As usual, while I appreciate your insights, I am not surprised to find our thoughts go in opposite directions. Although for philosphy, unlike monetary policy, if we go far enough from each other, we may well meet on the other side of the circle. By the way, to avoid confusing others further, can we agree to use pinyin spelling?
To continue:
In dynastic China, both guizu (the aristocracy) and dizhu (the landed bourgeoisie) exploited the subjugation of the laboring masses for their own separate benefits. Their differences rested only on their separate socio-economic relationships to the laboring masses. The aristocracy based its privileged relationship to the laboring masses on hereditary political legitimacy while the land-owning bourgeoisie based its on economic meritocracy, an early form of economic Darwinism. Each group felt its own separate social role to be natural and moral. The aristocrats, or at least their illustrious ancestors, had earned their privileges by providing protection to the masses, and by maintaining peace, stability and social order, without which the laboring masses could not become productive. They performed a needed social function as the governing elite, at least until government was taken over by the administrative shidafus (literati-ministers) who were professional bureaucrats. Unfortunately, during times when central authority was weak or absent, regional lords fought among themselves. Thus they often failed to fulfill their fundamental function in providing peace and order. They needed a strong huangdi (emperor) to mediate disputes peacefully. The land-owning bourgeoisie, on the other hand, provided needed capital, opened new markets and generated new employment through its individual member's business acumen, hard work, personal sacrifice and willingness to take risk. They felt that their contribution to the expanding economy had disproportionately enriched the undeserving aristocrats whose warrior role in society had long been replaced by professional soldiers and whose administrative role in government had been replaced by the shidafu class under central authority. And the landed bourgeoisie looked to the huangdi to redress the imbalance. Conflicts between corresponding interests of each of these two competing socio-economic groups fed a complex and protracted political struggle for dominance. And it is in a dynamic environment of power struggle between these two groups that the political career of all sovereigns would take shape. Before the Qin dynasty first united all under Heaven around 221 B.C., the aristocrats of the ancient slave-owning social system derived their traditional privileges from feudal titles bestowed on them by their respective princes. This system of local feudal lords is known as fenghou, meaning bestowed lords. Since the unifying Qin dynasty, which lasted only fourteen years, and after it, during the great Han dynasty, which lasted 426 years, the empire structure of a strong central imperial government replaced the traditional fenghou system of local feudal lords. The centralized Han dynasty finally collapsed around 230 A.D. The old system of fenghou, or bestowed feudalism, in which local lords enjoyed virtually autonomous political power, reemerged in the absence of central authority during the chaotic centuries following the collapse of the Han dynasty. During the reunified administration of the Sui dynasty, fenghou was revised and in its place was introduced a new system called fengjian, meaning bestowed fiefs. Fengjian is a system in which the fee holder enjoys only economic privileges in the name of the emperor who is, in theory if not always in practice, the moral fountainhead of all political power. This change reflected the effort of a revitalized central imperial government to curb the traditional autonomy of the entrenched local aristocracy by harnessing the new energy of the rising merchant landlords.
Unlike members of guizu (the aristocracy) who derived their privileges from political capital in the form of imperial grants, members of dizhu (the land-owning bourgeoisie) earned theirs from financial capital gained through entrepreneurial effort and good fortune. These merchants used their financial capital to buy land, slaves and contract labor in open market, usually from declining noble households to whom the merchants once paid their share of taxes. These successful merchants also purchased land from other less fortunate independent farmers. The transfer of landownership, via an open if not totally free market, to the politically-disfranchised bourgeoisie had gradually brought forth a new socio-political struggle. It is a struggle between two competing social orders: entrenched political feudalism with local autonomy verses rising agricultural capitalism under a centralized government. The entrenched order was defended by members of guizu (the aristocracy), while the emerging order was claimed by huangdi (the emperor) supported by members of dizhu (the land-owning bourgeoisie). Each of these two opposing social orders seeks to justify its own separate claim of righteous validity from different philosophical anchors. The entrenched political feudal order relies on the philosophical concepts of Confucianism (Ru Jia). The rising agricultural capitalistic order draws on the ideology of Legalism (Fa Jia). These two philosophical postures: Confucianism and Legalism, in turn construct alternative and opposing moral contexts, each providing rationalization for the ultimate triumph of its respective sponsoring social order.
The struggle between these two competing social orders has been going on, with alternating periods of triumph for each side, for more than 21 centuries, since the Legalist Qin dynasty first united China in 221 B.C. The effect of this struggle would still be visible in the politics of modern China, particularly during the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution of 1966-78 when the Gang of Four would promote Legalist concepts to attack the existing order, accusing it as being Confucian in philosophy and counterrevolutionary in ideology. To the extent that "Left" and "Right" convey meaningful images in modern political nomenclature, Daoism (Dao Jia) would be to the left of Confucianism (Ru Jia) as Legalism (Fa Jia) would be to the right. Modern Legalists in China, such as the so-called Gang of Four, would be the New Left, whose totalitarian zeal to promote social justice would converge, in style if not in essence, with the New Right of the West in its reliance on authoritarian zeal to defend individualism.
The flowering of Chinese philosophy in fifth century B.C. had not been accidental. By that time, after the political disintegration of the ancient Xi Zhou dynasty (Western Zhou 1027-771 B.C.), Chinese society was at a crossroad in its historical development. Thus an eager market emerged for various rival philosophical underpinnings to rationalize a wide range of different, competing social systems. The likes of Confucius (551-479 B.C.) were crisscrossing the fragmented political landscape of petty independent kingdoms, seeking fame and fortune by hawking their moral precepts and political programs to ambitious and opportunistic monarches. Traditionally, members of Chinese guizu (the aristocracy) were descendants of hero warriors who provided meritorious service to the founder of a dynasty. Relatives of huangdi (the emperor), provided they remained in political good grace, also became aristocrats by birthright, although technically they were members of huangzu (the imperial clan). The emperor lived in constant fear of this guizu class, more than he feared the peasants, for guizu members had the means and political ambition for successful coups. Peasant uprisings in Chinese history have been rare, only seven uprisings in four thousand years of recorded history up to modern time. Moreover, these uprisings have tended to aim at local abuse of power rather than at central authority. Aristocratic coups, on the other hand, have been countless and frequent. In four millennia, Chinese history recorded 559 emperors. Approximately one third of them suffered violent deaths from aristocratic plots, while none had been executed by rebelling peasants. The political function of the emperor (huangdi) is to keep peace and order among contentious nobles and to protect peasants from aristocratic abuse. An emperor without the loyal support of peasants, euphemistically referred to as the Mandate of Heaven (Tianming), would soon find himself victim of a palace coup or aristocratic revolt. Confucianism is the most effective philosophical device for keeping the troublesome aristocracy in check. It instills in otherwise-disorderly aristocrats an instinctive repugnance against immoral rebelliousness through a duti-bound observance of the Code of Rites. The Code of Rites (Liji), the ritual compendium as defined by Confucius (551-479 B.C.), circumscribes acceptable personal behavior for all in a hierarchical society. It establishes rules of appropriate socio-political conduct required in a feudal civilization.
Unfortunately, ingrained conditioning by conservative Confucian teaching inevitably causes members of the aristocratic class to degenerate in time from truly superior stock into mediocre and decadent seekers of unearned privileges. Such degeneration is brought about by the nature of their privileged life and the false security derived from a Confucian superiority complex. Although the process might sometimes take centuries to take shape, some dynasties would crumble within decades through the unchecked excesses of their ruling classes. Confucianism (Ru Jia), by promoting unquestioning loyalty toward authority, encourages the powerful to abuse its power, despite Confucianism's reliance on ritual morality as a mandate for power. Confucianism is therefore inescapably the victim of its own success, as Daoists are fond of pointing out.
The Code of Rites is a non-violent means of socio-political control. Without an universally-observed Code of Rites, conflicts can only be resolved through violent confrontation rather than by moral persuasion.
Generally, those who feel they can achieve their political objectives without violence would support the Code of Rites (Liji), the ritual compendium as defined by Confucius (551-479 B.C.). While those whose political objectives are beyond the reach of non-violent, moral persuasion would dismiss it as a tool of oppression. Often, those who attacked the Code of Rites during their rise to power would find it expedient to promote, after achieving power, the very Code of Rites they belittled before, since they would soon realize that the Code of Rites is the most effective governing tool for a sitting ruler.
The economy has always been dependent on the ambitious and energetic working elite: farmers, artisans, merchants. Through diligent efforts, creative scheming and upward-mobile aspiration, this meritorious elite eventually achieves land-owning status and its associated wealth and social respectability. It is the diligence of members of the self-made landlord class, not the rule of the hereditary local aristocrats, that keep the laboring peasants productive. The emperor would protect the legitimate interests of this land-owning class and defend the justly-earned rights of its members. In addition, the civil examination system, introduced experimentally in the Sui dynasty in 613, has provided a much-needed conduit for fresh talent into government. An eager meritocracy has emerged whose elite members are the literati that staff the bureaucracy that runs the government. This professional literati have replaced the local aristocrats in their role as local administrators. The civil examination system has the dual purpose of infusing new blood into the establishment as well as co-opting the talent and leadership of the able and restless underprivileged. This examination system would be expanded and institutionalized to serve the political purpose of the imperial dragon throne. It would be based on a curriculum of moral studies drawn from an approved syllabus of Confucian classics.
Confucian ethics is designed to buttress the terms of traditional social contract. It aims to reduce potential for violent conflict between the arrived and the arriving. It aims to channel the powerful energy of the arriving into a constructive force for social renewal. Confucian ethics aims to forge in perpetuity a continuing non-violent dialectic eclecticism, to borrow a Hegelian term. The violent overthrow of the government, a criminal offense in the United States, is a moral sin in Confucian ethics. It is therefore natural that budding revolutionaries should attack Confucian ethics as reactionary. And those already in power should tirelessly promote Confucian ethics as the only proper code of behavior for a self-renewing, civilized socio-political order.
Order, according to Legalist concepts, is created not by moral persuasion but by authoritarian demand for obedience to law. The law should be applied equally to all.
Buddhists, because of their rejection of secular concerns, have not developed any formal political theory. So they often borrow Legalist concepts to oppose hostility leveled on them at court regularly in the name of Confucianism (Ru Jia), even though Buddhist emphasis on mercy represents the very antithesis of merciless Legalist thinking. The Qin dynasty (221-207 B.C.), ending 26 years of domestic war to become the first unifying regime in Chinese history, had governed with Legalist principles some eight and a half centuries before the founding of the Tang dynasty (618-907). Qin was the very regime that had persecuted Confucianism ruthlessly by publicly burning Confucian classics and by live-burial of unrepenting Confucians. The dynasty lasted only 14 years. After the fall of the Qin dynasty in 207 B.C., Legalism (Fa Jia), despite periodic revival, has experienced continuous decline, eclipsed mostly by the rising dominance of Confucianism. While Legalist ideas advocated by serious thinkers have at times intruded into the general consciousness, there is no organized Legalist political party during Tang time (618-907). In general, Legalism is often viewed as extremist, particularly by Confucians who subscribe to the Path of Golden Mean (Zhongyong zhi Dao) as the proper approach to life. In Chinese politics, Confucianism (Ru Jia) is based on a theory of rule by self-restraint. It advocates the sacredness of hierarchy and the virtue of loyalty. It is opposed by Legalism (Fa Jia) which subscribes to a theory of rule by universal law and impartial enforcement. Although Buddhists have their own disagreements with Legalist concepts, particularly on the issue of mercy which they value as a virtue while Legalists detest as the root of corruption, such disagreements are muted by Buddhist appreciation of Legalist opposition to both Confucianism and Daoism, nemeses of Buddhism. Above all, Buddhists need for their own protection Legalism's opposition to selective religious persecution. Legalism, enemy of Buddhism's enemies, is selected by Buddhists as a convenient ally.
Legalism places importance on three aspects. The first is shi (influence) which is based on the legitimacy of the ruler and the doctrinal orthodoxy of his policies. The second is shu (skill) in manipulative exercise of power. The third is fa (law) which, once publicly proclaimed, should govern universally without exceptions. These three aspects Legalists consider as three pillars of a well-governed society.
Unlike Confucians who claim man to be good in character but has fallen from his natural grace, Legalists believe that man's temperament is basically inclined towards evil and that human nature must be curbed through strict laws. The essential political function of all subjects is to serve the emperor who is the sole legitimate personification of the political order and sovereign of the political realm. While all powers emanate by rite from the Son of Heaven, the proper execution of these powers can take place only within an impartial system of law. While people should be taught their ritual responsibilities, they should at the same time be held responsible by law not only for each person's individual acts but also for one another's conducts, as an extensive form of social control within a good community. Therefore, punishment should be meted out to not only the culprit, but also to his relatives, friends, associates and neighbors, for negligence of their ritual duties in constraining the culprit. Efficiency of government and equal justice for all are cardinal rules of good politics. Legalists believe that administration of the state should be entrusted to officials appointed according to merit, rather than to hereditary nobles or literati with irrelevant scholarship. Even granting validity to the extravagant Daoist claim that ideas, however radical, are inherently civilized and noble, Legalists insist that when ideas are transformed into unbridled action, terror, evil, vulgarity and destruction emerge. Freedom of thought must be balanced by rule of law to restrain the corruption of ideas by action. Whereas being well-versed in Confucianism (Ru Jia) binds shidafus (literati-bureaucrats) culturally as faithful captives to the imperial system, such rigid mentality unfortunately also renders its subscribers indifferent to objective problem-solving. Thus Confucianism, by its very nature, would ensure eventual breakdown of the established order, at which point Legalism (Fa Jia) would gain ascendancy for a period, to put in place new policies and laws that would be more responsive to objective conditions. But Confucians take comfort in the fact that, in time, the new establishment that Legalists put in charge would discover the utilitarian advantage of Confucianism to the ruling elite. And the cycle of conservative consolidation would start once again. Generally, periods of stability and steady decay would last longer than intervals of violent renewal through Legalist reform, so that Confucianism would become more ingrained after each cycle. This perpetual, cyclical development proves to the Daoist mind that indeed "life goes in circles". It is an astute observation made by the ancient sage, Laozi, father of Daoism (Dao Jia) who lived during sixth century B.C. The so-called Gang of Four would promote Legalist politics in China in the 1970's. They would use Marxist orthodox doctrine, reinforced by Maoist personality cult, as shi (influence), Communist party discipline as shu (skill) for exercising power, and dictatorial rule as fa (laws) to be obeyed with no exceptions allowed for tradition, ancient customs or special relationships and with little regard for human conditions. Legalists yearn for a perfectly administered state, even if the price is the unhappiness of its citizens. They seek an inviolable system of impartial justice, without extenuating allowances, even at the expense of the innocent.
More in next post......
Henry C.K. Liu