 
UAW International leadership could have authorised them to strike
on the basis of ongoing health and safety violations, shutting 
down the Ohio plant, but that didn't happen either.

The GM publicity department has been working overtime to portray 
the workers in the stamping plant as unreasonable and 
unproductive. In many plants it has been a long-standing 
tradition for operators to be assigned a daily quota. They (not 
assembly line workers) are then free to meet it however they 
decide. Some choose to work at a furious pace and finish early 
while others finish only by the end of the shift. As long as the 
operator meets the quota, the job is satisfactorily completed. 
But in the "lean" system of today's factory, foreman are 
demanding continuous production. Workers on one shift are 
supposed to compete with workers from another shift-- and all are
encouraged to surpass yesterday's production. This 
intensification of the work day--and the attempts by workers to 
maintain the set quota--is one of the subtexts of the struggle at
the stamping plant.

On June 11 5,800 members of UAW Local 651, who work across town 
at Delphi East, a major GM parts factory that produces fuel 
pumps, speedometers and other small parts, went out on strike.

By the end of June twenty-six out of the twenty-nine GM assembly 
plants in North America and over 100 parts plants--including 
independent parts suppliers that produce for GM--were shut down. 
About 150,000 workers are out--but only 9,300 are on strike. This
phenomenon of a relatively small strike having a domino effect on
the entire GM North American chain is the result of 
"just-in-time" production, which reduces inventories to a 
minimum. The shutdown is now costing GM $75 million a day in lost
profits.

The two strikes in Flint, home of the 1937 sit-down that led to 
the formation of the UAW, are over work rules, health and safety 
issues and job security due to out-sourcing and subcontracting. 
These are not only local issues, but challenge the reorganisation
of work at the end of the twentieth century. GM backed out of its
commitment to invest $300 million in the metal-stamping factory 
because it claims the union did not go along with changing work 
rules to increase productivity (i.e. speed up and downsizing).

Local 659 strikers on the picket line explain that GM is 
comparing apples to oranges in its productivity measurements. 
They point out that their plant makes larger parts--hoods, 
fenders and engine cradles for light trucks--while other stamping
plants make much smaller ones. They cite the number of 
concessions they have made to management over the past decade, 
and point out that these have not resulted in job security, but 
only more demands by GM. As one striker put it, "After ten years 
of 'co-operation' the company decided that we still weren't 
giving enough, so they felt justified in ignoring the contract 
and written promises we had spent almost two years negotiating."

Michael Moore's 1989 satirical film, "Roger and Me," documented 
the plant closings that devastated Flint throughout the '80s. But
despite losing nearly 50,000 jobs over the last twenty years, 
Flint is still home to 33,000 GM workers and remains the largest 
concentration of GM workers in the world. While GM accounts for 
65% of the local economy, announced plant closings and downsizing
could decrease that to 35% within five years.

Flint strikers feel that they have to take a stand now, before 
the jobs have left. Strikers complain that the union had gone too
far in co-operating with management, and management had not lived
up to their end of the bargain. 

This is not the 1970s or '80s, when the US economy was in a 
downturn. Indeed, GM is sitting on more money than they know what
to do with. And yet, the company is demanding more downsizing and
out-sourcing. The response has been a wave of strikes. During 
1996-97 GM lost $1.5 billion from nine strikes, most of them 
demanding the hiring of more workers.

Last year GM surprised everyone by announcing that it would close
the Buick City Assembly plant in Flint after producing the 
current (1999) model. It revealed to GM workers that there is no 
relationship between quality and productivity on the one hand and
job security on the other. Buick City's LeSabre has received 
numerous quality awards as the best-built domestic vehicle and as
one of the top quality-built vehicles in the world. And Buick 
City is ranked #2 in productivity on GM's list of assembly 
plants.

Simultaneous with GM's announced closing of Buick City, the 
corporation confirmed the closing of its Flint-based Chevy V-8 
engine plant. The two plants scheduled for shutdown employ over 
5,000 workers. GM promised to build a new engine plant somewhere 
in the greater-Flint area ­ but it will employ only 800. 
Nonetheless city and state governments have put together a tax 
abatement package that would subsidise GM by $153,000 per job. 
(GM already enjoys $2 billion in tax abatements from Flint-area 
communities.)

GM claims it must eliminate jobs, change work rules and have the 
flexibility to send work to outside suppliers. It has delayed 
investments in many U.S. plants and demanded that the union 
accept the combination of job classifications. This means that 
each worker must be able to perform a variety of jobs, wherever 
and whenever necessary. This more "flexible" and lean workforce 
is also forced to put in more overtime.

GM is also selling off some of its parts plants. The second 
striking Flint plant is part of the Delphi division of GM, the 
world's largest auto parts producer, posting sales of $27.8 
billion in 1997. Delphi is currently merging with another GM 
division, Delco Electronics. Delphi-Delco will become a "smart 
systems" operation for electronic engine controls, as well as 
steering and braking systems. These are high-tech, computer 
driven and highly profitable lines. Whatever parts of Delphi 
don't meet that definition may be sold off or closed. 

By shedding much of its parts work, GM will be able to buy in its
parts from non-unionised factories. Only 10% of U.S. workers in 
the parts supply industry are unionised. They make less than 70% 
of the UAW-organized workers' $20 an hour, with considerably 
fewer benefits. Additionally, most UAW workers have a local 
contract which specifies the maximum number of daily hours a 
worker is forced to work and regulates the number of Saturdays 
required. Non-union plants have more flexibility regarding hours.
(Though even UAW-organized auto workers are forced to work more 
than fifty hours a week!)

In Brazil, GM has used outside suppliers to assemble various 
components for new cars before delivering them, along the lines 
of Japanese manufacturing practices. For example, instead of 
sending speedometers, gas gauges, radios and glove boxes, the 
suppliers send partially assembled dashboards. This decreases the
amount of floor space necessary in an assembly plant and reduces 
the number of assembly workers--what Wall Street calls 
"efficiency."

Since the strike began the *New York Times* reported that GM has 
been quietly talking to the UAW about building a Brazilian-style 
factory in the United States. These factories have an "L" or "T" 
shape, to accommodate the large number of loading docks needed to
deal with the large number of outside suppliers.

In 1997 GM made $6.7 billion. Over the last two years it paid the
top executives more than $22 million in cash plus an additional 
$35 million in stock options. Jack Smith, GM chairman, president 
and chief executive officer, received a 26% increase in combined 
salary and bonus in 1997--$4.3 million, up from $3.4 million in 
1996. But judging by Wall Street's measure, GM's profit margin is
a narrow 3% and its market share stands at 32%--down from the 50%
it held in the 1970s. In comparison with Ford, GM is less 
"efficient." And although it has trimmed 212,000 jobs over the 
last dozen years, according to Wall Street GM still has "too many
workers and factories."

Wall Street is encouraging GM to stand tough in its negotiations 
with the UAW. During the first week of the strike two internal GM
memos were leaked to the press, obviously to undermine the 
confidence of the union. The first revealed GM's plans to double 
the number of vehicles assembled in Mexico over the next four 
years. The second lays out a plan to shut down by 2003 the 
Lordstown, Ohio assembly plant, which employees 6,300 workers.

Yet the strikers feel confident. Although the UAW has not called 
for mass picketing or organised support rallies, contingents of 
auto workers from various locals as well as other trade unionists
drop by to help with the picketing. And certainly the number of 
cars and trucks honking support to the strikers makes it clear 
that Flint supports the workers' struggle--even if the town's 
mayor does not.

By the end of the first quarter of 1998 GM was sitting on $13.6 
billion in cash. With all that money it still cannot afford to 
delay the 1999 launch of the Chevy Silverado and GMC Sierra 
full-size pickup trucks. Pickups account for 15% of GM's North 
American sales with each pickup a clear $7,000 profit. A quick 
start-up is needed in order to race past Ford and regain first 
place in market share.

Since the beginning of the year GM and its suppliers have been 
working to get all the bugs out of the new-model changeovers. 
This means that the Oshawa, Ontario truck plant has be to running
at full speed--about sixty trucks per hour--by early November, 
with Pontiac, Michigan and Ft. Wayne, Indiana assembly plants 
following closely behind. Crippling GM's North American 
production will disrupt what *Business Week* described as "A 
Launch GM Can't Afford To Blow."

The UAW strikers should be in a position of maximum power. Except
that the union has undermined its position all along by its 
"partnership" programs with GM, Ford and Chrysler. *Business 
Week* asks why GM and the UAW can't work out the same sort of 
deal that Ford has with the union. According to *Business Week,* 
a UAW vice president meets with Ford Chairman Alexander J. 
Trotman for breakfast every other month and there are "no nasty 
surprises." When Ford closed its Thunderbird factory in Ohio last
year, laying off 2,500 workers, the union didn't protest. Instead
the UAW worked out a deal for those workers transferring to a 
Kentucky pickup truck plant to receive a $45,000 bonus.

Much of Ford and Chrysler's downsizing took place during the 
1980s and as a result Ford has surpassed GM's productivity--33.3 
vehicles per blue-collar worker to GM's 27.3. It's also true that
the UAW's GM department does not have the cosy, high-level 
relationship with the company that the Ford department does. But 
it would be folly to believe that "labour peace" has been 
achieved just because Ford and Chrysler workers haven't gone out 
on strike.

It's clear that the fight over downsizing at GM is occurring in a
tight labour market, where the corporation pays management 
outrageous salaries and nickel-and-dimes those who do the work. 
It's an explosive situation as industry analysts discuss GM's 
need to shed an estimated 30,000 workers. Yet the advice that the
industry analysts trot out is that GM can only meet its objective
if it negotiates a new, more co-operative pact with the union.

For GM workers the answer is quite different. It involves 
rejecting "partnership" deals with the corporations, fighting 
against the deterioration of working conditions on the shop floor
and opposing forced overtime. It means developing a strategy to 
organise the unorganised parts sector. It means developing close 
ties with the CAW in Canada and the struggling independent unions
in Mexico to work out a common strategy. It means replacing union
officials who may sound militant but end up taking the bosses' 
side.

Obviously a strike settlement in Flint will not resolve all of 
the problems the strike has so effectively highlighted. But just 
as in the case of the UPS strike, people all around the country 
are seeing a diverse group of working people on strike--African 
Americans, Latinos, whites, men and women. The strikers explain 
their issues to reporters, obviously knowledgeable about the 
processes of their jobs and willing to fight back against 
injustice. Some are third generation autoworkers with a sense of 
how the union was built in Flint. They talk about corporate 
greed. They don't yet articulate demands for a shorter work week 
at no loss in pay. Instead, they stress that they want to ensure 
good jobs for their children.

[Sources: *Business Week, Labor Notes, New York Times, The Voice 
of New Directions.)


Louis Proyect

(http://www.panix.com/~lnp3/marxism.html)