> Wouldn't large scale economic revival be in the political interest of
> the ruling parties of the major European players when the Euro takes its
> place on stage? Moreover, isn't it possible that the Euro itself could be
> the target of attacks as a weaker than expected (or hoped for) currency?
Yes to question #1, no to question #2. Unlike the US, the EU still has a world-class industrial base, so they have more to gain from "real world" growth, as opposed to speculative bubbles (also note that, per capita, the EU has actually grown faster than the US throughout the 1990s, thanks to things like social democracy and powerful unions). The EU is self-financing, so they don't depend on capital flows to fuel their economy (unlike the US). And against what currency would the euro lose value? The overbubbled, highly leveraged, totally overvalued US dollar? I'm sure the Japanese yen and related East Asian currencies are as undervalued vis-a-vis the EU as they are against the dollar, but their economies are geared towards industrial accumulation and world export markets, too, so they have a real incentive to avoid overvaluation.
The euro will indeed happen in one form or another; the only question is whether countries like Sweden and Spain will receive enough subsidies from a pro-growth, pro-worker EU Parliament to keep internal demand going strong, and prevent a monetarist collapse in late 1999 or 2000, or whenever the next cyclical recession is due. IF they don't, then they'll likely devalue, resulting in a somewhat smaller euro than was planned (something like Germany, Austria, Finland, Benelux, France, Italy, Ireland, which is still a huge chunk of the world economy). But sooner or later all those Continential currencies are going to go the way of the D-mark, because the "real world" economic integration has already happened.
-- Dennis