first up, why should even bother to rely to a post that was (variously) accusatory, flattering, demanding and bizarrely suspicious? you might get something from this kind of exchange, but I don't. we disagree. it's that simple and i would have thought uninteresting.
I'll reply here to the specific question of the theory of social change stuff, which in any case I have already replied to in two subsequent posts, but you did not seem to read. on the issue of Zizek and Balibar, if you have any specific citations that trouble you, cite them and I'll do my best to respond to specific questions and criticisms of them. on the issue of Sennett and sociology, I think I've already elaborated, but I'll send an offlist replying specifically to your recent post. I'll also reply offlist to your complaints about what you perceive as my not having been sufficiently attentive to you and so on. if anyone thinks I'm being harsh, then I'd be happy to send them a copy of these offlist posts. nothing to hide, it's just tedious to have to have responded to, and no doubt to read.
so, on the issue of theories of social change:
kelley wrote:
> why do I say this? when i asked as to whether zizek's account had some
> semblance of a theory of social change, I was read as demanding that theory
> dictate practice, that theory and intellectuals assume some dictatorial
> role in history, that my question could only assume that i must support
> some sort of archemedean approach to Truth.
no, you were read as assuming that a theory of social change is possible as more than a retrospective account, as history; ie., that it is possible to have a theory of the transition from capitalism to communism (or something other, or better, or other than capitalism) and not simply a theory of why and how past events and processes of social change occurred. that would be a fairly reasonable interpretation I think.
is that accurate?
and, my response to this was to refer not only to a notion of finite intellects (which is not the same as arguing there is no transcendent truth a la rorty or lyotard), an archimedian position (specifically, outside of history, crudely here described as the 'map', but still not a question of truth or falsity), and Marx's critique of utopian politics. I specifically wrote: "our intellects are finite, not archimedean: they remain trapped in the world as it is, no matter how frustrating. this to me is also the meaning of Marx's injunction against utopianism. the pretense that one has overcome the world in theory is reallythe reproduction of the world in a more idealised form, shorn of the 'bad side' of a dialectical unity."
here's one theory of social change: there is a contradiction between the forces of production and the relations of production. the forces of production are progressive, the relations are residual, reactionary. by enhancing and encouraging the development of the forces of production, we move forward to communism. that's a decidedly crude outline, which I'll no doubt get into trouble for, but bear with me. the problem with this formulation, in regard to the comments above, is not only that it idealizes the forces of production, reduces them to those moments which are progressive and forgets those moments which constitute real setbacks (machines not as labour-saving devices but as strikebreakers, for instance) -- ie., forgets the contradictions on both sides of the grand contradiction it has decided constitutes the key to a theory of social change --, but it also places the future on the plane of an already existing, specifically capitalist, construction, that of the forces of production as _historically distinguishable_ from the relations of production. to put it another way, it makes the future a replica of the present, but now seen through rose-coloured specs.
and, whilst the formulations, including the above can often be useful in analyses to get at the heart of this or that problem and certainly shouldn't be rejected out of hand for this, their connection to a politics of change is dubious, not least because it would have us cheering on the forces of production (in toto) and designating resistance against (say) the uses of technology in enhancing the power of capital in specific situtations as reactionary.
now, whether these kinds of utopian projections are avoidable is doubtful. but there are other questions to ask that do not entail the same kinds of pitfalls, but do approach the same set of issues. I've usually been more interested in, for some of the reasons above, thinking through not what theory of social change is best, but what is or is not integral to capitalism. this was the exact debate in the thread on surplus value, for instance. in another sense, the question can be how is the working class organised and disorganised, ie., the question of class composition, which is why I referred to preferring Kim Moody's book, and why I went into a discussion of class composition, bologna and Tronti -- to which you didn't respond. perhaps i was too obscure or concise, in which case, you should have asked for elaboration.
I'm wandering, but you get the gist: there are ways of approaching these issues that are not an attempt to arrive at a general theory of social change. my argument then, is that we shouldn't expect there to be a _theory_ of social change.
if there is another theory of social change with which you're more familiar, or to which you're sympathetic, maybe we can be more specific in discussing that.
>indeed you referenced a post to chaz in
> which it was pretty clear i rejected this position.
well, it was not at all clear that you had problems with a vanguardist notion of the party, given you explicitly said you were playing devil's advocate. what was also not entirely clear is how you would distinguish between a vanguardist theory of the party and a vanguard moment in/for theory? the connection between theory and the party is central to leninist ideas of social change: the party is the intellect, this is what enables it to move outside of the given experiences of the working class (I guess defined as non-intellect) and envision a radically different future. ie., it's a voluntarist theory of theory as the spur and vanguard of social change. this is not news. but, my response to the issue of a _theory of social change_ would be that theory in particular cannot be expected to play this role. it tries to reduce the complexity of a situation (often and at its best moments) into a dialectical key. even a vanguardist notion of the party is better than this.
I'll put it as concisely as I can: I don't think there can be a _theory_ of social change that isn't also an obstacle that needs to be overcome, and which can't be overcome in theory. if there are criticisms of established theories of social change from the perspective of opening up the horizon, of finding the ways in which a closure has been effected, all the better: this usually indicates that the world is on the move.
that's why i think that deconstructive, lacanian, etc stuff can be useful -- not as some set of abstract principles.
Angela _________