Mikhail Gorbachev on the Russian crisis (FWD from The Nation)

James Farmelant farmelantj at juno.com
Tue Sep 22 15:39:47 PDT 1998


Selected Editorial

Russia Needs a Change

The unfolding Russian crisis is not just a "bump on the road" of

the democratic, free-market reforms that are supposed to have been

under way in Russia since 1991. The crisis goes to the very heart

of the policy course chosen by Boris Yeltsin seven years ago. In

fact, it marks the total failure of that course.

It is true that the situation in the country seven years ago was

very difficult. The mistakes my government made in economic policy

during the years of perestroika, coupled with deliberate efforts by

perestroika's opponents to shatter the country's financial system,

had brought about the collapse of the consumer market. The attempt

by the reactionaries to turn back the clock, in the failed August

1991 coup, triggered a sharp backlash, with the other Soviet

republics running away from the Union center. Still, there was a

clear choice--either to move forward firmly but prudently, step by

step, reforming both the economy and the Soviet Union, or to plunge

into a reckless political and economic adventure.

Yeltsin wanted the latter course, not only because he always

preferred "strong medicine" but also because irresponsible

radicalism, or what others would call extremism, was his shortcut

to power and one-man rule. For that, he was prepared to go a long

way, even to the point of breaking up the country. Prosperity was

right around the corner, Yeltsin told the people: Once Russia got

rid of the burden of other republics and reformed the economy via

"shock therapy," it would take just two or three years to become

one of the world's most prosperous countries. And the sad truth is

that people believed and supported him.

Yet it was this decision to break up the Union and subject the

economy to shock therapy that predetermined Yeltsin's failure. The

root cause of the current collapse lies there rather than in the

"intrigues of the opposition" or the consequences of the Asian

economic crisis.

Yeltsin's policies abruptly broke the production and market

integration that linked Russia and other former Soviet republics

much more closely than even the European Union. As the republics

pursued uncoordinated financial and economic policies, their

ability to reform successfully was undermined. Precipitate

decontrol of prices led to a sharp decline in real incomes and made

people's savings, including those of the large middle class,

worthless. Opening up the markets to imported products at a time

when most Russian producers were not competitive destroyed the

chances of many industries to restructure and "marketize"

themselves. As for privatization, it quickly degenerated into a

gigantic scheme to grab and steal what had been built during the

previous decades.

Yeltsin insisted on pushing through his ultra-radical policies,

whatever the cost to the country. He was, increasingly, in

confrontation with large sections of Russian society and in

defiance of Russian culture, which rejected such an approach to

reform. Violence was, therefore, inherent in Yeltsin's policies,

and it was inevitable that blood would be shed. The shelling of the

elected Russian Parliament in October 1993 and the bloodbath in

Chechnya will remain an indelible stain on Yeltsin's record. They

have also stained the West, which in effect endorsed those

atrocities.

Today, Yeltsin is trying to cling to power. Once again, the West

seems ready to throw him a lifeline of moral and political support.

Visiting Moscow, Bill Clinton repeated the mantra about the need to

stay the course of reforms--the "reforms" that have impoverished

millions of Russians and have imposed a second-rate status on

Russia in international politics. Many in Russia are wondering if

this is indeed what the West wants. Is the hidden agenda behind US

policy to weaken Russia and then use its weakness for its own

purposes?

Surely it would be much better to let Russia work things out

according to its own traditions and possibilities without tying the

future of reforms to an authoritarian regime and its leader, as

well as to Western dogmas and conditions. Russia has the strength

and the resources to overcome this crisis. We must, as part of any

new plan, guarantee private deposits in failing Russian banks, a

move that would restore trust in the banking system. If creditor

countries and international institutions would join with our banks

in developing methods of backing such guarantees, that effort would

also build trust in the West's intentions.

But Russia can end the crisis only if the ruling regime is

replaced. For now, there is still a chance to make it happen by

constitutional means. Today Boris Yeltsin is the main obstacle to

ending the crisis. The difficult and painful decisions that are now

necessary will be supported by Russian society only if it trusts

the authorities. But neither the president nor the Duma has such

trust now. Hence the need for early elections of both president and

Parliament. The confirmation of Yevgeny Primakov as the new Prime

Minister has created favorable conditions for holding them.

Primakov is capable of keeping the situation from exploding during

the period needed for preparing and holding the elections. The new,

credible leadership that will emerge from the elections will

certainly have to deal with a terrible legacy. The dangers that we

are facing are many, but Russia will not go back to the

totalitarian past.

Eventually, it will find its own way--quite different from the road

to which it was pushed by the power-hungry politician Boris

Yeltsin, and which was supported uncritically by the West.

Mikhail Gorbachev

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Mikhail Gorbachev was President of the Soviet Union.

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