On Fri, 27 Nov 1998 16:33:06 -0500 "Andrew Kliman"
<Andrew_Kliman at email.msn.com> writes:
>Doug,
>
>The passage,
>
>"The weak points in the abstract materialism of natural science,
>a materialism that excludes history and its process, are at once
>evident from the abstract and ideological conceptions of its
>spokesmen, whenever they venture beyond the bounds of their own
>speciality."
>
>is in a footnote at the beginning (2nd page) of _Capital_, Vol.
>I, Chap. 15, Machinery and Modern Industry.
>
>In the present case, the pomos are the ones who have ventured
>beyond the bounds of their own specialities, and their abstract
>and ideological conceptions of the natural sciences have been
>revealed by S & B.
>
>I haven't read the book, and I have little sympathy for Sokal's
>ontology -- the term "abstract materialism" is apt. But I have
>read a good deal of the prior debate on the "Sokal affair," and
>Sokal has certainly demonstrated his crucial points: the pomos
>in question (1) are guilty of confusing and conflating ontology
>and epistemology -- using the social construction of knowledge as
>"evidence" that reality is socially constructed, for instance,
>and (2) do not make sense when they discuss natural science.
Concerning point (1) if we are going to concern ourselves with ontologies isn't the issue one of trying to develop a critical realism which acknowledges the existence of an external physical reality and which defines truth as the correspondence of our ideas to external reality but which also recognizes that our cognition of external reality is always mediated through our ideas and theories about the world. Therefore, while it doesn't make too much sense to talk about the "social construction of reality" as such it is perfectly legitimate to talk about the social construct of our knowledge of the world since our cognitive practices like science are always social practices. Roy Bhaskar for instance has argued that for Marx, two epistemological themes predominated: (a) an emphasis on objectivity including the objectively
real nature of social reality and (b) an emphasis on the role of praxis in human cognition which leads to a recognition of the socially mediated and socially constructed character of our knowledge of the world. In Bhaskar's view to ignore either theme is likely to lead us astray. Unfortunately though, much of Bhaskar's own writing on Marxist philosophy tends to be impenetrable. However, in any case the problem with much pomo writing lies in the tendency to emphasize (b) at the expence of (a). It could be that Sokal perhaps falls into the opposite error but clearly the reason why his original hoaxing of _Social Text_ resonated as much as it did because it exposed the absurdities that many pomos fall into because of their denial or ignoring of (a).
Jim Farmelant
>
>The responses to Sokal have been dishonest and diversionary,
>evading these central points.
>
>
>Andrew ("Drewk") Kliman Home:
>Dept. of Social Sciences 60 W. 76th St., #4E
>Pace University New York, NY 10023
>Pleasantville, NY 10570
>(914) 773-3951 Andrew_Kliman at msn.com
>
>"... the *practice* of philosophy is itself *theoretical.* It is
>the *critique* that measures the individual existence by the
>essence, the particular reality by the Idea." -- K.M.
>
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