Chinese feudalism had evolved long before the advent of modern mass communication technology. The appearance of pamphlets and newspapers, the first form of mass communication resulting from the invention of printing, would make public opinion important in political disputes and eventually win a (small) measure of freedom of the press from direct political control of the rulers. Freedom of speech, amplified by mass circulation in print form, would since render popular support an increasingly critical prerequisite for political power. Prior to the era of prerequisite popular support in liberal politics, feudalism had evolved from the logic of moral philosophy and the calculus of power politics. Its immediate local authority had been imposed from the top down, resting on the local strongman's ability to maintain law and order necessary for local stability and his promise of protection against external threat. The agrarian peasants under the local lord's rule had needed both for a productive life. As the agrarian economy expanded, the provision of security and order, under the nomadic tribal rules of primitive kinship loyalty and clannish vendetta, had gradually been institutionalized by an evolving hierarchical feudal order, buttressed by agrarian societal values of morality and justice. Free men no longer enjoyed the freedom of movement inherent in a nomadic life because their agrarian livelihood was tied to immobile land. They then bartered away their own individual freedom and labor rights, as well as those of their descendants, often willingly but at times under coercion, in exchange for protection from their local lords and the lords' heirs. The local lords in turn offered loyalty and obedience to the Emperor and his heirs in return for more powerful imperial protection against other neighboring local lords. The Emperor's authority had been derived from its ready recognition by the collegiate regional lords and, to a less direct but more fundamental degree, from peasant expectation of him as a higher authority to whom the peasantry could appeal for justice against the frequent abuses of the local lords. The Emperor's role under feudalism was twofold: to arbitrate the disputes among local lords; and to protect the peasants from the oppressive aristocrats. In feudal politics, a wise Emperor was, by definition, a liberal Emperor.
Economic prosperity naturally resulted from peaceful stability and established social hierarchy. Material prosperity in turn provided a pragmatic validation for feudalism. Direct popular support through universal suffrage had been immaterial and impractical before the advent of the age of individual freedom of speech and mass communication. But while universal suffrage did not exist, it does not follow that popular support had been unnecessary as a mandate of political power under the feudal political system. Confucianism understands well the link between popular support and political power. Until the 20th century, whenever widespread political unrest should occur in China, it would generally be against an abusive ruling monarch and sometimes his morally bankrupt dynastic house, rather than the feudal system itself. The fall of feudal monarchies over the course of scores of centuries were the result of palace coups and political rebellions rather that social revolutions, the few exceptions being minor social upheavals in times of widespread economic turmoil. The flowering of liberal democracy in the West would usher in a rising expectation around the modern world on respect for human rights and for the concept of political equality for all individuals, regardless of social rank and class affinity. The consent of the governed as expressed through universal suffrage would become a modern global prerequisite for a mandate to govern. Since then, 3 competing political systems: socialism, fascism and capitalistic democracy, would dominate the unfolding of modern history. China has not been exempted from this historical development. Socialism would attract popular support by promising the masses that the welfare of the people is the responsibility of the state, while fascism would demand power over the people by asserting that the welfare of the state is the duty of each individual. Both socialism and fascism would exact from the people total obedience to state control as the price for fulfilling each of their separate and opposing social philosophies and political visions. However, the difference in ideology would not prevent a similarity in methodology. Both political systems would be required by their internal logic to be similarly authoritarian and totalitarian, as a moral justification and as an operational necessity, though toward opposite ends. Both socialism and fascism, in the quest for guaranteed material welfare for the people, would strip them of their individual will, and in the process rob them of their creativity and initiative. Unfortunately, material welfare, even if absolutely guaranteed, is always a poor compensation for loss of individuality. Fascism, because of its contempt for equality as an ideal, would not hesitate to enslave the masses to create an efficient state that would deliver glory to the nation and an improved living standard to the dutiful masses. Socialism, on the other hand, obsessed by its belief in the myth of equality, would willingly suffer inefficiency in wealth-creating processes, even if it should result in less income either for use by the state or for fair distribution among the people. In practice, albeit history to date would only permit imperfect models, the history of radical socialism would be frothed with examples of attempts to achieve equality by making the rich as poor as the poor. Capitalistic democracy would base its mandate on the individual's acceptance of responsibility for his own welfare through the exercise of private property rights. Since it would promise only equal opportunity to a good life rather than a good life itself, its ideology would require neither authoritarian moralization nor totalitarian control, because individual failures would not imply dysfunction of the system. Rather, such failures would be deemed necessary in the selection process to keep the system healthy, the concept of the survival of the fittest being the foundation of capitalistic social Darwinism. Social welfare safety nets would be tolerated in capitalistic democracies merely as humanitarian compromises, a decadent liberal concession from the theoretical sanctity of market efficiency. For the true believer of capitalism, economic efficiency should ideally be maintained with social euthanasia of the economically unfit. Charity is bad economics, except when charity contributes in the short term to reducing other high costs of preserving law and order, of preventing crimes of the poor (not on the poor), social unrest or revolution. The most efficient method of eliminating poverty is to let the poor die with natural obsolescence. It is the fear of poverty that provide the psychological fuel for economic initiative. Making poverty sufferable through social welfare programs would erode the vitality of the economic system, so market capitalists argue. The power of the state in a modern capitalistic democracy would be restricted to that of maintaining national security, preserving basic human rights as defined in the liberal tradition of the Enlightenment, which would not include the right of individual economic security (except the value of money; thus when wages increase, its called inflation, but when share value rises, its called growth), of protecting the sacredness of private property rights in order to insure the efficient functioning of the market mechanism and upholding the principle of return on capital as the driving force in human society. Within the rules of market economy, the individual in a capitalist democracy would enjoy broad freedom as long as the exercise of which is consistent with the security interest of the state, compatible with the preservation of capitalism and compliant with the traditional moral standards of its local community. The trouble is that truly free markets, like absolute equality, is a myth. Markets in a complex global economy in modern time would in reality be shaped by factors external to national borders and functional industry boundaries. The so-called unseen hand of the market would constantly require national governmental policies and regulations to prevent it from sub-optimization and to protect it from manipulation by powerful special interests domestically, by policies of other national governments and by business strategies of transnational, multinational and international enterprises. Capitalistic democracy would appear to be materialistically efficient due largely to its shedding of the costly burden of social responsibilities. It would operate with clear purpose, because material gains are stimulated by material incentives, relatively unencumbered by metaphysical morals. Capitalism is paradoxically tied to the perpetuation of poverty, because it needs the fear of poverty as an negative incentive for the individual to work. Even if capitalism should succeed in eliminating material poverty, it would do so only at the price of a poverty of the spirit. It is when questions of responsibility to one's fellow men and the higher purposes of life are asked that the purpose of economic efficiency in a capitalistic democracy faces it's most serious challenge. While an ample supply of bread may prevent political revolutions, it is necessary to remember, as Christ pointed out: "Man lives not by bread alone."
Feudalism in China has aspects of what modern political science would label as fascist, socialist and democratic. As a socio-political system, feudalism is inherently authoritarian and totalitarian. However, since feudal cultural ideals have always been meticulously nurtured by Confucianism to be congruent with the political regime, social control, while pervasive, is seldom consciously felt as oppressive by the public. Or more accurately, social oppression, both vertical, such as sovereign to subject, and horizontal, such as gender prejudice, is considered natural for lack of an accepted alternative vision. Concepts such as equality, individuality, privacy, personal freedom and democracy, are deemed anti-social, and only longed for by the derange-of-mind, such as radical Daoists. This would be true in large measure up to modern time when radical Daoists would be replaced by other radical political and cultural dissidents. (Here a distinction needs to be made between genuine indigenous dissents from those merely playing opportunistically for foreign cash). The imperial system in China took the form of a centralized federalism of autonomous local lords in which the authority of the sovereign is symbiotically bound to, but clearly separated from, the authority of the local lords. Unless the local lords abused their local authority, the Emperor's authority over them, while all inclusive in theory, would not extend beyond federal matters in practice, particularly if the Emperor's rule is to remain moral within its ritual bounds. This tradition continues to the modern time. This condition is easily understandable for Americans whose Federal government is relatively progressive on certain issues of national standard with regard to community standards in backward sections of the union. Confucianism (Ru Jia), through the code of rites (li), seeks to govern the behavior and obligation of each person, each social class and each socio-political unit in society. Its purpose is to facilitate the smooth functioning and the perpetuation of the feudal system. Therefore, the power of the Emperor, though politically absolute, is not free from the constraints of behavior deemed proper by Confucian values for a moral sovereign, just as the authority of the local lords is similarly constrained. Issues of constitutionality in the U.S. political milieu become issues of proper rites and befitting morality in Chinese dynastic politics. To a large extent, this continues to the modern Chinese polity.
Buddhism (Fo Jiao) and Daoism (Dao Jiao), two major religions in Chinese society, have their separate hostile relationships to Confucianism (Ru Jia), which is more a socio-ethical value system concretized by a rigid tradition of rites than an organized religion. Buddhism, more widespread, enjoyed popular following among members of guizu (aristocracy) because it provided them with a direct religious experience independent of the traditional monopoly on Confucian ritual spirituality claimed by the Son of Heaven (Tianzi). The spiritual rites of Confucianism, inseparable from secular rites, had traditionally required guizu members to worship exclusively through the person of the sovereign, Son of Heaven, in accordance with a spiritual hierarchy in the celestial realm parallel to the feudal hierarchy in the secular world. Buddhism frees its devotees from this bondage of spiritual hierarchy and allows the faithful to bypass the monopolistic hold of the Son of Heaven on the quest for spiritual salvation. Ironically, Buddhism in China, while it undermines the spiritual authority of the Chinese secular system, derives its meticulous theological feudalism from the secular feudal traditions of Confucianism. Within an elaborate hierarchy of ranked boddhisattvas (gods or goddesses), Buddhist devotees often select a minor boddhisattva toward whom to shower their devotion rather than directly worshipping Buddha, who is considered as an emperor-figure too remote and preoccupied with global issues to pay attention to isolated local affairs. So Buddhist ecclesiastical structure is basically Confucian as is Buddhist church politics. Confucius (551-479 B.C.), during his lifetime, was ambivalent about the religious needs of the populace. "Respect the spirits and gods to keep them distant," he advised. He also declined a request to elucidate on the supernatural after-life by saying: "Not even knowing yet all there is to know about life, how can one have any knowledge of death?" It was classic evasion. Confucianism (Ru Jia) is in fact a secular, anti-religious force, at least in its philosophical constitution. It downgrades other-worldly metaphysics while it cherishes secular utility. It equates holiness with virtue rather than with divinity. According to Confucius, man's salvation lies in his morality rather than his piety. Confucian precepts assert that man's incentive for moral behavior is rooted in his quest for respect from his peers rather than for love from God. This morality abstraction finds its behavioral manifestation through a Code of Rites (Liji), which defines the proper roles and obligations of each individual within a rigidly hierarchical social structure. Confucians are guided by a spiritual satisfaction derived from winning immortal respect from posterity rather than by the promise of everlasting paradise after God's judgment. They put their faith in meticulous observance of secular rites, as opposed to Buddhists who worship through divine rituals of faith. Confucians tolerate God only if belief in his existence would strengthen man's morality. Without denying the existence of the supernatural, Confucians assert its irrelevance in this secular world. Since the existence of God is predicated on its belief by man, Confucianism, in advocating man's reliance of his own morality, indirectly denies the existence of God by denying its necessity. To preserve social order, Confucianism instead places emphasis on prescribed human behavior within the context of rigid social relationships through the observance of rituals. As righteousness precludes tolerance and morality permits no mercy, therein lay the oppressive roots of Confucianism. Most religions instill in their adherents fear of a God who is nevertheless forgiving, but Confucianism, by denying the necessity of God, denies the virtue of forgiveness. Faults are not forgiven until they are corrected, making forgiving an empty gesture.
Confucianism (Ru Jia) places faith in rule by men, albeit moral and virtuous men, based on rigid observation of rites in an anti-institutional context, in opposition to Legalism (Fa Jia) which places faith in institutions and law. There are Leninist aspects o this attitude in that Leninists believe in revolutionaries more than they do in revolution which they suspect to be susceptible to revisionism. The danger of Confucianism lies not in its aim to endow the virtuous with power, but in its tendency to label the powerful as virtuous. Confucianism, more a socio-political philosophy than a religion, distinguishes itself by preaching the required observation of an inviolable Code of Rites, the secular ritual compendium as defined by Confucius, in which tolerance is considered as decadence and mercy as weakness. Whereas Legalism (Fa Jia) advocates equality under the law without mercy or exception, Confucianism, though equally merciless, allows varying standards of social behavior in accordance with varying ritual stations. However, such ritual allowances are not to be construed as tolerance for human frailty, for which Confucianism has little use. St Augustine (354-430), who was born 905 years after Confucius, in systematizing Christian thought, defended the doctrines of original sin and the fall of man. He thus reaffirmed the necessity of God's grace for man's salvation, and further formulated the Church's authority as the sole guarantee of Christian faith. The importance of Augustine's contribution to cognition by Europeans of their need for Christianity and to their acceptance of the orthodoxy of the Catholic Church can be appreciated by contrasting his affirmative theological ideas to the anti-religious precepts of Confucius (551-479 B.C.). Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), who would be born 2,275 years after Confucius, would develop the theme of "Transcendental Dialectic" in his Critic of Pure Reason (1781). Kant would assert that all theoretical attempts to know things inherently, which he would call "nounena", beyond observable "phenomena", are bound to fail. Kant would show that the three great problems of metaphysics: God, free will and immortality, are insoluble by speculative thought, and their existence can neither be confirmed nor denied on theoretical grounds, nor can it be rationally demonstrated. In this respect, Kantian rationalism lies parallel to Confucian spiritual utilitarianism, though each proceeds from opposite premises. Confucius allowed belief in God only as a morality tool. Rationally, Kant would declare that the limits of reason only render proof elusive, they do not necessarily negate belief in the existence of God. Kant would go on to claim in his moral philosophy of categorical imperative that existence of morality requires belief in existence of God, free will and immortality, in contrast to the agnostic claims of Confucius. Buddhism (Fo Jiao), in its emphasis on a next life through rebirth after God's judgment, resurrects the necessity of God to the Chinese people. Mercy is all in Buddhist doctrine. Buddhist influence puts a human face on an otherwise austere Confucian culture. At the same time, Buddhist mercy tends to invite lawlessness in secular society, while Buddhist insistence on God's judgment on a person's secular behavior encroaches on the emperor's claim of totalitarian authority.
(part 3 and final to follow)
Henry C.K. Liu