> has the NATO intervention saved any lives?
Nope.
> has the NATO bombing escalated the expulsions and the killings?
Yup.
> has the NATO intervention entrenched the force of nationalism in the
> ex-yu countries?
Hard to say, but not necessarily. Collective aid from the NATO countries, opening borders, etc. go against the grain of nationalism. In the narrow sense of nations bordering Serbia being more anti-Serbian, yes, and maybe some nationalist aggravation in Greece/Turkey.
> will the NATO intervention enable the kosovars to return home now or
> in the conceivable future?
Not as things stand.
> but my answers: no, yes, yes, no.
>
> what are yours?
no,yes, maybe, maybe.
> in light of this, what are the responsibilities of NATO countries to
> those refugees? two options: contain them in camps in countries which
cannot afford them or spread them into countries which can?>
Both in the short-run. In the medium term, create the conditions for their safe return.
I think Burford has a good fix on this, though his 'social fascist' rap is not on point. My knowledge of the history is limited, but I do recall Stalin using the term to describe German social-dems during a phase (nice word) when Stalin was not in overt opposition to Hitler. Others can clarify this better, but I fail to see the application to Milo, who's no social-dem, fascist, or Stalinist, far as I can see.
Anyway, Burford said the following, which I think is mostly well-taken:
>> This is a war for the self-determination of Kosovo. It is a just war. But
the imperialists pursue it with imperialist means. It is better than an
imperialist policy of appeasement of social fascism, but NATO strategy
relies on massive air power, and shows self-interest in not being willing
to commit ground troops. The issue is similar to imperialist reluctance to
open a Second Front in the second world war. If what the Serbian
nationalists have done is a major war crime, then armies are there for a
purpose unless you are a pacifist, and in hopefully rare circumstances, it
may be right to use them.
IMO what is proportionate is to use them only to neutralise the military superiority of the Serbian nationalists, by occupying strategic high ground on the border between Kosovo and Serbia, and using this to cut communications and supplied from Serbia to its occupation troops. Such postions could be supported by air. The use of air power in the rest of Yugoslavia should be restricted to achieving air domination. The campaign that is starting against wider economic targets is not just and proportionate.>>
The second front analogy is pertinent. Clinton clearly edged into this with a view towards maximizing his political support in the U.S. That meant the reliance on air-power deployed in a fashion that makes smart bombs even stupider then they are to begin with. It meant assuring everyone ground troops would never be used. It meant failure to protect Kosovars. It meant a lackadaisical posture regarding preparation for relief efforts, since that costs money and we've got our precious budget surplus. It meant depending on the ensuing suffering to generate political support for more costly measures, and if such support proved not be forthcoming, then screw the whole thing -- call a halt to bombing at an opportune time, work up some kind of partition and jive agreement with milo that gives him what he has taken.
We saw this pattern with Clinton on welfare reform -- he did something he knew was wrong in basic ways to maximize his electoral success, though he could probably have won the election anyway. He's a creep with a slippery zipper, q.e.d.
I also agree w/Burford about (not) bombing Serbia's cities and civilians, as I noted a few days ago. There's a good article this morning in the Washington Post Outlook section by John Prados, our local progressive savant on national security, which explains why the bombing of cities has no practical basis.
In my bid to replace Madeleine Halfbright as Secy of State, I would modify and extend Angela's demands as follows:
** Open borders and immigration for refugees to NATO countries as a short-term measure;
** Massive relief effort;
** Use of ground troops to cleanse Kosovo of Serbian military and para-military, supported as needed by air power; destruction of any Serbian air power; arm the KLA, absent evidence they should not have arms;
** Self-determination for Kosovo. K was an autonomous region of Yugoslavia, a Federal republic. For all practical purposes, there is no more Federal republic. Milo had taken the lead in blowing it to smithereens, before this year had begun. Serbia has forfeited any right to rule anybody but themselves. No partitions.
** Free movement inside a NATO-liberated Kosovo for human rights/Green monitors of every description, the better to maximize information about who is doing what to whom;
** Involve the Russians in peace-keeping operations to the extent possible;
If the Post is right this morning, the EU is coming around to this more than the U.S. Sentiment for something like the above in Europe (with the exception of Greece and the Czechs) is growing, in contrast to the U.S., where we don't give a shit, thanks in part to the example of our president.
Jimbo: nice to see you back, but where've you been? Doing actual work . . . for pay? Yecch. You've echoed what has been said here already, but I would like to provoke you regarding the implications of your assessment of NATO/US motives, in light of the record re: Kurds, etc. I don't think anyone here disagrees with that, only with what to make of it.
A good argument by my lights is that NATO/US/Clinton are so inherently treacherous and anti-humanitarian by constitution that no venture they engage merits support. One could tell a similar story in the realm of domestic policy. Nothing good can be expected from the state. Democratic practices are ineffectual and illusory. Only proto-revolutionary insurgency forces the state to make concessions. It's a good argument, but I would say a faulty one.
Bourgeois states are not perfectly democratic, but they are not perfectly the contrary either. There is space for diverse types of reformist action leading to concrete progress. Mass movements and grass-roots activity provide crucial energy for this process and are also expanded by it.
Any such positive outcomes are less likely in a foreign policy context, where elites have much more sway (control over information, decision-making, etc.), so the grain of truth in the strict anti-imperialist case is that any support for the state's exercise of foreign policy has a high burden of proof. At the same time, the gravity of a situation -- the threat of genocide -- reduces this burden.
Exemplary application of this doctrine to Iraq: tho Saddam's threat to innocent people is real, bombing civilians is worthless, and bombing military w/out complimentary rescue efforts is also worthless. Ergo forget about Iraq, other than with diplomatic/economic measures. The threat to Kosovars seems a bit more real on the one hand, and given the will a successful intervention on behalf of self-determination for the enclave also looks practical, ergo the policy proposed above.
Junking all this, Jim, doesn't the logical extension of the strict anti-intervention position to domestic matters deprive the left of most any practical politics, other than an ultimatist one which must await the proverbial, possibly mythical mass strike?
mbs