STRATFOR.COM Global Intelligence Update July 22, 1999
Yugoslav Opposition Admits it is Powerless
Summary:
Serbian opposition leaders have postponed a major march on Belgrade due to admitted lack of interest, suggesting NATO's claims of the impending collapse of the Milosevic regime are a bit optimistic. The Yugoslav opposition is plagued by disunity, and by resentment of their Western sponsors. They also lack the vital support of the military and police apparatus. As long as Milosevic remains in power, Western Europe cannot hope to achieve its already fantastic goal of bringing peace, stability and prosperity to the Balkans. Milosevic is banking on this, and with little current threat to his regime, may just last long enough to cut a deal for his resignation.
Analysis:
On July 20, the Daily Telegraph reported that a major opposition march on Belgrade had been postponed until late August or early September due to a lack of popular support. The march was organized by the Alliance for Change opposition movement and was to have been a climatic event following recent protests held across Serbia calling for the ouster of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. The march was expected to bring more than a million Serbs to Belgrade from all parts of the country. The Alliance for Change has also circulated numerous petitions calling for the resignation of Milosevic, and has accumulated hundreds of thousands of signatures, according to the independent Beta news agency. Yet opposition leaders Zoran Djindjic of the Alliance for Change and Vuk Draskovic of the Serbian Renewal Movement both admitted on July 18 that they had a long way to go before they could muster enough people to force the resignation of Milosevic.
The United States, Germany and other NATO countries have touted the impending collapse of the Milosevic regime and have increased their support to the Yugoslav opposition to hasten that outcome. German Foreign Ministry spokesman Andreas Michaelis said July 17 that within the next week his office would conduct further "rounds of dialogue" with Serb opposition politicians. U.S. State Department spokesman James Rubin has also previously called for Milosevic's resignation and has vowed that international aid would not be given to Yugoslavia under Milosevic's control. In early July President Clinton authorized the CIA to engage in electronic warfare to meddle in bank accounts of President Milosevic and has also approved funds to support various opposition groups.
However, despite Western optimism about Milosevic's downfall, the rumors of that downfall appear to be greatly exaggerated. Three major things stand in the way of Milosevic's ouster. The first is the power of Serbian resentment and sense of martyrdom. Milosevic did fight to keep Kosovo, while the NATO countries now actively supporting the Serbian opposition bombed Serbia for two and a half months. And now that NATO is arbiter of justice in Kosovo, it appears to be doing little to halt Albanian attacks on Serbs. Serbs feel that Western Europe ganged up on them to strip their country of a historically significant province on behalf of hostile Moslems in Albania, after similarly supporting Serbian foes in Croatia and Bosnia. And now Western Europe is attempting to dictate democracy to Serbia through the overthrow and trial of the Serbian president and his replacement with pro-Western stooges. Serbs may not like Milosevic, but they are not ready to forgive NATO or back its allies.
The second factor, openly acknowledged by the opposition, is that Milosevic is still firmly in control of the military and the police. On July 21, Yugoslav government officials moved to address the single weak link in the security apparatus -- quiet, angry army reservists who fought against NATO and have yet to receive their back pay. 1,000 reservists are blocking roads in central and southern Serbia and have said they will not move until they are paid. Many of the reservists have reportedly brought their weapons home and said July 21 that they would go to Belgrade if they were not paid within 48 hours. Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic told a government session July 21 that payment of the reservists was a top priority, but that it would be in their best interests to wait until August 1 to receive their first installments. Milosevic has already paid the police force, and the opposition has acknowledged seeing no other sign of impending mutiny in the ranks of the military.
Finally, the opposition itself is fractured. Djindjic told the Montenegrin daily Vijesti July 19 that the Alliance for Change had "no reason" to cooperate with Draskovic's Serbian Renewal Movement. Djindjic said the two sides disagreed over the need to oust Milosevic from power, and also "Draskovic's offer [of cooperation] is not acceptable because it places a roof before building a foundation." Meanwhile, Draskovic, who is more a weathervane than a true opposition leader, has continued to toy with the idea of rejoining the Milosevic government. Milosevic is undoubtedly already exploiting and exacerbating rifts in the opposition, and will leap at the prospect of co-opting opposition factions.
With a fragmented Yugoslav opposition, continued NATO-accepted Albanian pressure in Kosovo, and the tools of power firmly in Milosevic's hands, U.S. calls for his resignation or ouster are falling on increasingly deaf ears. The opposition has admitted it is incapable of ousting Milosevic, and lacking a groundswell of popular support, it is having little impact on the balance of power in Belgrade. The lack of support for the march on Belgrade illustrates a general reluctance on the part of the Serbian people to risk bloodshed either to remove Milosevic or to enthrone the opposition. If he can appease the army reservists, police forces, and regular army troops, thus securing himself from the threat of ouster by a fellow Serbian hardliner or an opportunistic and charismatic opposition leader, Milosevic may manage to remain in office long enough to strike a deal on his future. For now, Western Europe appears stuck with a Milosevic regime in Serbia, and with its own embargo on the Serbs. In short, it has a secure, hostile, and embattled regime in the heart of the region it is attempting to stabilize and rebuild. For Milosevic, that is a serious bargaining chip.
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