>>The first question is whether any 'empirical hypothesis' that involves
>>human observation and interpretation has ever been satisfactorily
>>'falsified,' in the sense of putting an end to the debate, _in sociology_,
>>when the hypothesis in question concerns measuring + interpreting something
>>like degrees of 'solidarity.'
>
>Interpretation vs. empirical falsification in sociology is like baldness --
>it is difficult to pinpoint the line where it starts, but you can surely
>tell the difference between bald and not bald.
>
>Imre Lakatos introduced a theory of science in which emprical evidence is
>weighted against institutional interests vested in mainaining scientific
>theories. In essence he argued that the first line of defence of any
>theoretical edifice against empirical falsifcation are "problemshifts" or
>auxiliary hypotheses to reinterpret the core of the theory and bridge the
>gap between it and contradicting empirical evidence (he also identified
>different ways of so doing, but that is besides the point here). The point
>I'm trying to make is that you will always find a ceratin degree of
>'interpretation" in science -- theories are not just abandnoned at the
>first sight of contradicting evidence.
<snip>
>Call me an epistemological reactionary, but there is a fire wall between
>various explorations into the subjective meaning of gender, ehtnicity,
>class, sexuality, oppression, etc. -- which are a part of literature; and
>empricially testable statements about the incidience of gender or ethnic -
>based victimization, forms of behavior prevalent among people in ceratin
>occupational categories, material causes behing social inequality, etc --
>which are a part of empirical science.
I wouldn't call you 'an epistemological reactionary' or anything of the sort.
But I still think that nothing seems to be 'falsified' in the sense of putting an end to the debate in sociology. For instance, the underclass theory lives on, regardless of theoretical critiques and empirical falsifications of it.
BTW, do you think social science is scientific in the same way that natural science is?
>>The second question is, why do you cast the term working-class in male
>>terms? Is there any reason for doing so? For instance you say:
>>>hunting, fishing and male bonding are virtually defining features of the
>>>white working class in America.
>>
>>The above makes it sound like there are no women in white working class
>>America, or women don't bond, or their bonding is not a matter of
>>working-class culture, or whatever they do doesn't constitute a 'defining
>>feature'. (I say this while leaving aside the question of whether hunting,
>>fishing, & male bonding are 'defining features of the white working class
>>in America.')
>
>Again 'all white male solidarity' is certainly not the 'politically
>correct' form of solidarity, it is also likely to be dysfunctional to
>defend class interests of the working class (Marxian false consciousness),
>but it is a prevalent form of solidarity among Caucasian blue collar
>workers in the US - whether we like it or not. My ex who used to work as
>an organizer for UNITE! told me that the one thing she could not stand was
>being treated like a 'girlie' by male unionists. I can also show you
>survey results that allow me to compare the views of American blue collar
>males on gender issues and compare them to similar classes in other
>countries, and I can assure you that they are very conservative. And that
>is an empirical fact that needs to be explained (calling it false
>consciousness instilled by bourgeoisie is NOT an explanation, unless
>demonstrated empirically).
>
>It does not mean that other forms of solidarity, female bonding, etc. do
>not exist or are irrelevant.
Why not call it 'white male working-class solidarity,' then? That would be much more specific, concrete, and accurate, and it has an added benefit of preserving the term 'working-class solidarity' for a normative use.
Yoshie