-----Original Message----- From: Patrick Bond <pbond at wn.apc.org> To: lbo-talk at lists.panix.com <lbo-talk at lists.panix.com>
>Nathan, strong argument you're making about realignment. From a long
>way away it sounds plausible.
>But why, then, were only 3 dems (Sanders, deFazio, Kucinich)
>consistently opposed to IMF recapitalisation?
Patrick,
That is a debate that split the Progressive Caucus itself, with House Minority Whip David Bonior arguing for recapitalization with Sanders leading the charge against. Given the fact that Bonior has been the main leader throughout the 1990s against NAFTA, GATT and Fast Track authorization, this reflects less disagreement about how abusive the IMF has been (since Bonior has stated he has no disagreement with Sanders on that issue) but how to change the situation.
The fear is that in the absence of government recapitalization, private monies will step into the breach without any constraint, yet they will (as Long Term Capital shows) still ultimately be backed by the government if the economy goes south. That was what happened with the Latin American debt "crisis" (meaning in Henwoodian terms, a threat to bank profits). It was only when private loans had spiralled out of control that the IMF, then the Brady Bonds stepped in with all the pain and destruction of structural adjustment.
The threats against IMF funding, however, have been used by an odd coalition of progressive people like Bonior and conservatives to force some changes (although not that significant yet) on the IMF. In a sense, the politics of the IMF has an odd concentric ring structure: damn-the-consequences leftwing and rightwing politicians in total opposition, pragmatic left and right politicans using the former opposition to extract concessions, and the center left and right in full support.
I honestly am not sure which strategy makes most sense, since it is not clear to me that the total abscense of IMF money wouldn't lead to an even more savage round of privatization in search of foreign money. In the ideal, the abscence of the IMF would induce a debtors strike against loan repayment, but a global fire sale to international capital seems just as likely, with a general economic crisis just exascerbating poverty globally.
Is it clear to you that in the absence of the lure of IMF money, governments in crisis would avoid even more severe policies than those imposed by the IMF?
--Nathan Newman