Don't get me wrong, I'm no advocate of eugenics (nor am I anti-choice under the social conditions of today), but I do feel your arguments need at least one more plank under 'em.
It seems to me intention alone ain't enough. The foetus must be distinguished from 'another' in at least one respect intrinsic to the category 'foetus'. I'll try to lend a little shape to my vague reservations below.
When Frances writes:
>> The following two statements are different,
>> "I do *not* want this baby." and "I do not want *this* baby." The former
>> is not about the fetus. It is about not wanting to have a child. The
>> second statement is directed towards a particular fetus or baby. As such,
>> I think it's directed towards a *person*. Now, if I get pregnant
>> and I don't want a baby, I abort it. No problem. My action is not directed
>> towards another self (broadly understood).
>> It has nothing to do with that fetus *in particular*. Now,
>> if I get pregnant, and I want a baby, but I find out that tests show the
>> child will have some kind of disability, and then I abort it, I think
>> that's different. My actions are aimed towards another.
... it seems here we are running the risk of differentiating between the two foetuses on unsatisfactory grounds. The mother's intention does not make foetus 2 any more 'another' than foetus one, does it?
If I shoot carelessly into a crowd of Indonesian students and hit one, have I committed a different act than if I have hit a selected target?
Each student is obviously 'another'. I may not shoot them because they are rational, self-conscious beings (or whatever). Singer argues that babies and foetuses are not the sorts of things we may not kill. But you do not.
Your foetus 2 has a future (as a human being with a disability). This is important in your argument because that's effectively (rather than precisely) why you insist we may not abort it. But foetus 1 is, it seems to me, here effectively distinguished from foetus 2 on wholly *other* grounds. Its future is not a factor at all. Rather it is its lack of sentience (or whatever it is that affords the mother this 'absolute right').
If both are without sentience, and this disqualifies both as bearers of the absolute right to be born, then fine. Neither is 'another'. My question is, how can your intentions affect their status?
Or do I misunderstand?
Cheers, Rob.