Charles Brown
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The following is the most recent draft of Carl Lesnor's, "The Politics of War," presented last Saturday (April 10th) at the Socialist Scholars Conference in New York City as part of the RPA panel, "The Crisis in Kosovo." ----------
>From: CLesnor at aol.com
>(somewhat)REVISED VERSION
>A talk I gave April 10 at a session sponsored by the Radical Philosophy
>Association at the Socialist Scholars Conference in New York. It was
hastily
>written the day before, a spot on the program having opened up at the last
>moment. We thought something should be said inasmuch as the sponsor of the
>conference actually favors the war. Comments and editorial suggestions
>welcomed.
>
> Hegel taught that the meaning of historical events becomes clear only
in
>retrospect, but that didn*t stop him from trying to understand the meaning
of
>the battle of Jena. The owl of Minerva is at present huddling in a bomb
>shelter with a target attached to her breast; she has not yet taken wing.
But
>she has already made a number of flights over this territory and brought
back
>enough reconnaissance photos to enable us to get our bearings.
>We don*t need much philosophy to oppose this war. People justify wars in
>two ways: It*s good for us and it*s good for them. Only if there is a
>conflict between the two does a moral problem arise. Since this war is
>clearly bad for us, the only question is whether it is good for the
Kossovo
>Albanians, as the President claims. Since it is obvious that it has made
>their lot incalculably worse, and moreover that he was told to
anticipate
>this result before he launched his missiles, (New York Times, April 1,
>p.1:"Pentagon planners, for example, said they warned the Administration
>publicly and privately that Mr. Milosovic was likely to strike out
viciously
>against the Kosovo Albanians as soon as the possibility of military action
>was raised...")we have more than sufficient reason for trying to end it.
>
>In trying to figure out how to be most effective in doing this we have to
>take into consideration the fact that now pro-war forces are drawing their
>principal support from liberals and social-democrats whose humanitarian
>feelings are being cynically exploited. There's nothing new in playing on
>the public*s feelings with atrocity stories. The Kuwaiti babies thrown from
>their incubators by the diabolical Iraqis helped tip the balance in favor
of
>going to war. Later on it turned out that the story was invented in the
>offices of an American public relations firm working for the Emir of
Kuwait,
>but by then, of course it was too late.
>
>I have begun with the moral question because we are being asked to believe
>that humanitarian considerations are not only the justification for the
war,
>but its explanation as well. Anyone who still thinks that humanity matters
to
>the war makers need only consider Madeleine Albright*s reply to Leslie
Stahl
>on 60 Minutes May 11, 1996:Leslie Stahl: "We have heard that a half
million
>children have died as a result of sanctions. That*s more than died in
>Hiroshima. Is the price worth it?" Albright: "I think this is a very hard
>choice, but we think the price is worth it." or listen to the real voice of
>Bill Clinton, (talking about Somalia) as quoted by George Stephanopoulos:
>'We're not inflicting pain on these fuckers,' said Clinton, softly at
first.
>'When people kill us, they should be killed in greater numbers.' Then, with
>his face reddening, his voice rising, and his fist pounding his thigh, he
>leaned into Tony [Lake, then his national security advisor], as if it was
his
>fault. 'I believe in killing people who try to hurt you. And I can't
believe
>we're being pushed around by these two-bit pricks."
>Which leaves us with the question, why is this happening? Since NATO was
set
>up to counter a purported Soviet threat, and since the Soviet Union
collapsed
>a decade ago, one would have thought that American troops might finally
come
>home from Europe where they have been based for over a half century.
Instead
>our government fought to expand it, and then launched it on an offensive
war
>against a sovereign state that had neither attacked it nor threatened to do
>so. We were led to believe we would be receiving a peace dividend. It was
>canceled when new threats were hastily discovered. Old allies and CIA
assets,
>such as Manuel Noriega and then Sadam Hussein, were suddenly converted into
>dangerous foes.1
>This shouldn't have come as any surprise to anyone who had watched Uncle
>Joe, our gallant Soviet ally in the people*s fight against Hitler,
>metamorphose into a virtual reincarnation of the defunct Nazi leader.
Anyone
>trying to distinguish the good guys from the bad has his work cut out.
>The Germans were bad guys; then they became good. The Japanese traded
places
>with the Chinese, who were first good guys when Mao was fighting them,
then
>bad when he came to power, then good when Nixon and Kissinger readmitted
them
>to our good graces. Our government has supported the Kurds, then betrayed
>them a number of times. Now they are at once the good guys vis-à-vis Iraq,
>and bad guys when they confront the Turks. The US arms and supports Islamic
>fundamentalist freedom fighters, then discovers the threat of Islamic
>terrorism. The U.S. entered the First World War on the side of Serbia,
then
>set up Yugoslavia under the Serbian king, then supported the Slovenians and
>Croatians in seceding, then....
> The list goes on and on, but there's one example we should be sure not to
>overlook. Pol Pot --who came to power as a result of US bombing of
Cambodia,
>and who holds several world records in mass murder, was considered by the
US
>the legitimate representative of Cambodia, and his right to occupy its seat
>in the United Nations strenuously defended by the United States, Clearly,
>neither ideological nor moral criteria are of any help in sorting out our
>friends from our enemies.
>
>What does? The most widespread way of finding a consistent explanation for
>this bewildering mess of inconsistency is to reduce it to something we all
>know and understand: money. Militant anti-interventionists not only
condemn
>imperialist wars, but see them as the result of the capitalist class*s
>appetite for profits. They hold that the cause of our perpetual wars is to
be
>found in the process of the expanded reproduction of capital. Curiously, or
>not so curiously, the hardheaded ,*realistic* advocates of intervention
say
>the same thing: our prosperity depends on events in faraway places. If
there
>are oil wells they don*t even have to argue, The word *oil* has only to be
>mentioned for all rational inquiry to cease. So no one asks whether bad
guys
>do anything different with their oil than good guys, namely sell it. Nor is
>there any evidence that they sell it at a higher price, this being
determined
>by the market. Nor are we supposed to notice the inconsistency of first
>claiming that we need to assure our access to this or some other resource,
>which its present proprietors are allegedly threatening to withhold, and
>then declaring embargoes against them, thus depriving ourselves of it.
(Of
>course in wartime, countries -- unlike the US--- who are without their own
>supply of such resources are driven to seize them militarily, But obviously
>this is the negation of capitalism: a reversion to plunder.)
>
>Another aspect of the accepted Leninist wisdom is the need to conquer
>markets. For over a century American businessmen have been told that the
pot
>of gold at the end of the expansionist rainbow in Asia was the China
market.
>If each Chinese bought only one stick of chewing gum just imagine the vast
>wealth you could acquire! The result: after four or five horrendously
>expensive wars we are finally trading with China, and running an enormous
>trade deficit. We fought a bloody war in Korea (right after declaring it
>*outside our defense perimeter*) and helped create a rival which has
>destroyed or weakened several American industries, shipbuilding, steel,
>autos, etc. We maintain an army there too to protect this rival from the
>threat of North Korean aggression; yet South Korea has twice the population
>and more than ten times the GNP as the North. One would think they would be
>able to defend themselves, but when asked why they didn*t do more to assure
>their own defense, they replied that that would mean cutting back on social
>services. So, instead, American social services must be cut so we can
>subsidize our commercial rivals. We also maintain an army in Japan, having
>forbidden them to keep much of a military establishment. As a result, both
>they and the Germans had growth rates far outpacing ours, without the
>supposed benefits of military spending on the economy. Our government even
>refrained from collecting import duties on Japanese VCRs for political
>reasons. (Though an American invention, today we don*t produce any.) A
>century ago in the war that established America as an imperial power, we
>obtained the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and a protectorate over Cuba. The
>result: The Philippines became a white elephant; by the 1930*s there was
much
>talk of abandoning it. It was too expensive. Puerto Rico has no important
>resources except the labor power of Puerto Ricans, but if this were so
>attractive to American employers why does the government have to give them
>subsidies in the form of tax rebates to induce them to move there? In Cuba
>there were some US firms that made money, the ITT telephone company for
>instance. But American businessmen had few objections to Spanish rule, and
>similar American businesses have flourished in other Latin American
countries
>without the expedient of military intervention. If there was any increase
in
>profits for a handful of American investors, it is microscopic compared to
>the enormous costs of maintaining the embargo that has been in place for
the
>last forty years, (and which, it appears, is opposed by the American
>capitalist class) to say nothing of the military costs occasioned by our
>efforts to reassert our political domination. (to say nothing of almost
>blowing up the world in the Missile Crisis)
>The list could go on and on, but there*s no time now. Instead I would
>suggest a simple criterion by which the economic impact of military
>intervention could be evaluated. Using generally accepted accounting
>procedures, the costs could be balanced against the benefits, the profit
>against the loss. When someone suggests testing the claims of
psychoanalysis
>to cure patients, analysts are quick to argue that this is not the sort of
>thing you can quantify. Whatever one might think of their claim, no one
could
>claim that you can*t quantify money! Nothing is more quantifiable than
money.
>And if you can*t show any economic benefits, either to the people in
general,
>or the capitalist class in particular, then a policy of military
>intervention is clearly irrational from an economic point of view. To be
>sure, there is always somebody who makes money. Obviously munitions makers,
>or, as they are now called, defense contractors, do very well. But the
>government that hands out these lucrative contracts must find the money to
>pay for them, and that can only come from taxation either on other, less
>favored businesses, or from the population as a whole, i.e., their
customers.
>Indeed it is precisely by granting favors that politicians can build up a
>clientele and a source of campaign finance that keeps them in power. This
is
>what is sometimes called *socialism for the rich,* a useful description
>except that it underestimates the extent to which the government can make
>people rich.
>
>This power to raid the public treasury and bestow corrupt privilege on
their
>clients is real power. That politicians wield political power ought to be
an
>obvious truism. Yet it is hidden in plain sight, obscured by the reigning
>political ideology which holds that in our pluralist democracy,
politicians
>represent the interests of the electorate, and that their actions are
>determined by the competing interest groups that influence them. The only
>dissenters from the establishment ideology are Marxists and other radicals
>who deny that they represent the people, but instead represent the
interests
>of the capitalists. Now what both of these apparently opposing views
agree
>on is that politicians are merely the representatives of somebody else,
that
>they have no interests and no power of their own. They simply carry out
>orders given them by others. Politics becomes an epiphenomenon. To
understand
>it one must look elsewhere. That is a made to order way of never
>understanding politics, which is why it is so widely promulgated by
>politicians.
>
> What is today called *Marxism,* but which should more properly bear the
name
>*neo-Marxism*, doesn't derive from Marx, but rather from several Second and
>Third international theorists, chiefly Lenin, who tried to adapt his ideas
to
>new political developments. Marx never got around to writing his book on
>politics. He engaged in it with varying success, and in the process, wrote
>extensively about contemporary events. He was a remarkably intelligent
>observer and propagandist leaving us some remarkable analyses that bear
>re-reading today, such as his articles on the American Civil War for the
Neue
>Freie Presse in Vienna; he also made his share of mistakes, some of them,
>not surprisingly, about Eastern Europe! But he was not the author of any
>theory of imperialism. He thought that the bourgeoisie would be more
>peaceful, more given to compromise than the feudal aristocracy with its
code
>of military honor. He didn*t expound any principle of the right of national
>self-determination, but selectively supported some claims and opposed
others.
>He didn*t analyze the development of monopoly capitalism, since he felt
that
>monopoly was a relic of a mercantilist past. To be sure, he did say in the
>Manifesto, referring to England in the 1840*s, that the State was the
>executive committee of the ruling class. But this was before the growth of
>political parties, bureaucracies, and large military establishments, at a
>time when wealthy individuals met together in Parliament to decide public
>matters. He clearly didn*t mean this to become the equivalent of *There is
no
>God but Allah, and Mohammed is His Prophet.* For when he assessed the role
>of the bourgeoisie in the 18th Brumaire, he described how it had abdicated
>political power in favor of Louis Napoleon. Nor did he dream of applying
such
>a simple minded description to the Bismarck Reich. 2
>
>He began his political career as a radical democrat and looked to the newly
>emerging working class as its champion, given the weakness and timidity of
>the German bourgeoisie. As Hal Draper pointed out, the form the
*dictatorship
>of the proletariat* was to take was that of the democratic republic. And,
far
>>from seeing history as the product of anonymous objective forces, Marx
held
>that it is men who make history, but in not in conditions of their own
>choosing. I point this out, not as an act of ritual piety, but to exonerate
>him of the mistakes introduced by his followers.
>These followers had to confront unforeseen developments at the end of the
>19th century, chief among them militarism and colonialism, in particular
the
>scramble for Africa. Aside from the acquisition of great riches by a few
>individuals like Cecil Rhodes and King Leopold, these colonies tended to be
a
>drain on the treasury and bourgeois parliaments were more often than not
>reluctant to finance them. What made them attractive was their power to
>replace class antagonisms with patriotic and nationalist sentiment. The
>places that European powers fought over at the end of the 19th century and
>the beginning of the 20th were of negligible economic interest: e.g. the
>Sudan, Morocco, and finally Bosnia-Herzogovina ---which Bismarck had said
>was not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier --- but which was to set
>off the orgy of mass murder of 1914-1918.
>In America, political leaders, threatened by the precipitous decline of
party
>loyalty and the growing threat of populism, were attracted to the idea of
>foreign adventure for the same reason. The new American Empire burst on
the
>world scene in 1898, but it was not the first war it provoked. It was
>preceded by a war which never took place, but from which we can learn much
>about the future course of the American empire. In 1895, President
Cleveland,
>Secretary of State Olney, and the leaders of both parties, decided that a
>war --any war-- was just what was needed to take people*s minds off
domestic
>politics. Though Cleveland was told by his consul general in Havana that a
>war with Spain *might do much toward directing the minds of the people away
>>from imaginary ills*,3 the fruits of Cuban discord had not ripened
>sufficiently. So another crisis was created over a border dispute between
>Great Britain and Venezuela over the demarcation of the border between the
>latter and British Guiana, which ran through a tract of useless jungle.
>Though the British claim was stronger, based on old maps and documents,
the
>U.S. government began by offering to mediate, then escalated to an
ultimatum
>threatening the use of military force. The President told a cheering
>congress: *There is no calamity which a great nation can invite which
equals
>that which follows from a supine submission to wrong and injustice.* The
>reason for the enthusiasm was well expressed by Senator John Daniel of
>Virginia, who thought it *A sublime spectacle to behold how the call of
>patriotism made the people one..* War was only avoided by the arrival of
the
>Kaiser*s telegram to Kruger, the Boer leader, congratulating him on
>repulsing a British-led raid. The British, having enough on their plate,
>decided it wasn*t worth challenging the American diktat.
>Although American military expansion has grown from this little beginning
to
>encompass the entire globe, much can be learned from its humble beginnings.
>Enemies are apt to spring up anytime and anywhere. Situations of permanent
>instability have been created by leaders who solemnly proclaim that they
seek
>only stability. From this point of view the Israel-Palestine question is
>particularly attractive; it is guaranteed to produce endless crises and
>endless war, a condition they now call *The Peace Process.* Iraq is
another
>pot always simmering which can be brought to a raging boil at the flick of
a
>switch. And now Balkan ethnic disputes can be ignited without any trouble.
>Once American troops are sent in, they are likely to stay indefinitely,
>providing the government with new *vital national security interests* to
>protect, new *credibility* to be defended. The enormous military-industrial
>complex has become an essential part of our system of government. In a
>dangerous world seething with rogues, thugs, and Hitler clones, we are
>adjured to put our differences aside and rally behind our commander in
chief.
>As if by magic, yesterday's notorious liar becomes today's unimpeachable
>source of truth and yesterday's rapist turns into today's knight in shining
>armor. As Randolph Bourne said, *War is the health of the State.* It has
>infected our domestic life with Wars on Poverty, Wars on drugs, Wars on
>terrorists, etc., which have the effect of transforming us from citizens to
>soldiers. The purpose of all of this is now what it was at the beginning:
>to replace the American Republic with the American Empire and to reduce us
>>from citizens of the former to subjects of the latter. Only when
Americans
>understand that this Empire is directed against us, against our freedom to
>chart our own destiny, against our status of citizens of a free republic,
>will we rise up and drive a stake through its heart. And when we do, it
will
>be a broadly based movement of all defenders of our republic, who, however
>much they might disagree on other issues, are dedicated to reclaiming it
from
>the stranglehold of our bi-partisan political oligarchy.
>
>1 U.S. Ambassador Glaspie:
>"We have no opinion on your Arab-Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with
>Kuwait. Secretary (of State James) Baker has directed me to emphasize the
>instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960s that the Kuwait issue is not
>associated with America."
>(Saddam smiles.)
>And to remove any possible doubt on this matter:
>On July 31st, two days before the Iraqi invasion, John Kelly, Assistant
>Secretary of State for Near Eastern affairs, testified to Congress that the
>"United States has no commitment to defend Kuwait and the U.S. has no
>intention of defending Kuwait if it is attacked by Iraq."
>transcripts at http://www.flinet.com/~politics/iraq-war/gulf-war.html
>
>2 *Marx*s own characterization of the Bismarckian State reveal a mixture of
>vexation and bafflement. In a celebrated, enraged phrase that Luxemburg was
>fond of quoting, he described it as *nicht anderes als ein mit
>parliamentärishen Formen verbrämter, mit feudalem Beisatz vermischter,
schon
>von der Bourgeoisie beeinflüsster, bürokratisch gezimmerter, polizeilich
>gehüteter Militärdespostismus, * *nothing but a military despotism,
>embellished with parliamentary forms, alloyed with a feudal admixture,
>already influenced by the bourgeoisie, furnished by the bureaucracy and
>protected by the police.* [Critique of the Gotha Program. Marx-Engels
>Werke, Band 19, p. 29. Quoted in Perry Anderson. Lineages of the Absolutist
>State, p. 277]
>
>3 Walter Karp. The Politics of War, p.36. I am indebted to Karp, who in
this
>book, together with his Indispensible Enemies, has given us the best
history
>and analysis of American foreign and domestic politics -- and their
>interconnection --- that I know.
>
>
> POSTSCRIPT
>We are not going get out of this war easily. Aside from the problem of
>putting the Balkan Humpty-Dumpty together again, America cannot emerge from
>this unchanged. But although Americans thought the idea of getting involved
>in Kosovo preposterous, literally inconceivable , and although their
support
>for this adventure is weak, the government*s weapons: faits accomplis and
>atrocity stories, will eventually succeed in bludgeoning them into
submission
>if the anti-war movement has none. None, that is, except mini demos, which
up
>to now have been sponsored by sectarian leftists preaching arcane doctrines
>guaranteed to turn off any passing bystander who happens to lend an ear.
>Instead they attract vociferous Serbs and are characterized by the media as
>*Serbian demonstrations.* Without much of a left to mobilize, anti-war
>leftists are reduced to holding meetings.The trouble is that holding
meetings
>has become an end in itself for the left, as it is for academics. Since so
>many leftists nowadays seem to be academics, the futility of meetings for
>meetings* sake isn*t seen as a problem.
>In contrast, there has been a rather explosive growth of the Conservative
>anti-war movement. Enough significant voices on the Right have denounced
this
>war, and the interventionist policy behind it, for it to deserve that
name.
>Their strength lies in their greater prominence in the media and a
clientele
>who are in no mood to give blind obedience to a man whose integrity and
>morals they (properly) despise. It was this public the the Republican
>leadership was courting when it voiced reservations in the House vote
before
>the bombing, but is clear that it has no intention of mobilizing anything
>more than token opposition. Their vanishing act during the Easter recess,
the
>ubiquity of Mc Cain*s face on TV screens calling for ground troops, the
>meaningless statements of young Busch, all foretell a sell-out of those to
>whom they seek to appeal. The party bosses will not, indeed cannot,
abandon
>the bi-partisan foreign policy. Doing so would risk creating a real
two-party
>system, opening their ranks to a public they could no longer control. No,
the
>dissidents are either outside the party organization entirely, hold minor
>posts, e,g., anti-interventionist congressmen like Ron Paul, or are
mavericks
>like Buchanan. The split between these anti-war conservatives and the
>neo(i.e. interventionist)-conservatives is too wide to be bridged. Their
>fight is over the direction the country is to take and it overshadows
>whatever agreements they have on minor questions.In contrast, the anti-war
>conservatives are prepared to fight. They have thrown themselves into it
with
>great fervor. (see iraqwar.org and www.antiwar.com)
>I won*t wait till the end of this postscript to get to the point: We have
>everything to gain and nothing to lose from making common cause with these
>people. It is a chance for the Left to break out of its ghetto. (The ghetto
>was as much self-imposed as imposed from without.) A broadly based antiwar
>movement, from left to right, will be much harder to defeat than one that
can
>be dismissed as just an isolated band of Communist/Fascist sympathizers.
Its
>unifying commitment would be to the Constitution and to the welfare of the
>American people.
>To anticipate some objections: Don*t some of these people hold obnoxious
>views on other matters: separation of church and state, abortion, gun
>control, affirmative action, gay rights, the death penalty, tax cuts, etc.?
>Yes they do, but these are relatively insignificant compared to what is at
>stake now: Whether we are to enter into a new cold (and hot) war with
anybody
>and everybody, or are instead going to turn our attention to dealing with
>America*s problems. If and when that blessed day should arrive, we will
then
>have to argue with our fellow citizens whom we regard as misguided.
Misguided
>fellow citizens are not our enemies; the two party Mafia is.
>Many of these *issues* in fact turn out to be *hot button issues*, designed
>to provoke knee-jerk reactions and acrimony, all the while changing
nothing.
>1While the public is encouraged to engage in food fights over symbolic
>questions, substantive ones are resolved by powerful politicians in what
used
>to be smoke-filled rooms. The whole question of the role of government
>shouldn*t deter us. We can discuss the question of the role of government
>once we have made it responsible to the people.
>I would also suggest that we might actually learn something from them, and
>they from us. Arguments over honest differences of opinion between people
who
>respect one another would be a welcome relief from mutual paranoia. If we
are
>ever to live in a democratic society, we have to find some way of talking
to
>people we disagree with. Who knows, we might even rediscover some
>pre-post-modern ideas like reason.
>The other question the Left would have to think about in such an alliance
is
>the question of nationalism vs. internationalism. These terms have come to
>mean the opposite of what they seem. Internationalism is sacred principle
>for Leninists and Wilsonians alike.2 But in the absence of any socialist
>international --except the one that is now waging war --the former can
easily
>slip into the latter. Leftist concerns for the plight of people in distant
>lands seem to be in conflict with Rightist insistence on putting the
>interests of America first, but the conflict disappears when one
considers
>the nature of the interventions the US engages in. On questions of trade
>policy a de facto Left-Right alliance has already emerged: NAFTA, GATT,
Fast
>Track, etc.
>Much of te animosity between the Right and the Left is generated by a host
of
>*cultural* issues. Again, these are often exaggerated by politicians
seeking
>to solidify support among their respective clienteles. Some are
manufactured,
>*phony* issues, e.g., Gays in the Military. (It is hard to fathom why this
>was Clinton*s first initiative upon coming to power, except as a way of
>taking the public*s minds off more important issues and generating enough
>opposition to provide an excuse for not doing anything about them. His
final
>compromise policy, *Don*t ask; dont tell* achieved the worst of all
possible
>worlds: hypocrisy solemnly proclaimed as a national policy and a worsening
of
>conditions for homosexual servicemen and women. Some consist in pandering
to
>advocates of identity politics, e.g., bilingual education, a program that
>benefits an educational bureaucracy, but probably harms immigrant children.
>Some, like *Hate Crimes* laws are designed to appeal to liberal and
>humanitarian sentiment, but are seen, not without reason, by conservatives
as
>increasing the power of the state at the expense of liberty. (The actions
of
>the government at Ruby Ridge and Waco became a rallying cry for the far
>Right, but I haven*t come accross any Leftists who don*t share their
outrage.
>It would not be unpricipled pandering to these people to point out that
Sadam
>Hussein is not the only one who has *used poison gas against his own
>people.*) [more]
>
_______________________________________ Dr. James Lawler Philosophy Department SUNY at Buffalo Buffalo, NY USA 14260 Base e-mail: jlawler at acsu.buffalo.edu
forwards to: james.lawler at sympatico.ca Work phone: 716-645-2444 x770 Work fax: 716-645-6139 Home phone: 905-687-6651