US hasn't accepted India's need for N-deterrent Holum

[Ulhas Joglekar]

11 December 1999
US hasn't accepted India's need for N-deterrent: Holum
By Ramesh Chandran
The Times of India News Service
WASHINGTON: In a very precise and categoric manner, John Holum, the
senior-most Clinton administration official dealing with non-proliferation
and disarmament issues stated here on Thursday that the US had not accepted
the idea that India needs to have a credible minimum nuclear deterrent in
its arsenal.
Holum, who is the senior advisor to President Clinton as well as Secretary
of State Madeleine Albright for arms control, non-proliferation and
disarmament told foreign journalists: ``A core point of our dialogue with
India has been our belief that every country determines its own security
requirements. But we think that from our perspective, India's security
requirements are best served without a nuclear capability''. He stated that
the Administration did not ``acquiesce in or accept that capability'' and
his comments scotched some recent speculation that Washington is gradually
veering towards accepting the reality from a South Asian security scenario
that India is well served by a nuclear deterrent capability.
Speaking at the Foreign Press Centre, Holum, a former Director for the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency which was subsequently merged with the
Department of State, was reviewing non-proliferation issues for 1999 and
looking ahead to the year 2000. He said the US did not have the ability to
judge India's security requirements but its own assessment of regional
security factoring in both Pakistan as well as China did not imply that New
Delhi needed to have a nuclear capability.
On the contrary, Holum responding to a question stated that now that a
proper government is in place, ``We hope India will sign the CTBT. We have
been following with great interest the ongoing debate in India regarding the
signing of the treaty. It seems to me that the CTBT is consistent with
India's own policy of having a moratorium on further tests. So signing the
treaty is not a giant step. It is relatively an easy one, though it may be
controversial''.
Holum, who also has the responsibility for coordinating security assistance
programmes emphasised that the Administration was still ``looking for
progress'' on the various ``benchmarks'' it had established before sanctions
imposed against India and Pakistan after the May 1998 nuclear tests, could
be completely lifted. The so-called benchmarks include strategic restraint
and adherence to the CTBT, negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off
Treaty and export controls on nuclear knowhow. He pointed out: ``The
benchmarks remain integral to US policy'' and added that some sanctions had
been eased under the Glenn Amendment for both India and Pakistan using the
presidential waiver authority. Further progress will ensure lifting of the
remaining sanctions and the signing of the CTBT would also contribute
towards ``defusing an arms race in South Asia''.
He also told correspondents that India was an indispensable party for the
treaty to go forward and ensuring its ``entry into force''. Holum was also
asked about China's determined efforts to help Pakistan with its nuclear and
missile programmes and its technology transfers on this field. He stated
this has always been closely monitored by the Administration. He rejected
suggestions that the Administration has been soft on China in the past in
this regard citing examples when sanctions were imposed against Beijing.
Despite recent confirmation by American intelligence sources that Beijing
may have transferred M-11 missiles to Islamabad, Holum maintained that a
``determination'' confirming the transfer of the M-11s was still being made
by the Administration adding that its perception and the intelligence
evaluation may differ at times before full-scale sanctions could be imposed.
For reprint rights: Times Syndication Service
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Bennett, Coleman & Co. Ltd. 1999.