In the evolutionary process God goes unnamed throughout, he (always he) is literally omnipresent. An evolution that insists on deducing from continuous process the ascending movement which reaches the summit of consciousness and thought necessarily implies that consciousness and that thought were there at the beginning. It is only from the view of an absolute beginning, which marks the origin of the signifying chain as a distinct order and which isolates in their own specific dimension the memorable and the remembered, that we do not find Being always implied in being, the implication that is at the core of evolutionist thought (Lacan talked about this in the 50's - I suspect that some evolutionists have shifted from a teleological model) (like Gould's contingency plan). Creation ex nihilo is the only place one finds production as an original domain.
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See? This is what I mean about confusing linear sequences with telos.
As for an unnamed omnipresence, I consider this identical to being, nothing, and ether: an imaginary medium that appears contemporaneous with other elements and relations that appear to require such a fiction.
Remember the saying sometimes a cigar is just a cigar? On the hard surface of the world were everything is as it appears, the most mysterious thing is that there is no back door, no escape, no underlying depth. The world is completely opaque. And worst of all, there are no hints.
So I take these rules to circumscribe the universe of discourse since they seem given in advance. Within this arena, which could be called an empirical naturalism, it is amazing to me how few scientists are willing to follow their own rules all the way down.
Even Gould has his moments of weakness.
In _Hen's Teeth and Horse's Toes_, Gould goes to great lengths to analyse some apparently inexplicable morphologies and adaptations of living things and how these features have arrived through evolutionary processes. Of course I could say this about any of his numerous book. But there is always something missing in his accounts. Quite simply, the non-biological world is missing. That is, he fails to mention that for many items on a physiological manifest there is a corresponding physical element or process in the world. In mathematics such correspondences between elements constitute a mapping, a morphism of some sort.
So, let's ask an obvious physiological question. How can we explain the topologically similar morphological symmetries that exist across species and phyla?
I think I can frame an answer to this question.
Would you like to play a game?
Chuck Grimes