A moral imperialism that dares to speak its name

[Michael Pollak]

[Influential man calls for a new Berlin conference . . .]
   
                       Paris, Thursday, April 1, 1999
                                      
The Solution:A Pan-European Peace Conference for the Balkans
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   By William G. Hyland The Washington Post
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   WASHINGTON - The president has put America in a virtually impossible
   position. It cannot escalate without grave risks.
   
   If the president and NATO truly want to halt ethnic cleansing, the
   alliance will have to put in a large ground force, or at least mount a
   credible threat to do so. A conventional ground war in the mountains
   of Albania and Kosovo will quickly degenerate into a quagmire.
   
   On the other hand, the United States and NATO cannot retreat without
   humiliation that could have dangerous consequences not only in the
   Balkans but in Europe and even in Asia.
   
   The only real alternative is to revive international diplomacy.
   
   The Clinton administration's so-called peace plan is dead. It would be
   insanity to turn Kosovo back over to lethal Serbian rule, no matter
   what the degree of ''autonomy.'' It is also implausible to introduce a
   NATO peacekeeping contingent on Serbia's borders after bombing that
   country.
   
   The way out is for Washington to recognize that the problem is
   preeminently a political one; military pressure will help but cannot
   be the solution. Second should be the recognition that the crisis is
   no longer a Balkan affair but a pan-European problem that cannot be
   solved by NATO alone.
   
   Yugoslavia has become the sick man of Europe. It cannot be put back
   together; but the European powers could reconstitute a security system
   that might satisfy contending nationalist forces. President Bill
   Clinton should take a page from history and do what European leaders
   did in the last century: convene a European summit conference, as the
   Great Powers did in 1878 at the Congress of Berlin.
   
   Then as now, the purpose would be to redraw the map of the Balkans and
   avoid an all-out war. Not just the United States but all of Europe,
   including Russia and Ukraine, should devise a peace plan for the
   Balkans.
   
   Kosovo is the most urgent issue and obviously will have to be a
   central element. There is no geographical or historical reason to
   treat Kosovo as sacrosanct; it will have to be partitioned. One part,
   probably the largest, should become independent. But for some defined
   period it should not be permitted to join Albania.
   
   The other part of Kosovo, along the Serbian border, should remain
   under Yugoslav sovereignty, but as a demilitarized security zone. The
   capital, Pristina, might become a free city under UN auspices for,
   say, a few years. Some military forces would have to be inserted into
   independent Kosovo to man the partition line, to protect the Serbian
   minorities that still will reside there and to guard sacred Serbian
   historical sites.
   
   Guarantees would have to be negotiated to protect all parties,
   especially Macedonia and Montenegro. All the Balkan countries would
   have to join that guarantee, in particular the Greeks, Turks and
   Bulgars.
   
   Montenegro ought to be given a chance to decide its own future,
   perhaps by plebiscite. Its independence would mark the final reduction
   of Yugoslavia to Serbia. And this brings up the question of the Serbs
   in Bosnia.
   
   The Dayton agreement is not working politically. As compensation for
   giving up most of Kosovo, Serbia should be permitted to co-opt the
   so-called Republika Srpska in a loose confederation, as provided for
   in the Dayton principles. Similarly, the Croatian parts of Bosnia
   ought to have a chance to rejoin Croatia if that is the will of the
   population. This, too, is a principle of Dayton.
   
   All of Europe, including Russia, would have to guarantee any
   settlement. The guarantees should be a deterrence against other ethnic
   minorities starting a guerrilla war, for example, in Romania or
   Hungary.
   
   Sanctions would have to be lifted. Probably an area-wide amnesty for
   war crimes would have to be declared, unpalatable as that might be.
   Major economic assistance should be offered. U.S. forces could be
   withdrawn from the area by a date certain and replaced, but not by UN
   forces. The peacekeepers should be drawn from all European countries,
   serving under a political command subordinate to a council of the
   Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
   
   Obviously, such a conference should be preceded by a cease-fire,
   including a bombing pause. But that is a dangerous move; a bombing
   pause ought to be part of the bargaining, not its starting point.
   
   In 1878, the powers imposed a solution on the so-called Eastern
   question. Some of it was negotiated in secret, which would not be a
   bad precedent for this crisis, rather than reviving the sterile
   spotlight diplomacy of Rambouillet.
   
   The Congress of Berlin's solution was by no means perfect, but it
   avoided the threat of major war and provided for several decades of
   peace.
   
   The writer, a former editor of Foreign Affairs who served in the Nixon
   and Ford administrations, contributed this comment to The Washington
   Post.
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