>If this is part of a wider KLA takeover of the Kosovo economy, much may
>also depend on whether their agenda is purely nationalist or whether there
>are some consciously socialist or at least cooperative elements within it.
>Hopefully the latter.
I followed reported chats with KLA members pretty closely throughout, and I heard everything from committed democratic socialism to fascist bloodlust. The KLA is no monolith, and I'd not be surprised to see all those unreturned shooters put to use in the region again soon.
And I reckon NATO jumped at the first chance it had to end that air war, Nathan. It was a disaster for all concerned (except the manufacturers), and NATO is relying on its PR people (more sophisticated than its general staff, for mine) to turn embarrassing truth into the glow of victory. It made sense only in concert with successful US pressure on Russia, for mine. And 6000 Serbian deaths is three times the figure for prewar Albanian Kosovar fatalities in the year up to the NATO intervention, most of whom, I'd guess with some confidence, were KLA belligerents.
As for prediction number two, Milo's still in the chair, the opposition is fracturing, and is smaller, on numbers reported, than was indicated by the popular street activism of a couple of years back. Stratfor reckons Milo is pretty safe, too.
And international law was not a particularly salient issue in LBO debate. If it were, the constitution of tribunals and the discretion of states like the US simply to refuse to be party to investigations into their own actions would need to be addressed.
I've changed my mind on a couple of things on these lists. The civilising potential of military western intervention is one. I now reckon there ain't any.
Cheers, Rob.