> On Fri, February 5, 1999 at 16:05:58 (+1100) rc-am writes:
> >...
> >there's something seriously amiss in the way chomsky approaches
> >arguments such as these. ...
> >i think he wants to make a distinction between the formal rules of
> >speech and the propositions/judgements, as if the formal rules
> >themselves are a good thing and only need to be applied more
> >rigorously, as if they can be (or should be) separated from the
> >propositions themselves.
> >
> >at times, when I'm thinking of this as a kind of rhetorical strategy,
> >that is, as a tactic to show the irrationality of what is deemed
> >rational, i kinda enjoy it, like i expect a lot of people do. but i
> >don't think he's that cynical about it. i think he actually believes
> >you can and should distinguish the form from the content, which is why
> >he comes out with arguments like the above. which shows that he
> >really cannot come to terms with why so much 'irrationality' exists in
> >the midst of 'rationality' - he thinks they can be distinguished
> >outside of rhetoric.
I've got my own rejoinders to the above to insert here before commenting on Bill's response.
Angela seems to be implying that Chomsky somehow agrees with those he is criticizing, particularly right here:
> >i think he wants to make a distinction between the formal rules of
> >speech and the propositions/judgements, as if the formal rules
> >themselves are a good thing and only need to be applied more
> >rigorously, as if they can be (or should be) separated from the
> >propositions themselves.
(1) Implicit in this, I suppose, is the notion that rationality itself is oppressive. Well, if you really believe this, what's the point of criticizing anything? Nuclear weapons trump any possible argument.
(2) On a purely factual level, it's self-evident that formal rules can be separated from the propositions themselves. That's what propositional logic & propositional calculus are all about -- the workings of formal rules without respect to specific content.
So what's going on here? Is Angela defacto denying the EXISTENCE of propositional logic?
Now onto Bill's comments:
> To what "formal rules" and "propositions/judgements" are you
> referring?
>
> If you mean his theory of universal grammar, I scarcely see
> how his arguments concerning IQ have anything to do with it.
I think this is Angela imposing a sort of over-all gestalt, connecting the idea of generative grammar to the use of formal logic. Chomsky certainly does believe that both are inherent attributes of mind, but:
(1) Whether that's so or not is irrelevent to the *USE* of logical arguments. One can believe that logic is entirely learned and zero percent inherent in the human mind, and still engage in the exact same kind of analysis, with as much vigor and commitment as Chomsky. In fact, if one thinks that logic is entirely dependent on one's own accomplishment--with no help at all from millions of years of evolution--one might be even MORE zealous in using it.
(2) The important point here is precisely that people can so easily MISconstrue logical arguments, and thus need recourse to the kind of logical critique Chomsky provides. This is strikingly DIFFERENT from the Chomskian picture of language. This is not to say that it's incompatible, of course. But it's an important point to note: it's as difficult to speak a language incorrectly (the old "furious green thoughts...") as it is easy to construct a logical argument incorrectly.
> I also don't see where Chomksy is "distinguish[ing] the form
> from the content". Chomsky is not interested per se in the
> "form" of the argument, that is, the logical relation amongst
> the component parts, he is merely trying to get at the assumptions
> underpinning the argument.
I think what she means (whether she realizes it or not) is simply that Chomsky is capable of bracketing an argument, and treating it as if it were true. In one form or another this is deeply a part of rational argumentation that I don't see how one could possibly do without it. This same habit of mind is, of course, the foundation of all art and literature.
> I also don't understand what you mean by your claim that Chomsky
> "thinks [rationality and irrationality] can be distinguished outside
> of rhetoric". We distinguish rationality and irrationality outside of
> "rhetoric" (whatever that entails) all the time. Try building a
> bridge with irrational methods. Try understanding how children
> develop language with such methods.
An excellent point very succinctly made.
However, all rationality is embodied and language is an embodiment that can have a rhetorical rationality that's not exhausted (or could even be misrepresented) by casting it into purely logical representations. This doesn't seem at all relevent here, but it is an important point to keep in mind generally.
> Chomsky does not pretend to see
> into the dark reaches of the human mind to tell us *why*
> Murray/Herrnstein hold the beliefs that they do, merely that their
> endeavor is that of racists, since it could only make a difference to
> racists.
And this is the real cash value of his whole enterprise.
Getting so hung up on the means that you miss this point is a terrible mistake. Whatever analysis of the means you want to put forward, it has to square with this result, and the intent to reach it.
-- Paul Rosenberg Reason and Democracy rad at gte.net
"Let's put the information BACK into the information age!"