[clip] This is an egocentric view of the Administration in which Presidential success or failure depends on what is happening in Stephanopoulos's little circle of influence. The distorted view of the Administration's actions is signaled in Stephanopoulos's treatment of Bob Woodward's book ''The Agenda.'' You would think, from his treatment of that volume, that this was a major turning point in the White House's performance. Because Stephanopoulos had promoted the idea of cooperating with Woodward, and the President resented the book's conclusions, Stephanopoulos lost his access to the inner circle around Clinton, and Dick Morris was allowed to offer disastrous advice not countered by the sweet reason of our hero. The only way Stephanopoulos could regain access, given the consequences of the Woodward affair, was by making a deal with Morris himself, a bargain with the devil that solidified Morris's position instead of undermining it. Because the book permanently damaged Stephanopoulos's standing, it became a major factor in the failures of Clinton as a President. This egocentric way of weighing events is understandable; but if Stephanopoulos is going to exaggerate the importance of a book, he should at least understand what was involved in its appearance. He claims that Woodward was essentially right in his conclusions, and that Clinton simply resented the description of White House decision making as chaotic. Despite the fact that Stephanopoulos ruefully says he was wrong to promote Woodward's project as a way of increasing his own importance, he does not get the real point of ''The Agenda'' and its impact not only on his own standing but on that of his old War Room colleagues, James Carville, Mandy Grunwald and Paul Begala.
Those campaign veterans appeared in Woodward's pages as defenders of Clinton's liberal campaign promises, as aides who resented Clinton's antideficit strategy as a surrender to Wall Street selfishness. In fact, this ''surrender'' was the key to all of Clinton's later successes -- it turned around the economy and laid the basis for the country's continuing prosperity. This entire side of the matter either escapes Stephanopoulos or is cleverly hidden by him. He was not wrong on a matter of procedure (putting Woodward in a position to tell embarrassing truths) but wrong on the substance of policy (joining Woodward in a view of the economy that proved fundamentally mistaken). The President is presented by Stephanopoulos as demoting him out of pique that truths were told, whereas Clinton had good reason to pay less attention to a man who had given such bad advice.
For all his rather histrionic questioning of his own personal motives, Stephanopoulos never investigates his own political judgment, which was often poor (his political judgment is the commodity he has on sale at the moment, which shows why a penitence that quietly celebrates it is a good career move). The second most important matter for Stephanopoulos, after his own demotion over the Woodward book, was the rise of Dick Morris's influence in the vacuum that (he is sure) was created by Clinton's turn from his former adviser.
Stephanopoulos misunderstands the role of Morris. He merely glances at the real damage Morris did -- the frenzy of fund raising he inspired by his expensive and early ad campaigns. On the substance of the advice given by Morris, Stephanopoulos follows the conventional wisdom in Washington -- that Morris got Clinton to adopt Republican programs, that little symbolic gestures (school uniforms, for instance) covered a deep desertion of Democratic principle. This was the deficit fight all over again, with Clinton ''surrendering'' to conservatives -- and, just as in that fight, Stephanopoulos misses the point. Clinton's incremental emphases on concrete, unquestionably good things that government can do changed the whole political atmosphere.
The antigovernmentalism that came to such noisy prominence under Newt Gingrich has faded, has given way to a new desire for governmental solutions to problems. By declaring that the era of big government was over, Clinton removed the adjective that Republicans had pinned to all government programs. Since he no longer had to defend big government, just government, Clinton was saving liberalism from the liberals, as Franklin D. Roosevelt saved capitalism from the capitalists. Stephanopoulos, in his no doubt justified resentment of Morris as a despicable creature, misses the large electoral consequences of Clinton's 1996 victory (which established the framework in which the public has been able to judge Clinton apart from his personal scandals).
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I don't know about you all, but I can now sleep much better knowing this is the best of all possible worlds.