Interesting post, but a few caveats:
1) The claim that Albania sits astride the two major routes linking "Europe and the East" is nonsense. Hey, the Danube does not run through Albania! Maybe for the old Venetian Republic, and maybe for modern Italy, but Europe? Nah.
2) Bassett like others seems to think that partition is a viable solution. There are people in Washington mumbling about establishing an enclave for the Albanian refugees inside Kosmet. Maybe. But there is no obvious line of partition. Kosmet is not neatly divided into zones where one group is predominant and then another. It is too muddled up. And the zone that would be the obvious Albanian enclave would be in the south. But that is where most of the Serbian religious and historical monuments are that form the basis of the chauvinistic "heart of Serbia" argument that drives the worst of the fanatics in Belgrade.
3) With respect to the latter I would note that the historic "heart of Bulgaria" is in what is now Macedonia. The attitude of the Bulgarians is a sharp contrast with that of the Serbians, despite that vague plottings by the Bulgarians.
4) BTW, Bulgaria is officially backing NATO and even begging to join, although it may be that popular opinion in Bulgaria is much more pro-Serb. Barkley Rosser -----Original Message----- From: Greg Nowell <GN842 at CNSVAX.Albany.Edu> To: lbo talk <lbo-talk at lists.panix.com> Date: Wednesday, April 21, 1999 7:20 PM Subject: Jane's Defense Weekly on Balkans
> http://defence.janes.com/
>BALKAN ENDGAME?
>
>
>Following devastating
>airstrikes in Yugoslavia,
>what are the options for an
>acceptable settlement on
>the ground? Richard
>Bassett examines the
>prospects for the future
>and the lessons of the past
>
>
>In the wake of NATO's attack on Yugoslavia the Balkans
>ends the century
>much as it began; an expression of great power rivalry
>and a source of
>potentially destabilising conflict.
>
>As at least one military historian of note, John
>Keegan, has written, the
>problems of Bosnia, Macedonia and indeed Kosovo would
>be wearily
>familiar to any official of the Austro-Hungarian empire
>posted to Sarajevo in
>1908. The inevitable competing spheres of influence led
>the great
>19th-century German Chancellor, Bismarck, to observe:
>"The Balkans are not
>worth the bones of a Pomeranian Grenadier."
>
>If history is one of the inescapable millstones of the
>Balkans, geography is
>another. Albania today still lies across two of the
>most important routes that
>link Europe with the East.
>
>Its appearance on the global stage, in 1912 at the
>Ambassador's conference,
>when it was described as the "child of Austria, with
>Italy acting as midwife"
>was an attempt to balance the pretensions of Russia's
>main protegé in the
>region, Serbia, and limit its access to the
>Mediterranean.
>
>Today, there is still anxiety on the part of the
>western powers, notably the
>USA, over Serbian and, by extension, Russian influence
>over the eastern
>Mediterranean. At the same time, those in Europe
>(judging by recent
>comments from the French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin,
>they include France)
>who, like Russia, are fretful of the "naked expansion
>of US power" in the
>aftermath of the Cold War, are equally keen to ensure
>that the Balkans does
>not become a US sphere of influence.
>
>Former West German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt,
>underlined his belief that
>this was just a new twist to the old game when he said
>in a recent interview:
>"Only the Americans would be naive enough to imagine
>that there could be a
>lasting peace in the Balkans".
>
>If, after the airstrikes, Milosevic backs down and a
>multi-national force is
>deployed then that force may not be an entirely NATO
>entity.
>
>Seen in the context of any future envisaged troop
>deployment in Kosovo, it is
>clear that Serbia could only sign up to a deployment
>which reflected an
>agreement between the powers (in this case the USA, on
>the one hand, and
>Russia and Moscow's supporters on the other).
>
>Such an agreement has proved extremely difficult to
>reach, not least because
>of exaggerated demands on both sides which have had to
>be reined in by
>some very tough negotiation between US Secretary of
>State, Madelaine
>Albright and Russian prime minister and former KGB
>spymaster, Yevgeny
>Primakov.
>
>But all the powers know that only when faced with a
>credible united front can
>Milosevic be persuaded to back down. Eventually the
>advantages of having
>the West disarm the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) may
>become apparent
>to the Serbs and the stationing of Russian troops will
>ensure the protection of
>their fellow Slav citizens in Kosovo.
>
>One of the most sensitive issues is the exact
>positioning of the Russian
>contingent as this will inevitably be the de facto line
>of partition in the
>province. In the eyes of the KLA, the British and the
>French, traditional allies
>of the Serbs in two world wars, can also be relied on
>to defend the Serbs,
>though London and Paris would, with reason, deny this.
>
>As the French and UK forces would come under a NATO
>commander, the
>KLA believes that US influence which is largely
>pro-Albanian would manage
>to prevent a too tough approach being taken towards the
>Albanians.
>
>However, recent suggestions to shift the political
>control structure of the
>deployment from NATO to the Organisation for Security
>and Co-operation in
>Europe (OSCE) would of course neutralise US influence
>and be an ominous
>development for the Albanians.
>
>It is, however, quite feasible to see a de facto
>splintering of Kosovo into
>separate zones not dissimilar to those which divided
>Berlin, Vienna and
>Trieste and its hinterland after 1945, though
>presumably with more cordial
>relations between the various participating forces than
>during the Cold War.
>However, given the different interests of the
>participants and the fact that a
>NATO and Russian force would be sitting cheek by jowl
>under separate
>commands, it can be assumed that a great deal of time
>and energy will be
>devoted to working out the correct protocols to govern
>this interface of highly
>sensitive, and in practice divergent, commands.
>
>However, even if in Kosovo there is an eventual
>resolution of the
>spheres-of-influence problem, the Albanian question, as
>is frequently
>mentioned, also spills into Macedonia and(less
>frequently mentioned)
>Montenegro.
>
>Macedonia has an ethnic population of Albanians which
>comprises 23% of
>the country's entire population. Fears that it would
>try to break away from the
>republic have been behind the generally cordial ties
>between Skopje and
>Belgrade.
>
>Despite denials by the ethnic Albanian leaders, there
>is no doubt that, situated
>as they are close to the Albanian frontier, the
>temptations of a future tie-up
>with a Greater Albania remain high on the agenda.
>
>Even without the Albanian issue, Macedonia has long
>been a controversial hot
>spot where Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian interests
>collide. Greece has long
>contested the right of the Macedonians to use the name
>of Macedonia, saying
>that it implied a territorial claim over Greek
>territory. Moreover, Greek
>politicians until relatively recently attempted to
>undermine the new state at
>international forums and in discussions involving new
>trade links.
>
>However, more recently under Russian, US and European
>pressure the
>Athens government has adopted a more supportive line,
>though this is of little
>comfort to the ethnic Albanian minority.
>
>Bulgaria which has long maintained that Macedonian is
>only a Bulgarian
>dialect, has also become more supportive of the
>government in Skopje,
>though this is partly a result of the government,
>dominated by the newly
>elected VMRO party, enjoying traditional ties with
>Bulgaria.
>
>Before the Second World War, Bulgaria financed with
>Italy the VMRO party
>which was then dedicated to destroying the newly
>created Yugoslav state and
>was implicated in the assassination of King Alexander
>of Yugoslavia in
>Marseilles in 1934.
>
>The news earlier this month that Bulgaria is to donate
>150 main battle tanks,
>including 115 T-55As, and nearly 150 artillery pieces
>caused some concern in
>western embassies. The concern was particularly acute
>over the arms import
>as the Bulgarian donation came on the heels of the
>supply by Germany of
>BTR-70 armoured personnel carriers. With all Macedonian
>army leave
>cancelled and the deployment of two brigades on the
>Albanian/Kosovo
>frontier, analysts fear that the arsenal now being
>created in this small country is
>a tinderbox awaiting ignition.
>
>More ominously, the build-up of weapons, with the tacit
>agreement of
>Belgrade suggests that the future of Macedonia may have
>already been
>decided by its neighbours.
>
>The emergence of Bulgaria as a regional player is also
>viewed with some
>disquiet in the region - traditionally Bulgaria and
>Serbia have a long history of
>emnity, though some analysts point to the old Comintern
>idea of a
>Serbian-Bulgarian federation possibly being revived.
>Such a development,
>however, has been described as two stranded swimmers
>linking hands across
>a sea of Macedonian troubles.
>
>Certainly the agreement on 22 February by the Bulgarian
>and Macedonian
>governments to "put an end to the artificial problems
>between our two
>countries" suggests that events are moving rapidly
>towards some form of
>anti-Albanian front and that a military "solution" may
>be imminent.
>
>The language of the February agreement is adamant in
>its reconciliation of the
>Bulgarian-Macedonian differences claiming that neither
>government will allow
>its territory to be used by groups hostile to the
>other. In diplomatic jargon this
>is a clear warning to Albanian groups smuggling weapons
>into or, indeed, out
>of Macedonia.
>
>It remains to be seen whether this agreement stabilises
>Macedonia. The clear
>anti-Albanian implications of the agreement may drive
>the ethnic minority in
>Macedonia to desperate measures. Moreover, in the
>long-term, Bulgarian
>-Serbian-Greek rivalry over Macedonia is inevitable and
>partition may be
>unavoidable also here.
>
>Montenegro also has a sizeable Albanian community
>though only forming 8%
>of the population. Moreover, in contrast to the
>Albanians in Macedonia and
>Kosovo, these Albanians are predominantly Catholic
>rather than Muslim.
>
>However, Montenegro is at perhaps one of the most
>strategic points in the
>Adriatic. Already at the beginning of this century, the
>Imperial Austrian Navy
>saw the importance of the great bay of Kotor, which
>until the Second World
>War was one of the most naturally defensible harbours
>in the Adriatic.
>
>Even today, the harbour is the major naval installation
>of the Yugoslav navy
>and is Serbia's vital access to the Adriatic. The
>harbour is guarded by the
>Prevlaka peninsular (see map) which has been the bone
>of contention
>between Serbia and Croatia since hostilities ended
>between those two
>countries four years ago. Croatia is adamant that it
>cannot cede control of the
>peninsular without endangering its own security
>interests although for the same
>reason, Serbia is determined to ensure that the
>peninsular is controlled by
>Belgrade. Otherwise the entire Serbian fleet and its
>facilities can be deployed
>only subject to Croatian veto. Unsurprisingly, these
>facilities were a priority
>target for NATO attack.
>
>Partly for this reason, Serbia last year initiated a
>plan to move against
>Montenegro's democratically elected anti-Belgrade
>government. The plan met
>with considerable resistance among the upper ranks of
>the Yugoslav army,
>many of whose officers are Montenegrin and provoked the
>resignation of the
>Serbian Chief of the General staff, General Perisic.
>
>A move against Montenegro is still likely, however, for
>the strategic reasons
>outlined above especially if western funds,
>particularly from Germany,
>continue to pour into Montenegro in an attempt to
>detach the leadership there
>from Milosevic's control. As well as German attention,
>Montenegro remains a
>traditional focus for Russian activity. Before 1914,
>the Russians established
>the biggest of the legations in the Montenegrin
>capital.
>
>During the Cold War, a small but significant remnant of
>this legacy remained in
>the shape of the small Soviet merchantman spy-vessel
>which remained at
>anchor in the bay of Kotor, despite Tito's break with
>the Comintern in 1948.
>It was a token presence but one which underlined the
>Churchill-Stalin deal
>that Yugoslavia should be divided 50-50.
>
>For the West that meant a Yugoslavia that was not part
>of the Warsaw Pact.
>For the Soviets that meant despite the formal break no
>offensive activity or
>alliance with NATO. For both sides there were small
>intelligence favours of
>which the Kotor merchantman was one.
>
>Russia's views on events in Montenegro are likely to be
>consonant with those
>of Serbia and therefore hostile to any moves that
>appear to detach the country
>from the Serbian orbit.
>
>Thus as the century ends, the problems of the region
>remain bound up with
>the ambitions and aspirations of the global powers as
>well as the hopes of
>different ethnic groups. It is therefore perhaps
>illuminating to examine in some
>detail the solutions those powers sought to impose on
>the region in those
>times.
>
>Before the First World War, diplomacy was secret though
>in practice there
>were no secrets between ambassadors and those involved
>in foreign affairs.
>An exception, perhaps, occurred during the First World
>War with the
>controversial Treaty of London which lured Italy into
>breaking its alliance with
>Austria and Germany in order to gain territory at
>Vienna's expense.
>
>Fortunately for students of diplomacy in the Balkans,
>the treaty was published
>when the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia in 1917.
>
>In addition to the clauses relevant to Italy's northern
>territorial acquisitions,
>there were several which underlined the status of the
>Adriatic Ð the region
>which is now so hotly contested.
>
>Italy was given important rights over the direction of
>Albania's foreign policy.
>Albania itself remained partitioned between Serbia,
>Greece and Italy which
>had rights over the port of Vlore (Valona), the key to
>the Straits of Otranto.
>
>The rump Albania was designated a Muslim state to be
>governed from Tirana,
>a concession few European states would tolerate today
>in a period of
>increasing religious polarisation and anti-islamic
>feeling. Above all, however,
>the signatories to the treaty, which included Russia
>and France, all agreed to
>work together to prevent the Balkans becoming an area
>of dispute between
>them. In the attempted agreements hammered out between
>NATO and
>Russia the spirit of this Treaty can still be seen,
>however different the territorial
>lines drawn on the map today. Although the USA is a new
>player in this game,
>there are reasons to think that it does wish to work
>through consensus though
>it may not understand as vividly as the Europeans the
>potential dangers of an
>uncontrolled conflict originating in the Balkans.
>NATO's surprise guarantee of
>Albania's territorial integrity last week is
>incompatible with the Treaty of
>London's intentions.
>
>In any event the USA's room for manoeuvre has been
>dramatically cut down
>by the coalition of European and Russian forces which
>are traditionally
>pro-Serbian. It remains to be seen what the USA can do
>for the Albanians
>despite all the talk of this being a "single-polar
>world".
>
>For its part, the UK, for which the Balkans has always
>been a traditional area
>of expertise, remains committed to establishing a
>lasting solution for the
>region. Although it no longer stands at England's
>imperial jugular, the region
>remains critical to the Mediterranean and the long-term
>interests of Europe.
>As far as London is concerned, it is synonymous with
>the 500-year-old game
>of erecting a balance of power.
>
>The interests of the third partner, Russia, however,
>remain perhaps the most
>constant -preservation of some presence, albeit a token
>one, along the
>Adriatic and the prevention of the peninsular being
>dominated by any one
>power. Here the activities of the USA are a cause for
>serious alarm in Russian
>strategic counsels.
>
>The precarious internal situation in Russia also
>militates against the
>confidence-building measures the West feels are
>essential to any joint solution
>of the Balkans crisis. The obvious policy disputes
>between Russian President
>Boris Yeltsin and Primakov may be just questions of
>degree but they continue
>to overshadow the ability to come to agreements at the
>highest level which
>can be seen as having a chance of sticking.
>
>Yet without such an agreement there is every indication
>that the Balkans will
>continue to smoulder and that the flames of ethnic
>cleansing will continue to
>blaze for several years to come.
>
>Richard Bassett, JDW's Business Editor, is a former
>Central Europe
>correspondent for the Times of London
>
>--
>Gregory P. Nowell
>Associate Professor
>Department of Political Science, Milne 100
>State University of New York
>135 Western Ave.
>Albany, New York 12222
>
>Fax 518-442-5298
>
>
>