Sundry; Ultra-imperialism ?

James Devine jdevine at popmail.lmu.edu
Wed May 20 08:39:54 PDT 1998


At 10:07 a.m. 5/20/98 -0400, Charles wrote: ... >Might the below be a defining characteristic of superimperialism or ultraimperialism. as in the debate between Lenin and Karl Kautsky? Lenin's difference with Kautsky was not that ultra-imperialism could not occur, but that it would not mechanically, like a clock , automatically turn into world peace and socialism. In 1915 Kautsky had said:


>"Cannot the present imperilaist policy be supplanted by a new,
ultra-imperialist policy, which will introduce the common exploitation of the world by internationally united finance capital in place of the mutual rivalries of natonal finance capital ? Such a new phase of capitalism is at any rate conceivable."<

BTW, this doesn't sound "mechanical" to me.


>The Russian Revolution of 1917 interrupted imperialism's march to
ultra-imperialism. Perhaps the fall of the Soviet Union has removed a main obstacle to the development of imperialism into ultra-imperlialism.


> Ultra-imperialism is transnational almost mono-dictatorship of the
bourgeoisie (the intense, anarchic struggle between rival national state groups of financiers is substantially abated from 1915) and thrombosis production when in crisis. It is the second eve of world socialist revolution, if the world working class intervenes as subjects united. with theory and program, etc.<

a few points: (1) I wouldn't say that the "intense, anarchic struggle between rival national stage groups of financiers" was simply amongst financiers. Lenin's model seems to apply best to continental Europe. But that's not a very important issue for now.

(2) I don't think the struggle abated until about 1945. The struggle shifted from the military arena after World War I, over into the international-trade arena, in the form of competitive protectionism (trade blocks and the like). This in turn encouraged the 1929-33 international collapse, just as the pre-1914 struggle encouraged WW1. The _form_ of the competition changed, not the reality of it. (Bukharin, in his excellent little book on Imperialism, writes that international rivalry encourages _either_ war _or_ economic crises. Lenin, by the way, thought that B's book was superior to his own pamplet on the subject.) The international competition encouraged WW2, also, though I think that Hitler and his boys added new dimensions to the disaster (to say the least).

(3) The end of the struggle coincides with the rise of US world hegemony after WW2. This was not simply based on the relative power of the US vis-a-vis the other leading capitalist powers, but also the Cold War battle with the USSR. The Cold War period is the only period I know of that approaches Kautsky's notion of ultra-imperialism (in appearance). The US strived to be the de facto world government, stifling contention within the "Free World" while "containing" the USSR. Kautsky missed the factor of the external threat. He also missed the way in which the "ultraimperialist" unity was aimed against rebellion in the colonies and ex-colonies. (Of course, he lacked the benefit of hindsight.) There was no peace in this "ultraimperialist" era.

Ironically, this suggests that the 1917 revolution in Russia actually _encouraged_ an erzatz ultra-imperialism (by allowing the USSR to become a big player and "threat" on the world scene), contrary to what Charles says above.

(4) With the end of the Cold War, an important prop for ultraimperialist rivalry is gone. The US is encountering the embarassment of equality vis-a-vis the other leading capitalist powers (relative equality, that is), which means that the US elite has to strive more for cooperation rather than acting the dictator.

On the other hand, the leading capitalist powers are much more integrated, both militarily and economically, now than when Lenin wrote. I think it's almost impossible to imagine a military confrontation among the G-7 powers, or within NATO. (Maybe, Russia could get in a war with the G-7 or NATO, but not with its current military situation.)

The military confrontation with the "third world" continues (as seen in Chiapas, e.g.), but in a lot of places the focus has shifted to IMF/World Bank type monetorture (e.g., S. Korea). The economic contention continues, but it's more of a matter of competition to cut wages and social benefits to attract multinational capital (what I call "competitive austerity") than a matter of tariff hikes. The austerity drive is the roots of the possible replay of the 1930s collapse in the near future.

(5) The tension resulting from international competition will continue to cause problems, so there will still be an ultraimperialist drive to create a real world government, probably in the form of US/IMF/WB/WTO/UN amalgamation (in rough order of power). The unification of the world economy continues, so we might see an EU-type organization being proposed for the world sometime in the next century. Of course there is nothing inevitable about the success of this drive, while the actual results depend crucially on popular struggles to defend living standards and to attack the system.

For more see my article in the 1994 issue of RESEARCH IN POLITICAL ECONOMY.

Jim Devine jdevine at popmail.lmu.edu & http://clawww.lmu.edu/Departments/ECON/jdevine.html



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