Tentacles of the Eurostate

[Yoshie Furuhashi]

Trond Andresen replies to Doug:
>>Speaking of political cohesion, what is it with the Japanese ruling class?
>>They seem barely able to function as a coherent political force in the
>>midst of an endless slump. And that's mainly a domestic affair; even at the
>>height of Japan's financial power, there was minimal projection of Japanese
>>imperial power abroad. Not so the U.S. ruling class, which, despite the
>>fact that it owes big money to the other two metropoles, is very coherent,
>>forceful, and confident.
>
>To me this is another confirmation of the importance of (group) psychology,
>public moods etc. I think that the importance of gaining understanding of
>such factors, and -- especially -- their dynamics, is  very under-estimated
>among lefties and marxists, and should have higher priority. I also think
>that large theoretical and political gains are possible if this happens.

I've always thought that the ideological density of capitalist apologia is
rather low in Japan compared to the strident tone and mind-numbing
frequency with which the media broadcast the beauty of the 'free
enterprise' system in America. Public support for capitalism in Japan is
based on the fact that so far it has 'worked' for a lot of the Japanese,
not on an ideological argument that capitalism equals democracy, freedom,
etc. So, once a real economic crisis arrives, the ruling class has a
problem of ideological vacuum. Also, while capitalism is often equated with
the American Way in the US, thus cementing social fissures of capitalism
with nationalism, the same trick can't be used in Japan, in that capitalism
is still thought of as vaguely foreign.

In terms of timing, the slump hit Japan just at the time when the Japanese
ruling class was beginning to implement bits and pieces of
neoliberalism--privatization, deregulation, budget austerity, etc. In this
context, neoliberal policy--especially the financial deregulation aspect of
it--is rightly associated in the public mind with the burst of the bubble,
so the Japanese ruling class would have trouble arguing that more of the
same would cure the economic ills. On the other hand, since a threat of
depression is quite real, there is a contradictory pressure at home as well
as from abroad upon the Japanese Government to cut taxes AND spend its way
out of the slump WHILE opening the market (particularly finance) AT THE
SAME TIME AS insuring that bad loans won't endanger financial stability--an
impossible feat.

As for the relative lack of imperial power projection of the Japanese
ruling class abroad even at the hight of its economic power, reasons are as
follows: (1) lack of domestic support for such an enterprise; (2) the
Japanese ruling class's (historically determined) inability to bid for
cultural hegemony on an international scale; and (3) the Japanese ruling
class owes its post-war prosperity to American policy needs dictated by the
Cold War, trading ideological and military subservience for economic
benefits. Of course, the third reason is the most important.

Yoshie