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>Global Intelligence Update
>Red Alert
>October 15, 1998
>
>Kosovo Crisis Sets Template for New Russian Politics
>
>Though it continues to suffer from economic collapse and domestic
>political turmoil, Russia has rallied behind one issue, the
>Kosovo crisis, setting the mold for both internal and external
>Russian politics for some time to come.  The United States is
>crediting the threat of NATO action with forcing Yugoslav
>President Slobodan Milosevic into accepting a diplomatic
>resolution to the Kosovo crisis, claiming that the threat of
>military action made use of military force unnecessary.  However,
>it remains to be seen whether anything was really achieved in
>Kosovo -- as the fox was thrown out of the coop after it already
>killed the hen -- and Milosevic has already begun to make good on
>his threat to take vengeance against the intervening foreigners
>by targeting their allies in Belgrade, the independent press and
>rights groups.  Much more important than the outcome in
>Yugoslavia, however, is how NATO's standoff with Milosevic has
>played in Moscow.
>
>Divided over every other policy issue, Russian politicians have
>come together to challenge NATO intervention in Serbia.  Even the
>most Western oriented have insisted that only the UN Security
>Council has the right to authorize military intervention in
>Yugoslavia, while the Communists have warned of the resumption of
>the Cold War and radical firebrand Viktor Ilyukhin has gone so
>far as to threaten the lives of Western diplomats in Moscow.
>Leonid Ivashov, the head of the Russian Defense Ministry's main
>directorate for international military cooperation, told Russian
>Public TV on October 13 that "the operation which is being
>prepared against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a
>provocation by the alliance's military forces against Russia,
>too.  Yes, this will only create a precedent.  Other countries in
>Europe, the CIS and Russia included, could find themselves the
>next targets of NATO action."  Ivashov said that, if NATO
>launched strikes against Yugoslavia, Russia would resume full
>military cooperation with Belgrade, including violating the arms
>sale embargo against Yugoslavia.  In addition, Ivashov claimed
>that Russia would respond to any attack on Yugoslavia with "a
>change in partnership with NATO" and a search for "possible new
>military allies to maintain the necessary military balance."
>Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov announced that Russia's relations
>with NATO may have to be reevaluated, and Russia already recalled
>its representatives to NATO on October 12.
>
>The factions in the Russian Duma have also united over the Kosovo
>issue.  Duma Chairman Gennady Seleznev said that NATO should
>reconsider its actions in Kosovo because a military attack would
>give "an impetus for the start of a cold war."  Seleznev
>announced that the Duma has decided to send a four-member
>parliamentary delegation to Yugoslavia, which will stay in the
>country until the termination of NATO ultimatum.  Duma Deputy
>Speaker Vladimir Ryzhkov announced that the DUMA is planning to
>pass a resolution calling any NATO strike on Yugoslavia an
>"unmitigated threat to the Russian Federation."
>
>Seleznev also issued a pan-Slavic appeal to Russia's "friends and
>allies", including Belarus and Ukraine, to also send delegations
>to Yugoslavia.  As usual, Belarus is way ahead of Moscow on this.
>On October 12, the Belarusian news agency "Belapan" reported that
>200 Belarusian citizens stand ready to go to Yugoslavia as
>volunteers to combat NATO intervention in Kosovo.  Ukraine has
>been more restrained, with Foreign Minister Tarasyuk claiming "it
>is only the UN Security Council which has the right to take a
>decision on the use of force."  Ukraine also offered to
>participate in OSCE monitoring of the situation in Kosovo.
>
>Russian Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov declared that "an
>attack on Yugoslavia with would be equivalent to a declaration of
>war against Russia."  He reinforced the Russia military's
>warning, saying "in the event of an attack we would support
>Yugoslavia with all our forces."  Zyuganov echoed Seleznev's
>assertion that, if NATO carries out an attack on Yugoslavia, the
>Russian Parliament will revoke all cooperation agreements with
>NATO and withdraw from the weapons embargo against Yugoslavia.
>
>The radical Viktor Ilyukhin, Chairman of the Duma's Security
>Committee and leader of the Movement for Support of the Army,
>Defense Industry and Military Science, said on October 13 that
>the Movement was "ready at the first call to send military
>specialists to Yugoslavia to organize resistance in the event of
>NATO strikes against Serbia."  Moreover, Ilyukhin threatened the
>West by saying that "in view of growing anti-NATO and anti-
>American moods in Russia, it is impossible to guarantee that no
>hostile acts will be carried out against diplomats and other
>representatives of NATO member states working in Moscow.  NATO's
>terrorist methods in relation to Yugoslavia may boomerang and hit
>those who initiate them."
>
>Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov on October 14 praised
>Russian unity over Kosovo.  He said that "It is the first time
>that I observe such a situation where on such an important
>international problem Russia has spoken with a single voice.
>Ivanov credited Russian unity with averting a NATO strike on
>Yugoslavia.  Kosovo has given Russia's political factions a
>source of unity, something they will remember even if the
>situation in Yugoslavia calms down.  Pan-Slavism works.
>Assertive foreign policy works.  Confrontation with NATO works.
>These themes unite Russia internally, help rebuild ties within
>its former empire, and help reestablish Russia as a great power.
>
>But talk, as they say, is cheap.  More alarming than this
>rhetoric, however, have been reports suggesting that Russia has
>already violated the arms embargo against Yugoslavia, and has
>provided the Serbs with military aid.  On October 7, the Times of
>London reported that Russia has supplied the Yugoslav army with
>new warheads, fuses, and sensors for its SA-6 surface-to-air
>missiles, a charge that Russian state arms export company
>Rosovooruzheniye has denied.  According to the International
>Institute for Strategic Studies, Yugoslavia has eight surface-to-
>air missile batteries at eight sites, as well as 100 other
>missiles.  According to Jane's, the Yugoslav army has an unknown
>number of SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-8, SA-9, SA-11, and SA-13 towed or
>mobile surface-to-air missile systems, as well as a variety of
>man-portable missiles.
>
>However, according to an unconfirmed report we have received from
>a source in St. Petersburg, Yugoslavia may have acquired far more
>than just an upgrade for its SA-6 missiles.  According to our
>source, a few weeks ago Russia shipped 50 2S6M "Tunguska" self-
>propelled air-defense systems to the Serbs.  The Tunguska is one
>of Russia's newest weapons systems, mounting two 30mm
>antiaircraft guns and up to eight 9M311 (SA-19) two-stage,
>hypersonic, low to medium altitude surface-to-air missiles.  The
>Tunguska is reportedly in service only with the CIS and India.
>
>If this report of deployment to Yugoslavia is true, it would
>indicate a serious threat to either air-strikes or reconnaissance
>against the Serbs.  It would also demonstrate that Russia has
>crossed the line, putting its missiles where its mouth is.
>Interestingly, on October 9, ITAR-TASS cited an anonymous senior
>Defense Ministry official as saying Yugoslavia now has both
>passive and active defense mechanisms to either destroy or
>misdirect Tomahawk cruise missiles.  Finally, if the Tunguskas
>were not flown into Belgrade, then this report would indicate
>that Russia now has the tacit backing of either Romania or
>Bulgaria, as the weapons would have had to come in by rail.  On
>October 12, the state secretary of the Russian-backed breakaway
>Dnestr region of Moldova denied reports that Russian troops and
>equipment were being shipped to Yugoslavia via the Dnestr region.
>Valeriy Litsky claimed that, such activity could not be occurring
>because it would have to cross the territory of Ukraine, Moldova,
>and Romania.
>
>Regardless of the veracity of the various arms transfer reports,
>interesting though they may be, the real story is the fact that
>Russia's response to the Kosovo crisis has set the pattern for
>Russian foreign and domestic politics for the forseeable future.
>Russia has united to reaffirm its claim to its traditional sphere
>of influence.  Pan-Slavism and opposition to NATO and the West
>can serve as a unifying force to stabilize Russia's internal
>disputes, to attract Russia's CIS allies into closer ties, and to
>begin the process of reestablishing Russia as a regional, if not
>a great power.
>
>One voice that has been relatively weak has been that of
>embattled Russian President Boris Yeltsin.  Though he declared
>his firm opposition to NATO strikes on October 9, Russia's
>nationalists and communists have claimed that weak Yeltsin
>leadership allowed the U.S. and the West to assert hegemony.
>Yeltsin is even losing control of national policy regarding
>Kosovo.  Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Yakushkin was forced to rebut
>Defense Ministry statements on the issue, claiming only Yeltsin
>and the Foreign Ministry could make official policy.  Kosovo may
>be Yeltsin's undoing, as it has united and revitalized his
>opponents.  However, Yeltsin has always been an opportunist, and
>he may yet see his salvation in seizing this issue and being more
>nationalistic and aggressive than his opponents.  What that would
>look like is frightening to contemplate.
>
>