"Appeasement," in my opinion, was not even a good term to characterize the policy of imperial powers with regard to fascism before they entered the WW2. Imperialists approved of and supported fascists in the beginning (see my 10 Dec 1999 post titled "Re: Anti-Democratic America"). That's not the same as "appeasement" (which suggests conciliation despite moral misgivings, political objections, etc.).
With regard to the Western policy on Yugoslavia, again, there was no "appeasement" -- to begin with, because there was no one to "appease," only pawns to be manipulated & enemies to be subjugated, all calculated in a Machiavellian fashion. "They" are not stupid, you see (though liberals and social democrats are).
The "guilt of appeasement," however, had to be manufactured in order to justify an escalating involvement. The myth of "embargo" served this purpose very well. I have already written about the matter here (see the archive, especially my posts on Edward Said and Todd Gitlin), but I reiterate this point with a different source.
***** Jane's Intelligence Review December 1, 1997 SECTION: EUROPE; Vol. 9; No. 12; Pg. 538 HEADLINE: The embargo that wasn't: Iran's arms shipments into Bosnia BYLINE: Tom Hunter
...Although, three years after the embargo began, President Clinton announced his support for its repeal, the USA under the Bush Administration initially supported the embargo - at least publicly. In reality, things were different, and it was revealed in 1996 that the US Government had given tacit authorisation to an illegal arms pipeline from Iran. Analysis of this activity reveals that these shipments also facilitated Iran's growing presence in the Balkans. It may also have provided the tools for increased future terrorist activity in the region.
The pipeline opens
Western intelligence services began to monitor events unfolding in the Balkans more closely following the outbreak of hostilities in 1991. This increased vigilance included the use of satellite and tactical SIGINT/ELINT reconnaissance platforms, which provided high-resolution imagery,communications intercepts and other timely information on troop and equipment movements in the region. Analysis of this data, supplemented by a variety of human resources on the ground, was used to monitor compliance with UN Resolution 713 (of 25 September 1991) which stated that "all states shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Yugoslavia, immediately implement a general and complete embargo of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia until the Security Council decides otherwise following consultation between the Secretary General and the government of Yugoslavia."
However, in 1992 the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was able to use this wealth of acquired information to confirm reports from other sources that Iranian weaponry was flowing into Bosnia in violation of the Security Council mandate. This direct link was confirmed in September of that year when an Iranian Boeing 747 ferrying relief supplies into Croatia was seized upon landing at Zagreb's Pleso Airport. An inspection of the airliner by airport officials and UN personnel turned up a quantity of small arms and ammunition. When confronted with this evidence, Iran denied any involvement in the shipping of arms into the region. In fact, however, Iran had already been sending similar shipments to Bosnia via Turkey and Croatia at least a year prior to this incident. *****
Other countries such as Brunei, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia also supported the forces of the Izetbegovic regime with monies to buy weapons. Argentina, Hungary, & Turkey facilitated the weapons purchase and transfer as well. (_The Embargo That Wasn't_) Early in the civil war, the Bosnian Serbs got the upper hand, gaining control of about 70% of the country. The USA responded by brokering the Muslim-Croat coalition:
***** As a result, a meeting was held in the Croatian President's office on 28 April, attended by President Franjo Tudjman and US Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith. At this meeting President Tudjman asked for the official US stance on the Croatian shipment of arms to the Bosnian Muslims. Galbraith had previously requested this information from the US State Department and was requested to inform the Croatians that he had "no instructions" regarding the matter. This response apparently provided the officials present with a sufficient perception of tacit approval of the arms transfers. Neither the US Department of Defense nor the CIA were notified of this action and months of mistrust between the State Department and the intelligence community followed.
With this authorisation deliveries of weapons and equipment began to flow at an increased pace. By this time, flights ferrying arms and ammunition reached an average of eight per month, 30 per cent of which were given over to Croatia as payment for their facilitation of the deliveries. One such example was an Iran Air 747B cargo aircraft that was witnessed by civilians and US military personnel after landing in Zagreb in June 1994. This flight alone is known to have been loaded with 60 tons of materiel of various sorts (one report included explosives as having been part of this shipment, although this was not confirmed). It was also at this time that the CIA estimated that as many as 400 members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and secret police were dispatched to Bosnia. These reports were confirmed when UN officials reported the presence of an independently controlled IRGC unit operating locally.
Also interesting were reports that known Lebanese Hezbollah guerrillas, armed and trained in Iran, were observed on the streets of Zagreb. US counter-surveillance experts were called in to monitor their movements and noted that the guerrillas were videotaping US Embassy officials in their day-to-day activities. It was determined that these individuals could have been planning an operation against the embassy and/or its personnel, and security was increased as a result. No such attack occurred, although it is not clear if this was due to the upgraded security.
By 1995, as many as 2,000 Iranians had found their way to the region and played a role in the operation of at least 15 paramilitary training camps. These forces were later found to have provided training to terrorists and guerrillas in such techniques as anti-tank warfare and weapon manufacturing. A significant portion of this training occurred at a facility north of Sarajevo in the town of Podgovrelica. It is not known what number of the approximately 4,000 mojahedin (holy fighters) from the Middle East and elsewhere that fought on behalf of the Muslim government participated in this training. It is known, however, that a substantial number of them remained behind following the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords - even though the accords brought a formal end to hostilities and dramatically reduced the previously large numbers of Iranian and Muslim paramilitaries in the region.
Nonetheless, Iran currently enjoys a strong and growing relationship with the Bosnian Government, a partnership which has not, however, affected US aid. In November 1996 the Clinton Administration authorised the further release of US$100 million in military aid to Bosnia. This occurred despite classified intelligence from the CIA indicating that Iran had provided US$500,000 in cash payments to the then-Bosnian candidate for president, Alija Izetbegovic. Izetbegovic and his Muslim government went on to win the election. Sources have also pointed to reports that Iranian agents have penetrated the Bosnian military and intelligence communities. Communications intercepted by the National Security Agency (NSA) confirmed the continued presence of the IRGC in the area in violation of the Dayton Peace Accords. (_The Embargo That Wasn't_) *****
Those who speak of "appeasement" are not in touch with reality.
>I
>supported the right of the Albanian Kosovo's to fight back, and considered
>they should be aided so long as they did not violate the national rights of
>others.
NATO gave the KLA 75 days of air cover. What more do you want?
Anyhow, as I said, I don't think I'd change your mind, but I'm doing this for the record, so to speak.
Yoshie