>>
Basically I had suggested that the perceived absence of real limits . . .
There simply would be no budget surplus and present terms of credit would be much more onerous without said advantages. . . .
We should be very clear about what level of catastrophic global capital
flight and distress exports it has taken to "grow" the American GDP . . .
>>
The problem with this argument is that it is logical in a qualitative sense, but it begs for numbers that would establish its grounding in empirical reality. The question of "how much" or "how big" lurks around every corner. Without specifications of this sort, we remain suspended in mid air.
>>
. . . It is a dangerous illusion for the American working class to think
that the govt can maintain a high level of effective demand. . . .
>>
I fail to see why not. It's not as if everyone's consumption desires here have been satiated, even as rich as the U.S. is relative to the rest of the world.
>>
Any sustained upturn
abroad will manifest itself in a resumption of the incline in the American
govt debt/GDP ratio that will constrain the use of the fiscal card
>>
But there is no problem with an incline (i.e., increase) in principle, as long as it's not too steep.
>>
(moreover, Max never responded to Shaviro's argument against Einser about
the real ineffectiveness of deficits in the 80s or Doug's question about
how a Keynesian would explain strong growth after 94 fiscal conservatism).
>>
I'm not the best person to deal with this, though I agree it is a legitimate question.
>>
Only due to present and conjunctural imperialsit advantages does it seem
as if the govt can enjoy the latitude and the good credit terms to
stabilize the economy through fiscal policy. There is not as much room here
as appears. The working class must reject this solution both because of
the foundations it is built on (world wide misery) and its tenuousness.
>>
This last is a moral argument, not a political strategy.
>>
Practically speaking, not too much time and energy should be spent on
getting fiscal liberals into office.
The risks of such electoral abstention are easy to underline while the
dangers of narrow parliamentarism--Hilferding's legacy--much easier to
forget.
>>
Parliamentarism need not be narrow.
Most of your criticism is directed at stabilization policy, but completely apart from that there is the matter of public programs to enhance economic security and redistribute income. The liberal/soc-dem agenda is more on these latter themes than not.
>>
. . . To repeat: My criticism is basically about why deficit spending
should not
be expected to remain an apparently viable and effective means by which to
stabilize the economy. The working class will have to find solutions other
than the election of friendly fiscal liberals. This is the message you must
bring to the Labor Party, Max. Don't sell em snake oil.
>>
The LP activists are not much interested in what I have to say. They are closer to your view than mine on electing liberals. It's not clear, however, how much they would guard against half- or quarter-measures coming from their own candidates, in the event they elected some. One clue to this is their odd congeniality towards labor governments in power in other countries, notwithstanding the neo-liberal policies of some of these governments.
mbs