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<H2>
Peril of rejecting nuclear `no first use'</H2>
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<BODY>THE press reports of the new German government's recent interest
in the question of ``first use of nuclear weaponry'' in Nato policies
bring to my memory certain happenings of a period just short of half a
century ago.
<P>
At the end of 1949, as I ended my period of duty as director of
General George Marshall's policy planning staff, the US government was
just confronting the question of whether to proceed to the development
of the hydrogen bomb to replace the less destructive one we had used
against the two Japanese cities. Robert Oppenheimer and I, having both
been involved with certain of the inner-governmental discussions of
this subject, both felt that before taking this fateful step, our
government should pause and ask itself where the adoption and
cultivation of this new form of weaponry might lead us. We both
recognised that if weapons of mass destruction were to be built into
our regular military posture, we might find ourselves deeply committed
to this sort of imagined warfare, and our commitment might stand in
the way of further progress in the elimination of such weapons.
<P>
In the first days of January 1950, I wrote a personal letter to the
new secretary of state, Dean Acheson, describing the question as I
then saw it: Would we develop this weapon and build our defence
posture around it? Or would we regard it as something to be held in
reserve for use only in response to a nuclear attack against us,
freeing us to go as far as the other nuclear powers were prepared to
go in efforts to eliminate this form of weaponry from international
arsenals?
<P>
Our public position, I wrote, should be this: ``We deplore the
existence of all weapons of indiscriminate mass destruction. We regret
that we were ever obliged to make use of one. We hope never to have to
do so again. We do not propose ever to do so, unless we are forced to
it by the use of such weapons against us. Meanwhile, we remain
prepared to go very far, to show considerable confidence in others,
and to accept a certain risk for ourselves, in order to achieve
international agreement on (the removal of such weapons) from
international arsenals; for we can think of nothing more dangerous
than a continued international competition in their development.''
<P>
I argued that no victory or security would be won for our people by
the sort of destruction these devices were capable of working. The
results they could produce would mean at best only a deterioration of
civilisation for people everywhere, including ourselves. The victories
that mattered would never be real victories unless they involved
changes leading toward greater tolerance and forbearance and
hopefulness in the minds of men, and such changes could never be
brought about by sheer destruction, particularly the destruction of
innocent life on so vast and indiscriminate a scale.
<P>
I can recall no reply from Mr Acheson, but some days later, on 15
January 1950, President Truman announced our government's intention to
proceed with developing the new nuclear weapon.
<P>
Were I to be asked how the statements of that letter might appear to
me today, I would have to say that not only do I stand by every word,
I also consider their reasoning to have been richly confirmed,
reinforced and strengthened by the events of the intervening
half-century.
<P>
I commend the insight and courage shown by the new German government
in bringing this subject once more to international attention. I hope
that all the major nuclear powers will ask themselves today where our
rejection of the principle of ``no first use'' has led us to date, and
what effect it promises to have on the future development of
international security.
<P>
<i>George Kennan is a retired American diplomat and historian</i>.
<P>
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