French diplomacy adrift in Kosovo
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>On 10 November the French defence ministry issued a document
criticising the
>attitude of the United States during the air attacks on Serbia,
claiming
that
>some military operations were conducted outside the strict framework
of the
>Atlantic Alliance. Washington immediately denied the allegation. With
the
>National Assembly's defence committee due to publish its report on
the Kosovo
>war later this month, questions remain about the reasons for France's
>involvement in an escapade that has heightened tension in the
Balkans.
>by ERIC ROULEAU *
>
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>--
>
>France's role in the Kosovo conflict has come in for little critical
analysis
>so far. Piecemeal information, and the occasional official untruths
common in
>time of war, have helped to blur the picture. But now that partisan
passion
>has subsided, some interesting facts are emerging. It is becoming
apparent
>that, despite its considerable advantages and experienced personnel,
French
>diplomacy allowed itself to be caught up in a chain of events that
diverted
>it from its traditional purpose. As a result, France was dragged into
an
>escapade with dangerous consequences for the present and future.
Several
>factors, some independent of the government's will, combined to bring
this
>about. Foremost among them was official secrecy.
>
>
>Parliament, the vital safety net in any democracy, was marginalised
from the
>outset. Many of its members complained they had learnt of the
outbreak of
>hostilities on the television. Contrary to established practice - and
to
the
>spirit, if not the letter, of the constitution - the government waited
48
>hours before officially informing parliament of France's involvement in
the
>conflict. In his defence, the prime minister invoked his absence at the
>meeting of the European Council in Berlin. Yet other European prime
ministers
>had taken the necessary steps to consult their parliaments or to obtain
their
>prior consent. In any case, there had been enough time to avoid
presenting
>the nation's representatives with a fait accompli. The air campaign had
been
>planned several months earlier. Recourse to war had been considered
likely,
>or indeed inevitable, for weeks. And the final decision to act had been
taken
>at least a week earlier, when the Western powers withdrew observers
from the
>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) from
Kosovo.
>
>Two other more significant omissions testify to the government's
>embarrassment. First, the draft interim agreement presented at
Rambouillet,
>whose rejection by Belgrade served as justification for the air
strikes,
was
>made public very late in the day. Second, the OSCE report containing
the
>findings of its 1,300 on-the-spot observers from November 1998 until
their
>withdrawal on 19 March has still not been released. This report would
have
>made it possible to verify the allegation that Serbian atrocities had
reached
>such proportions as to warrant breaking off the diplomatic process to
save
>the Kosovars from genocide. The OSCE's continuing refusal to release
the
>report can only strengthen doubts about the truth of that allegation.
>
>In this respect the testimony of Jacques Prod'homme, a French
member of the
>OSCE observer mission, is particularly interesting. Prod'homme, who
is 55,
>has been professionally involved in humanitarian missions for much
of his
>adult life. He worked for various international organisations on
missions in
>Africa, Asia and the Caribbean before taking up a post as a political
advisor
>with the OSCE teams in Kosovo. He claims that in the month leading up
to the
>war, during which he moved freely throughout the Pec region, neither
he nor
>his colleagues observed anything that could be described as
systematic
>persecution, either collective or individual murders, burning of houses
or
>deportations. More specifically, he states that "we were told about
clashes
>between KLA [Kosovo Liberation Army] fighters and the security forces.
Apart
>from that, we had occasion to investigate a total of one armed attack
and two
>disappearances." If this testimony is confirmed, Nato must be held
>responsible for the flight of some 800,000 Kosovars, who were trying
to
>escape as much from the allied bombing as from the Serbian atrocities
for
>which the withdrawal of the OSCE observers had cleared the way.
These
>refugees swelled the ranks of the 200,000 who had fled Kosovo over a
period
>of months in 1998 and 1999, mostly during clashes between Serbian
forces and
>the KLA.
>
>While the OSCE report still remains a well guarded secret, the French
>government eventually transmitted the Rambouillet draft agreement to
the
>parliamentarians who were asking for it. Despite his insistence, Paul
Quilès,
>chairman of the National Assembly's defence committee, did not
receive it
>until 3 June, when the Serbian parliament had already accepted the
terms of a
>cease-fire and the war was practically over.
>
>There seem to be a number of reasons for the authorities' reticence.
One was
>domestic politics. Full transparency was sure to provoke questions,
>challenges and debates in parliament, and in the media (even though
much of
>the media strongly supported the war from the outset). It would also
have
>provoked heated debate within the political parties. With European
elections
>in the offing, both the ruling left coalition and the opposition were
>concerned to avoid confusion in their ranks. The prime minister and
president
>were of one mind on the need to preserve unruffled "cohabitation".
>
>Premature publication of the Rambouillet agreement might also have
>compromised France's relations with its allies. The text which France
had
>approved was hard to defend. Saving the Kosovars from genocide and
>guaranteeing them "substantial autonomy" had been declared an
absolute
>priority. But if that was the case, a totally different draft would
have
been
>required. On the other hand, if the coalition's real intention was to
scupper
>the negotiations and leave only the military option, it could not have
>arranged matters better. The document presented to the Kosovar and
Serbian
>representatives was all of 57 pages long. It contained a framework
agreement,
>numerous legislative clauses, and a constitution that provided an
autonomous
>Kosovo with state institutions. It laid down detailed rules for the
conduct
>of elections and specified the membership, procedures and powers of
>parliament, the government, the supreme court and the constitutional
court,
>as well as the powers of the future president of Kosovo and the
decentralised
>communes. It even prescribed the numbers, equipment and uniforms
of the
>security forces, the tasks of the police training academy, and the
nature of
>the economic system. The parties to the conflict were given two weeks
to
>approve complex institutional arrangements conceived by the Western
powers,
>which were arrogating to themselves the sole right to supervise their
>implementation.
>
>In addition to all of this, there were the military clauses, which were
>contained in a section coyly entitled "implementation". This section
dealt
>the final blow to the diplomatic process. Nato was to have the
privilege
of
>constituting and leading a multinational force that would not only
enjoy
>"free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the
Yugoslav
>Federation (FRY), including associated airspace and territorial waters"
(i.e.
>not only Kosovo, but also Serbia, Montenegro and Vojvodina) but
would also be
>"granted the use of airports, roads, rails, and ports without payment
of
>fees, duties, dues, tolls, or charges." Nato military and civilian
personnel
>would be "immune from the Parties' jurisdiction in respect of any
civil,
>administrative, criminal, or disciplinary offences". As if that were
not
>enough, Nato would be entitled, as it saw fit, to "make improvements or
>modifications to certain infrastructure in the FRY, such as roads,
bridges,
>tunnels, buildings, and utility systems." No army of occupation in the
>post-colonial age has ever arrogated to itself such sovereign powers,
with
>such scant bearing on the interests and welfare of the populations it
is
>supposed to be protecting. The truth is blindingly obvious: a detailed,
>comprehensive agreement of this kind would have required many
months of
>negotiations, which would in any event almost certainly have ended in
>failure. While the document was described as "balanced" in a note
from the
>French foreign ministry, a senior official at the Quai d'Orsay, who
prefers
>to remain anonymous, admits it was unacceptable. It obviously could
not
>satisfy the Kosovars, since it did not recognise their right to
independence,
>or the Serbs, who were required to relinquish their sovereignty. And
>certainly not the Russians, whom it compelled to acquiesce in a Nato
takeover
>of the Yugoslav Federation.
>
>These obstacles were deliberately ignored. The United States notified
both
>parties to the conflict at the outset that only minor amendments could
be
>envisaged (1). US Ambassador Christopher Hill, the author of the draft,
and
>Secretary of State Madeleine Albright secured the KLA's agreement to
the text
>at the last minute by giving confidential assurances contrary to the
written
>provisions. Namely, that a referendum on independence would be held
at the
>end of the three-year transition period and that, in the meantime, no
great
>effort would be put into disarming the militias.
>
>Washington's real intentions are revealed by the argument that finally
>secured the KLA leader's agreement. The Americans explained to him
in
>confidence that his signature would enable Nato to begin hostilities
against
>Serbia without delay, since Serbia would then be seen as alone
responsible
>for the deadlock. Never mind that Belgrade had accepted most of the
>agreement's political clauses, in particular the granting of
"substantial
>autonomy" to Kosovo. As for Russia, its exclusion from the diplomatic
process
>was certain from the moment the Western powers declared that the
military
>clauses, adopted in the teeth of Russian opposition, were inseparable
from
>the rest of the document.
>
>Doomed at the outset
>
>The Rambouillet conference, which began on 6 February, was thus
doomed from
>the outset. Russia dissociated itself from the military clauses
immediately,
>and Serbia rejected them on 22 February, as soon it had sight of them,
on the
>grounds that they had not been approved by the Contact Group and
were
>therefore inadmissible. They had been presented to Serbia by the five
Western
>members of the Contact Group, although the sixth member, Russia,
opposed
>them. Such at least was the legal argument invoked by Belgrade as the
basis
>for its refusal to consider the document (2).
>
>By acting in this way the Western countries deprived themselves of a
valuable
>diplomatic instrument. Since its creation in 1994 the Contact Group on
former
>Yugoslavia had more than proved its worth. Thanks to Russian
pressure on
>Slobodan Milosevic (whose "reliability" was much appreciated by
Western
>diplomats, including the French), it had managed to end the war in
Bosnia.
>
>When it came to Kosovo, however, French diplomacy was plagued by
>contradictions. The inability to resist American and European pressure
>results in a sorry picture, in which the logic of war accompanies,
alternates
>or clashes with a clear desire to achieve a peaceful settlement. The
>guidelines laid down by President François Mitterrand at the onset of
the
>Yugoslav crisis, which were subsequently followed by President
Jacques Chirac
>and all French governments of the left or right, were clear enough: to
"avoid
>adding war to war" in a region where inter-ethnic conflict forbids
taking
>sides; to involve Russia as an inevitable party to any action in the
Balkans,
>where its moderating influence is vital; to act with the explicit
consent
of
>the UN Security Council so as to counter Nato's tendency to invade all
areas
>of decision-making at the expense of the European Union (3).
>
>Chirac, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin and Foreign Minister Hubert
Védrine
>endeavoured to adhere to these guidelines in the spring of 1998, when
tension
>was mounting in Kosovo. They made numerous public statements and
discreet
>approaches to Western allies, especially the US. The French foreign
minister
>worked hard in the Contact Group to get France's approach accepted.
Before
>the opening of the Rambouillet conference, he insisted that Serbian
>sovereignty over Kosovo and the supremacy of the UN should be
recognised in
>the text. France gave priority to dialogue with Ibrahim Rugova, twice
elected
>president of the "Republic of Kosovo" in the semi-clandestine elections
held
>in 1992 and 1998. Rugova was an advocate of compromise, preferring
"ten years
>of negotiations to ten minutes of war".
>
>At the same time, Paris kept its distance from KLA leader Hacim Taci,
whom it
>considered a dangerous troublemaker. In public Védrine utterly
condemned the
>behaviour of the Serbian forces, but he discreetly drew his opposite
numbers'
>attention to the provocations of the separatist militias, which stepped
up
>the civil war every time Milosevic made a move in the right direction.
The
>French authorities also knew the US and German intelligence services
were
>directly and indirectly arming and training the KLA fighters - whom the
US
>had once considered as terrorists structurally linked with the Albanian
>mafia. Yet France embraced the logic of war without apparent
misgivings. It
>is unclear whether it was trying to put pressure on Milosevic or to
dispel
>its allies' suspicions of pro-Serbian sympathies.
>
>In any event, it was Védrine who, as early as 28 May 1998, first
proposed
>that the Atlantic Council study the use of force. His proposal,
strongly
>supported by Albright, was accepted. The Nato ministers, including the
French
>minister of defence, Alain Richard, followed this up by endorsing the
planned
>air campaign as the most credible military option. And it was again the
>French foreign minister who, on 20 January, two weeks after the
opening of
>the Rambouillet conference, proposed that if negotiations on a
political
>compromise failed, a protectorate of Kosovo should be imposed by
force. The
>wheel came full circle at the beginning of February, when France
endorsed the
>military clauses of the interim agreement, this time under pressure
from
>America. It is therefore hard to give full credence to the French
>authorities' claims that "the United States did not impose its
strategy"
(4).
>
>Indeed, things were not that simple. It was Washington that drew up
the
>exhaustive Rambouillet document which put paid to all prospect of a
>negotiated compromise. And it was Washington that changed the
nature of the
>war envisaged by France, i.e. a war conducted in accordance with
>international law. It would seem that French diplomacy cherished the
hope, or
>illusion, that, despite everything, it would be able to avoid the
>irreparable. A week before the outbreak of war Védrine declared: "We
maintain
>that the UN Charter must be respected. Moreover, the treaty
establishing the
>Atlantic Alliance in 1949 quite clearly recognises the supremacy of the
>United Nations" (5).
>
>Conflicting demands
>
>In reality, France was caught between the demands of international law
and
>the combined pressure of its partners and the media. For various
reasons -
>humanitarian, ideological and purely demagogical - the press and
television
>were hammering away at the alleged passivity, impotence and
indifference of
>the European countries. It was a favourite theme of the American
media. But
>as Védrine himself had written, in criticism of earlier French
advocates
of
>armed intervention in Bosnia: "In such cases the dividing line is not
between
>compassion and indifference, but between responsibility and
irresponsibility"
>(6).
>
>There was also pressure, sometimes in opposing directions, from
France's
>allies. Certainly, the members of the EU are unanimous in their desire
for
>peace and stability in a region on their doorstep. But that is as far
as
>unanimity goes, and their national interests do not always coincide.
Despite
>much that has been written to the contrary, Kosovo is of considerable
>importance both strategically, because of its geographical position,
and
>economically. It has the greatest concentration of mineral deposits in
>southeastern Europe. It is a major supplier of lead and zinc to Europe.
>Before the crisis and wars of the 1990s, it produced 100% of
Yugoslavia's
>nickel and 50% of its magnesite (of which Yugoslavia itself is the
world's
>third largest producer). It also has large copper, iron and coal
deposits.
It
>is no accident that Kosovo was a target for conquest from Roman times
to the
>Third Reich. The Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires vied for
control of the
>territory, which has been occupied four times by Germanic armies in
the
>course of the last 300 years (7).
>
>Germany, above all, has its own interests and motives. It cannot forget
or
>ignore its long historical connection with territories that were once
>Austrian or German and bear many traces of German influence. Its
hasty
>recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independence at the end of
1991,
>against the advice of its European partners and the US, precipitated
the
>disintegration of Yugoslavia. As a former French ambassador to Bonn
has
>pointed out, the creation of Yugoslavia was experienced by Germany
as a
>particularly humiliating aspect of the Treaty of Versailles. In the
Kosovo
>crisis, Germany assumed a belligerent posture from the outset. The
future
>chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, and foreign minister, Joschke Fischer,
rushed
>to Washington in early October 1998, before the German general
election, to
>signal their agreement to the use of force. Germany was able to
exorcise its
>past by taking part in the "first humanitarian war in history" against
a
>"genocide" and, in so doing, to complete its "normalisation" by
engaging its
>armed forces in military operations for the first time since the end of
the
>second world war. Above all, it demonstrated its unfailing attachment
to
>American leadership in Europe. Although Germany is a special case, it
is not
>unique among the members of the EU. Willingly or grudgingly, all of
them
>espoused the cause of the US.
>
>Washington's motives were various, but essentially strategic. The
Clinton
>administration was concerned to secure the future of the Atlantic
Alliance in
>the 21st century by updating its role, which had ceased to be relevant
after
>the fall of the Soviet empire. To do so, it was necessary to
demonstrate
that
>Europe was unable to solve its own problems without American
military power.
>On 25 February, i.e. a month before war began, the New York Times
revealed
>that Albright was anxious to get the Kosovo crisis out of the way
before
>Nato's 50th anniversary celebrations on 22 April, when the Alliance
was due
>to take on its new colours.
>
>How are we then to reconcile the public determination of the US with
the
>surprising hesitation in certain quarters on the eve of hostilities
that
has
>been revealed by subsequent leaks? A few days before the air strikes
began,
>several senior officials in Washington confided their doubts about the
wisdom
>of military intervention to their French opposite numbers. The extent
of
the
>divergence within the Clinton administration was not known at the time.
The
>US president, like his predecessor, George Bush, considered the use
of force
>in Yugoslav crises a risky business. Defence Secretary William Cohen
and the
>Pentagon top brass were against the planned campaign because they
were
>convinced that air strikes could not succeed unless they were
accompanied or
>followed by a ground offensive.
>
>"We have managed to restore their morale," Richard boasted at the
time to a
>colleague in the French government. It is hard to see what he was so
pleased
>about, since French generals had exactly the same misgivings. Barely
three
>years earlier Védrine had stressed that "American, British and French
>military leaders all agree that bombing alone has never sufficed to win
a
>war, let alone end a civil war" (8). American hesitation was
compounded by
>the perfectly predictable danger, confirmed by secret reports from the
CIA
>and the Pentagon, that in the event of war Belgrade would launch an
all-out
>campaign to restore its grip on Kosovo, most of which had been
controlled by
>the KLA and its supporters since the beginning of the year (9). Hence
the
>risk of a humanitarian disaster on a far greater scale than the
suffering
>caused by the implacable repression to which the Kosovars had been
subjected
>so far. In the end, Clinton ignored the warnings of his intelligence
services
>as well as the opposition of a good part of Congress. He let himself be
>convinced by the War Party who were sure that Milosevic would
capitulate in a
>matter of days.
>
>Kept in the dark
>
>In the US doubts and scruples were expressed in the administration, in
>Congress and in the media before, during and after the war. In France
those
>doubts were allayed by two inseparable factors: the consensus at the
summit
>of the French state and the lack of proper transparency, which made
any
>meaningful debate impossible. According to one of its members, the
French
>council of ministers was kept as much in the dark as parliament itself.
Major
>decisions were taken by an inner circle consisting essentially of the
>president, the prime minister and the foreign minister. Chirac, like
Blair
>and Schröder, was enthusiastic about military intervention, and it was
he who
>guided foreign policy. For the sake of "cohabitation", Jospin went
along
with
>Chirac despite his reservations, but he left the entire responsibility
for
>the conduct of the war to the head of state. Védrine, who had doubts
about
>the whole business, translated the president's directives into
operational
>concepts and coordinated relations between the president and the
prime
>minister. Despite his efforts, he was drawn into a chain of events
whose
>outcome, according to his close collaborators, he very much feared.
>
>His task was not an easy one. Faced with the combined weight of the
US and
>almost all the members of the EU, who were aligned with Washington,
he had
>very little room for manoeuvre. "Despite everything," a senior foreign
>ministry official confided, "we did exert a moderating influence.
Besides, we
>had no choice. The alternative was to go down in splendid isolation."
And in
>the words of another high-ranking diplomat: "What did we stand to gain
except
>applause from Russia, China and possibly India?"
>
>French diplomacy was particularly active in seeking an end to the
conflict as
>soon as it became apparent that it was likely to drag on indefinitely,
with
>disastrous consequences. More and more Kosovars were fleeing
every day.
>Tragic blunders, claiming more and more Serbian and Albanian
victims, were
>increasingly frequent, despite France's attempts, which were
unsuccessful
>nine times out of ten, to persuade Washington to avoid civilian
targets.
>There was growing tension between Nato and the Russians and
Chinese. It
>seemed inevitable that several Balkan countries would be
destabilised.
>Mounting concern in Western public opinion was causing severe
tension within
>the German, Italian and Greek governments. Quilès was facing the
threat of a
>revolt in the French National Assembly, as well as considerable
unease in the
>army high command and the foreign ministry. The combination of these
factors
>could eventually threaten the cohesion of Nato.
>
>By the end of April the US, like France, had begun to realise that
>unconditional surrender by Serbia, seen as vital to Nato's credibility,
was a
>fantasy. Congress narrowly failed to pass a resolution summoning
President
>Clinton to suspend the air strikes: the voting was 313 in favour - and
313
>against (10). The time had come to compromise. Nato's terms were
abandoned in
>favour of the terms set by the G8, which Milosevic had little
difficulty in
>accepting. The compromise, which did not include the extreme
demands put
>forward at Rambouillet, was worked out in negotiations between
Milosevic and
>the European intermediaries, the Russia prime minister, Viktor
Chernomyrdin,
>and the Finnish president, Martti Ahtasaari. It was neither a
capitulation
by
>Serbia nor a victory for Nato, as had been triumphantly proclaimed.
The
>conflict was ended by a Security Council resolution. But when it came
to
>implementation, the US and its allies did their utmost to avoid
compliance.
>
>Although Yugoslav sovereignty in Kosovo had been reaffirmed in the
>resolution, it was -- to borrow the French foreign ministry's elegant
phrase
>-- "placed in parentheses". The measures taken in practice, which it
would
>take too long to describe in detail, boiled down to the independence of
>Kosovo. Among other things, Serbian soldiers, police officers and
customs
>officials (limited to a few hundred under the resolution) were not
allowed
>back into the province. Yugoslav federal laws were suspended. The
dinar,
>without which Yugoslav sovereignty is meaningless, was "officially"
replaced
>by the deutschmark. Above all, a blind eye was turned to
non-disarmament of
>the KLA, part of whose militias were incorporated into a "defence
force"
>intended to serve as the nucleus of the army of the future independent
state.
>In announcing at the end of September 1999 that the secession of
Kosovo
>seemed inevitable, the US administration ignored the serious concern
of the
>European countries, first and foremost France, that it would give rise
to
an
>aggressive pan-Albanian movement and could trigger a chain reaction
>throughout the Balkans by unleashing Albanian and Serbian nationalist
forces
>hostile to any compromise.
>
>While the US achieved its main purpose of securing its hegemony on
the
>continent of Europe, the EU failed to achieve its own aims, namely the
>stabilisation of the Balkans and, in the meantime, the establishment in
>Kosovo of a protectorate under EU administration. The French
proposal,
>accepted by all its partners, was officially presented in May. It was
>immediately rejected by Washington which, from early March, had
made no
>secret of its preference for a Nato protectorate (11). At the same
time,
the
>EU had to agree to bear, almost on its own, the burden of financing the
>rehabilitation of Kosovo. According to the UN secretary-general, this
will
>cost $10bn a year for at least 10 years (not to mention the $11bn spent
on
>devastating Kosovo and Serbia). No doubt American firms will not be
the last
>to benefit from the reconstruction contracts (12).
>
>It is doubtless too early to take full stock of this Nato escapade. The
>official inquiry commissioned by the national defence committee under
Quilès
>is to report in December and will no doubt make a substantial
contribution.
>Meanwhile, there is good reason to believe the "surgical operation" in
Kosovo
>will spread the cancer it was intended to eradicate.
>
>
>------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>--
>
>* Journalist
>
>(1) The Washington Post, 7 April 1999.
>
>(2) See letter dated 23 February 1999 from Yugoslavia's foreign
minister to
>the co-chairmen of the conference, Hubert Védrine and Robin Cook,
posted on
>the website of the Yugoslav ministry of information
(http://www.gov.yu).
>
>(3) Hubert Védrine, Les Mondes de François Mitterrand : A l'Elysée,
>1981-1995, Fayard, Paris, 1996, pp. 611, 637, 652.
>
>(4) Statement by Hubert Védrine to a joint meeting of the National
Assembly's
>foreign affairs and defence committees on 20 April 1999.
>
>(5) Le Monde, 16 March 1999.
>
>(6) Les Mondes de François Mitterrand, op cit, p. 637.
>
>(7) See Noel Malcolm, Kosovo : a Short History, Macmillan, London,
1998, pp.
>4-7.
>
>(8) Les Mondes de François Mitterrand, op cit, p. 635.
>
>(9) The Guardian, London, 4 April 1999, and The Washington Post, 7
April
>1999.
>
>(10) Associated Press, 29 April 1999.
>
>(11) Los Angeles Times, 31 March 1999.
>
>(12) According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies,
London.
>
>
>
>Translated by Barry Smerin