http://cwihp.si.edu/cwihplib.nsf/e7b8938c6eedaba4852564a7007a887a/577262b2024c7b d9852564bb006a024a?OpenDocument
Ah, here they are. Stalin seems to have kept Kim Il Sung on a very, very short leash until January 1950. Only on January 30 does Stalin say that he is "ready to help," and only after that does the flow of arms and advisors to Kim Il Sung increase...
To Attack, or Not to Attack?: Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War
by Kathryn Weathersby
The historical record of the Korean War has recently been greatly enriched by Russian President Boris Yeltsin's presentation to President Kim Young-Sam of South Korea, during the latter's visit to Moscow in June 1994, of 216 previously classified high level Soviet documents on the war from Russian archives. The collection totals 548 pages and includes documents from the period 1949-1953. Most of the documents are ciphered telegrams between Moscow and Pyongyang, and between Moscow and Beijing. The collection also includes notes of conversations among key figures in North Korea, the USSR, and China; letters from Kim Il Sung to Stalin; and resolutions of the Soviet Politburo and Council of Ministers. All of the documents are from either the Presidential Archive or the Foreign Ministry archives and, with a few exceptions,1 were unavailable to scholars prior to their presentation to South Korea. In July 1994, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea released Korean translations of these documents and in November 1994 the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF) began granting permission to scholars to read photocopies of the collection.2
Unfortunately, these records represent only a portion of the top level documents on the war in Soviet archives, several of which (such as the KGB and Defense Ministry archives) remain largely inaccessible to scholars. The narrative of events we can construct from these materials still has significant gaps, especially for the several months immediately preceding the North Korean attack on 25 June 1950. Nonetheless, these new sources reveal a great deal more than has previously been known about the relationship between the Soviet Union and North Korea, the decision-making surrounding the attack on South Korea, the role of Mao Zedong in all stages of the war, the formulation of the communist positions at the armistice negotiations, and the role of Stalin's death in bringing the war to an end.
These documents, when examined together with the larger body of records declassified in recent years by Russian archives, thus shed light on several questions central to the history of the Cold War (e.g., the efficacy of American threats to use nuclear weapons in Korea) and a full analysis of them requires a full-length study. This essay will offer a small sample of these new sources, presenting translations of and brief commentaries on seven documents from 1949 and 1950 that illuminate with significantly greater specificity than the 1966 Soviet Foreign Ministry background report presented in an earlier Bulletin3 the question of when, how, and by whom the decision was made to launch a military assault on South Korea.
Document #1, the minutes of a conversation between Stalin and Kim Il Sung in Moscow on 5 March 1949, sets the stage, revealing in a most intimate way the nature of the relationship between Kim's newly created state, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and its Soviet patron. The conversation recorded in this report was the first and only formal discussion between Stalin and the official North Korean delegation that travelled to Moscow in March 1949 to conclude the DPRK's initial agreements with the USSR.4 This rare and intriguing glimpse of Stalin handling a petitioning vassal shows, above all, the importance to both leaders of matters of economic development and material supply....
Furthermore, to an unusual degree, North Korea was dependent on the Soviet Union for technical expertise.5 Japanese colonial policy had permitted only a small number of Koreans to gain higher education or management experience, and the politics of the occupation from 1945-48 prompted most northerners who possessed such skills to flee to the South. With regard to questions of the origin of the Korean War, these economic and demographic circumstances meant that, for the most basic and profound reasons, in the years prior to and during the 1950-53 war, North Korea was simply unable to take any significant action without Soviet approval, regardless of the nationalist inclinations of the DPRK leadership.6
Document #1 also reveals that in March 1949 Stalin had a strong interest in the balance of military forces between North and South Korea, but was far from approving a military campaign against the South.... [I]t appears that during another conversation between Stalin and Kim in March 1949, which may have occurred during a dinner or reception, Kim asked Stalin about the possibility of attacking South Korea and was rebuffed....
Document #4 (a ciphered telegram to Moscow from the Soviet charge d'affaires in Pyongyang dated 14 September 1949) reports Kim Il Sung's rather unconvincing response to the Kremlin's questions. It also conveys the opinion of the USSR embassy in Pyongyang that the limited offensive operation outlined by Kim was inadvisable at that time. Since the DPRK army was not sufficiently strong, such an operation would probably turn into a prolonged civil war, which would be disadvantageous both militarily and politically. Moreover, as the embassy quite correctly forecast, a "drawn out civil war" initiated by an attack from the North would give the United States an opportunity to intervene effectively, "more decisively than they did in China," and in general to agitate against the Soviet Union. Under existing conditions, the embassy concluded, an attack on the South would be "correct" only if the North Koreans could be certain that the war would end quickly....
The final document presented below is Stalin's telegram to Shtykov on 30 January 1950, giving his reply to Kim Il Sung's latest entreaties. This is one of the most interesting documents of the entire collection because it reveals so bluntly Stalin's strategic thinking and his mode of operation with subordinate rulers. Stalin cautiously stated that he was "ready to help" Kim but that the matter "needs large preparation" and "must be organized so that there would not be too great a risk." He then, in perfect mafioso style, "requested" that Kim provide the Soviet Union with at least 25,000 tons of lead per year...
[T]he documents presented to South Korea flesh out and substantiate the account given in the 1966 report published earlier in the CWIHP Bulletin. They show that the initiative for the North Korean attack on South Korea on 25 June 1950 was clearly Kim Il Sung's. Kim requested Stalin's approval several times in 1949 before the Soviet leader finally agreed in early 1950 to support a North Korean offensive. These documents vividly reveal Kim Il Sung's dependence on the Soviet Union and at the same time his ability to propose actions that he desired....
Kim was nonetheless an important, if not entirely independent, historical actor in his own right. Of course, Stalin did not approve Kim's plan in 1950 simply because Kim was persistent and fervent in his appeals. Stalin based his decision on his own calculations of relative cost and benefit to the Soviet Union, as he did in 1949 when he rejected Kim's appeals. The question that then remains is what made Stalin change his mind in January 1950 about the advisability of a military offensive on the Korean peninsula. Unfortunately, the documentary record available thus far does not answer that question clearly; it reveals only that Stalin considered it possible in early 1950 to support Kim's plan because of the "changed international situation."
Document I: Stalin's Meeting with Kim Il Sung, Moscow, 5 March 1949
5 March 1949. Notes of the conversation between Stalin and a governmental delegation from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea headed by Kim Il Sung. The meeting began at 8:00 p.m. Present were A.Ia. Vyshinsky,15 T.F. Shtykov,16 Kim I.M. (Translator). On the Korean side: Pak Hon-yong,17 Hong Myong-hui,18 Chong Chun-taek,19 Chang Shi-u,20 Paek Nam Un,21 Kim Chong-ju,22 the Korean ambassador to the USSR Chu Yong-ha, Mun Il (Translator). Stalin asks the members of the delegation how their trip was, was it difficult on the journey? Kim Il Sung thanks the Soviet Government for its attention to them and says that they arrived safely. Stalin asks how they travelled--by railroad or by air. Kim Il Sung answers that they came by railroad. Stalin asks whether they became ill on the way. Kim Il Sung answers that they were healthy. Stalin suggests that they proceed to business and asks what will be the questions. Kim Il Sung says that after the liberation of Korea by Soviet troops, the Soviet Government and the Soviet Army rendered aid to Korea in the matter of economic development, in the matter of the development of Korea along the democratic path, and that the Korean government understands that without further economic and cultural aid from the Soviet Union it will be difficult for the DPRK to restore and develop its national economy and culture. The assistance of the Soviet Union is required for the further development of the Korean economy and culture. Stalin asks what kind of aid. Kim Il Sung answers--economic and cultural. Stalin asks what precisely is needed. Kim Il Sung says that they have confirmed a two year plan for the restoration and development of the national economy. They need economic assistance to fulfill this plan and to strengthen the foundation of the economy. They need machines, equipment and spare parts for industry, communications, transport and also for other branches of the national economy. They also need technical assistance: sending Soviet specialists to Korea, drafting plans for the construction of new objects (factories and plants), conducting geological exploratory work. Stalin asks what kind of objects? Kim answers, e.g., irrigation structures [at] Anju, the construction of which they have now moved toward, but they do not have enough specialists, and also the restoration and completion of the Seisin metallurgical plant, repair of the Sufun hydroelectric plant and others. Stalin asks if there is iron ore in Korea. Kim answers that there is very much iron ore in Korea. Stalin says that it is possible to render this assistance, and it is also possible to provide specialists. Kim indicates that until now trade between the two countries has been conducted successfully, but in the future, for the fulfillment of the two year plan, they need to import from the Soviet Union equipment, steam engines, electric locomotives, spare parts and equipment for the textile industry. But exports from Korea will not cover the imports, therefore they need credit from the Soviet government. Stalin says "Fine" and asks in what amount they need credit. Kim answers from 40 to 50 million American dollars. Stalin--fine, what else? Kim Il Sung answers that for convenient transport and for strengthening the economic ties between our countries it is necessary to build a railroad from Aoji to Kraskino. Stalin asks where this is and how many kilometers is the distance of this railroad. Shtykov reports that this railroad should be built from the station at Kraskino (Soviet territory) to the station at Aoji (Korean territory) for a total distance of 58 km, of which 10 km is on the territory of Korea and 48 km is on the territory of the USSR. Stalin says that we will think about it and asks if there are some more questions. Kim Il Sung indicates the necessity of establishing air communications between Korea and USSR and says that they do not yet have their own transport planes and no pilots, but an air link is needed. Stalin asks aren't there Russian planes in Korea. Kim answers that after the withdrawal of Soviet troops Soviet aviation units and planes were not left in Korea. He indicates that they now have begun the preparation of their own pilots. Stalin asks if they have their own planes. Shtykov reports that they have their own training aviation regiment and they have training and military planes, but they do not have transport planes. Stalin asks how many planes they have. Shtykov answers that they have 48 military and 19 training planes. Stalin indicates that we now have fewer planes in a regiment, that we have lowered the number of planes in a regiment and asks what other questions they have. Kim Il Sung indicates the necessity of cultural ties with the USSR. It is hoped, for example, that Soviet teachers could be sent to Korea for work in Korean institutions of higher education, that Korean students could be sent to the Soviet Union for study, that Korean specialists could be sent to the USSR for practical work in production technology, that teaching programs and literature for institutions of higher education and technical schools could be sent to Korea and that there be exchanges of cultural and artistic figures. Stalin asks if there is an agreement with the Soviet Union on these questions. Kim indicates that earlier there was such an agreement. Now, after the formation of the government, there is no such agreement. Stalin indicates that it is possible to do this, but [sending] specialists and students will be difficult, since they do not know the language. Kim Il Sung says that instruction in Russian language has been organized in all schools and institutions of higher education in Korea. It is necessary to send teachers to Korea from the Soviet Union. Stalin says that it will be difficult for them because of not knowing the Korean language. Kim Il Sung indicates that there is not a sufficient number of qualified teachers in Korea, that Soviet teachers are already working in Korea and that they have translators, through whom it is possible to conduct pedagogical work. Stalin answers that it is possible to send teachers. Kim says that it is necessary to conclude an agreement on all the above-indicated questions, specifically about economic cooperation and the broadening of trade, a trade agreement, an agreement about technical assitance from the Soviet Union and about cultural ties. Stalin asks if Kim has thought about credit or a loan. Kim answers that he has thought about it and that they want to receive credit. Stalin answers that it is possible to do that and asks for what period they wish to receive credit. Kim answers that if credit will be given in the amount of 50 million dollars, then it will be paid back from 1951 until 1954. Stalin asks when will credit be paid. Kim answers that [it will be paid] beginning with 1951 to 1954. Stalin asks how they want to receive credit, at one time or in installments over the course of 1949, 1950, 1951. Kim answers that they wish to receive credit in 1949. If this is not possible for some reason, then in the course of 1949 and the first half of 1950. Stalin indicates that we cannot do this. You need machines, but machines must be ordered and manufactured. This requires time. Kim indicates that they need automobiles, steam engines, equipment for the textile industry, and oil, and that it is hoped that they would receive this during this year. Stalin answers that in one year it is not possible to do this and asks in what currency they wish to receive credit. Kim answers in American dollars. Stalin answers that we do not now calculate in dollars but we calculate in rubles and indicated that soon one dollar will equal 5 rubles. Stalin proposed to present equipment and machines in credit in the course of three years in equal portions and indicated that during these three years they will not pay credit, but in the course of the following three years they must produce payment, also in equal portions. For example: credit is given in 1949, 1950, 1951, and perhaps 1952, and payment of credit will begin from the fourth year in equal portions. In such a way, credit will be given out over 6 years. We render assistance to the countries of the peoples' democracies according to these principles. We take the following percentages for the credit received: 2% yearly, if the state has recovered [from the war], and 1% if the state has still not recovered. Moreover, close trade in goods between the countries will be continued without credit. This order will be established by agreement. Stalin asked if they have any people who can begin work on drafting these agreements. Kim answers that they have such people. Stalin indicates that we can give credit in the sum of 200 million rubles, i.e. 40 million dollars. We would give more, but now we are not able. Kim says that they agree. Stalin asks if they have any automobiles. Kim answers that they do not have their own cars, they would like to acquire them in the Soviet Union. Stalin says that it is possible to provide cars. It is possible also to provide planes. Shtykov says that the Korean Government wants to receive not only planes, but also to have a joint share aviation society and to build a railroad. Stalin answers that it is possible to do this. As concerns the construction of the railroad, we will review this question, but there is not a sufficient work force in the Soviet Union for the construction of a railroad, and asks if they have a work force among Koreans. Kim answers that they do have a work force among Koreans. Kim says that in the south of Korea there are still American troops and that intrigues against North Korea by the reactionaries are increasing, that they have infantry troops but sea defense almost does not exist. The help of the Soviet Union is needed in this. Stalin asks how many American troops are in South Korea. Kim answers that there are up to 20,000 men. Shtykov--approximately 15-20 thousand men. Stalin asks if there is a national Korean army in the south. Kim answers that there is, the number is around 60,000 men. Stalin asks if this number includes only regular army or also police. Kim answers that it includes only regular army. Stalin (joking) asks, and you are afraid of them? Kim--No, we are not afraid, but we would like to have naval units. Stalin asks which army is stronger--north or south. Pak Hon-yong answers that the northern army is stronger. Stalin asks if there are dry docks in Korea left by the Japanese, for example, in Seisin or in other places of Korea. Kim answers that there are none. Shtykov reports that there are dry docks, but only small ones. Stalin says that it is possible to render assistance in this, and that Korea needs to have military planes. Stalin asks are they penetrating into the South Korean army, do they have their own people there? Pak Hon-yong answers that they are penetrating, but so far they are not revealing themselves there. Stalin says that this is correct, that it is not necessary to reveal themselves now and indicates that the southerners also, apparently, are sending their people into the army of the north and that they need [to exercise] caution. Stalin asks what has happened along the 38th parallel. Is it true that several points have fallen to the southerners and have been seized, and then these points were taken back? Kim answers that they are taking into account that the southerners can send their own people into the [North Korean] army, and that they are taking the necessary measures. Kim reported that there was a clash with the southerners in Kangwon province at the 38th parallel. Their police were not sufficiently armed at that time. When regular units approached, the southerners retreated. Stalin asks--did they drive away the southerners or did they leave themselves. Kim answers that as a result of the battle they drove away the southerners, threw them across the border of the country. Stalin asks if they have a military school. Kim answers that they do. Stalin asks if there is a pilot school. Shtykov reports that they have a training-military aviation regiment. Stalin remembers that the last time two came to Moscow, and asks, appealing to Pak Hon-yong, if he was the second. Pak Hon-yong confirms this. Stalin says that Kim and Pak have both filled out and that it is difficult to recognize them now. Kim says that they have a military school, but no military academy and that among the officer corps of the Korean army there is no one who has completed a military academy. He asks permission to send Korean officers to the Military Academy of the USSR for training. Stalin asks wasn't there such permission. Kim answers that there was not. Stalin says that it is possible to permit it. Kim says that they do not have any more questions. Chong Chun-taek asks if it will be possible to send Soviet specialists to Korea and Korean specialists for practical training in production technology to the USSR. Stalin answers that they have already spoken on that question. Soviet specialists may be sent to Korea and Korean specialists may be received in the USSR. Stalin asks where the Koreans get cotton. Kim answers that they want to receive cotton from the Soviet Union. Last year they received already 3,000 tons. Stalin says, joking, that we ourselves want to receive cotton from Korea. Stalin asks if they have trade relations with other countries: with Japan, China, Philippines. Kim answers that they have such relations with China, but China is at war and therefore they cannot conduct regular trade [with China]. Stalin asks--and what about with other countries? Kim answers that they have not traded with other countries. They conduct trade with Hong Kong, but unofficially and on a case by case basis. Stalin asks aren't there trading societies among them of their own traders. Kim Il Sung answers that such a society exists. This society conducts trade in the main with Hong Kong, with the city of Dalny23 and with China. Stalin says that it is necessary to have such a society, there is nothing wrong with it. The national bourgeoisie exists; among the bourgeoisie there are, apparently, also good people, it is necessary to help them. Let them trade and deliver goods, there is nothing bad in this. I do not have questions. Stalin, turning to Vyshinsky, asks if he has questions. Vyshinsky answers that he doesn't have any. Hong Myong-hui thanks Comrade Stalin for the reception. Stalin in his turn thanks the delegation for coming and for the conversation. The conversation lasted for an hour and 15 minutes. Shtykov and translator Kim I.M. took notes. [Source: Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, (hereafter AVP RF), Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, listy 10-20; all translations by Kathryn Weathersby.]