>>In order to change Chinese feudal society towards Communist social
>>order, which is understood by Communists as a necessary goal of human
>>development, Mao developed specific methods out of Leninist concepts
>>which renedered special characteristics to Chinese Communism, its
>>strengths and shortcomings. These methods, above all
>>the system of organized mass movements, stress the change of social
>>consciousness, i.e. the creation of new men for a new society, as the
>>basis for changing reality, i.e. the mode of production. The concept of
>>the mass politics, relevant in Chinese political thought from ancient
>>time, plays a role as important as that of the elite cadre corps within
>>the Party.
>>The mass movement as an instrument of political communication from above
>>to below is peculiar to Chinese Communist organization. This phenomenon
>>is of utmost importance in understanding the nature and dynamics of the
>>governmental structure of the Communists Party of China (CPC). The
>>theoretical foundation of mass movement as a means of mediation between
>>the will of the leaders and the people presupposes that nothing is
>>impossible for the masses, quantitatively understood as a collective
>>subject, if their power is concentrated by a Party of correct thought
>>and action. This concept comes out of Mao's romantic faith in the great
>>strength the masses are capable of developing in the interest of their
>>own well-being. So the "will of the masses" has to be articulated by
>>the masses and within the masses. This the CPC calls the "mass line".
>>Mao's mass line theory requires that the leadership elite be close to
>>the people, that it is continuously informed about the people's will and
>>that it transforms this will into concrete actions by the masses.
>>>From the masses - back to the masses! This means: take the scattered
>>and
>>unorganized ideas of the masses and, through study, turn them into
>>focused and systemic programs, then go back to the masses and propagate
>>and explain these ideals until the masses embrace them as their own.
>>Thus mass movements are initiated at the highest level, announced to
>>Party cadres at central and regional work conferences, subject to cadre
>>criticism and modified, after which starts the first phase of mass
>>movement. Mass organizations are held to provoke the "people's will",
>>through readers' letters to newspapers and rallies at which these
>>letters are read and debated. The results are then officially discussed
>>by the staff of leading organs of the state and the Party, after which
>>the systematized "people's will" is clarified into acts of law or
>>resolutions, and then the mass movement spreads to the whole nation.
>>Until the Cultural Revolution, the history of Chinese politics is a
>>history of mass movements.
>>Mass movements successfully implemented Land Reform 1950-53; Marriage
>>Reform 1950-52; Collectivization 1953 - the General Line of Socialist
>>Transformation (from national bourgeois democratic revolution to
>>proletarian socialist revolution); Nationalization 1955 (from private
>>ownership of industrial means of production into state ownership). The
>>method against opposition was thought reform through "brain washing"
>>(without the derogatory connotation), which is a principle of preferring
>>to change the consciousness of political opponents instead of physically
>>liquidating them.
>>The Hundred Flower Movement, 1957 was launched on February by Mao with
>>his famous 4-hour speech; "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions
>>among the People" before 1,800 leading cadres. In it, Mao distinguished
>>"contradiction between the enemy and ourselves"
>>from "contradiction among the people" which should not be resolved by a
>>dictatorship, i.e. physical force, but by open discussion with criticism
>>and counter criticism.
>>Up until 1957, the mass movement policies of Mao achieved spectacular
>>success. Land reform was completed, the struggle for women's
>>emancipation was progressing well, and collectivization and
>>nationalization was leading the nation into socialism. Health services
>>were a model of socialist construction in both cities and the
>>countryside. The Party's revolutionary leadership was accepted
>>enthusiastically by society.
>>By 1958, agriculture production almost doubled from 1949 (108 million
>>tons to 185 million tons), coal production quadrupled to 123 million
>>tons, steel production grew from 0.1 million tons to 5.3 million tons.
>>The only problem came from bourgeois intellectual rebellion.
>>On May 25, 1957 Mao expressed his anxiety at a session of the Standing
>>Committee of the Politburo, and gave his approval to those who warned
>>against too much bourgeois liberty.
>>That afternoon, Mao said at a Conference of Communists Youth League
>>cadres that "all words and deeds which deviate from socialism are
>>basically wrong".
>>At the opening session of the Peoples Congress on June 26, Zhou Enlai
>>initiated the "counter criticism" against the critics.
>>Mao's call for open criticism was serious and genuine, but the
>>discussion he had conceived of as a safety-valve reached a degree of
>>intensity he had not anticipated. Mao over-estimated the stability of
>>the political climate.
>>Against this background, the CPC stood at the crossroad of choosing the
>>Soviet model of development or an independent path.
>>Economy development was based on three elements:
>>1) Build up heavy industry at the expense of agriculture.
>>2) The establishment of an extensive system of individual incentives by
>>mean of which productive forces could be developed from a conviction
>>that the superiority of socialist modes of production would be
>>vindicated by visible rise in living standards,
>>3) The acceleration of the socialist transformation of society in order
>>to create the precondition required by the CPC for establishing a
>>socialist order.
>>Two paths were opened to the CPC leadership in 1958:
>>1) a phase of consolidation
>>2) pushing forward toward permanent revolution.
>>Mao was forced by geopolitical conditions (withdrawal of Soviet aid and
>>US embargo) to overcome the lack of capital through mobilization of
>>China's vast labor reservoir. The strategy was to connect political
>>campaigns to production campaigns.
>>Under pressure from orthodox Leninists within the Party apparatus, with
>>the failure of the "Hundred Flower Movement", Mao concluded it was
>>impossible to create a socialist consciousness through a gradual
>>improvement of material living conditions; that consciousness and
>>reality had to be changed concurrently and in conjunction through
>>gigantic new efforts at mobilization.
>>This led to the Anti-Rightist Campaign 1957-58 followed by "Three Red
>>Banner" in Spring 1958 initiating simultaneous development of industry
>>and agriculture through the use of both modern and traditional methods
>>of production under the "General Line of Building Socialism". It was to
>>be implemented through a labor intensive development policy by a "Great
>>Leap Forward" and by establishing a comprehensive collectivization by
>>establishing "People's Communes".
>>The GLP was not as senseless as some suggest. It called for the new
>>system of "Two Decentralizations, Three Centralizations, One
>>Responsibility." By this it was meant the decentralized use of labor and
>>local investment, central control over political decisions, planning and
>>administration of national investment capital and one responsibility
>>meant every basic unit to account for itself to its supervising unit.
>>The GLP was successful in many areas. The one area that failed
>>attracted the most attention. It was the area of backyard steel furnace
>>production. The technological requirement of steel making, unlike
>>hydro-electricity, did not lend itself to labor intensive mass
>>movements. Yet steel was the symbol of industrialization and a heroic
>>attempt had to be made to overcome the lack of capital. The attempt
>>failed conspicuously, but its damage to the economy was overrated.
>>The real test however, was in the People's Commune. Favorable weather
>>conditions produced high yields in 1958 in the experimental communes.
>>This led to a rush nationwide to follow suit, even though almost
>>everywhere the fundamental preconditions for successful operation were
>>absent. Most did not have adequate administrative offices, nurseries,
>>canteens, old peoples homes, hospitals, etc.
>>In other places, the local leadership took the transition to communism
>>at face value and severed all connection with supervising organs in the
>>name of the withering away of the state. Disorder grew into chaos
>>within months.
>>During the Wuhan Party Plenum, December 1958, Marshal Peng Dehuai
>>criticized the over-extended commune program which led to the Plenum
>>initiating a readjustment of the "Three Red Banner" policy.
>>Conccurrently the Central Committee approved "the wish of Comrade Mao
>>Zedong not to stand again as a candidate for the Chairmanship of the PRC
>>after the end of his term in office".
>>Liu Shaoqi was elected as head of state by the second People's Congress
>>on April 27, 1959 and became heir apparent after Mao in the Party.
>>In the fateful Lushan conference July 2-August 16 1959, Marshal Peng
>>shifted his criticism from policy to the person of the leader. On July
>>23, Mao in an emphatic speech, rejected the reproach of his critics and
>>declared that the "Great Leap Forward" and the People's Commune had
>>brought about more advantages than disadvantages. Mao threatened an open
>>split:
>>"If we deserve to perish I shall go away, I shall go to the countryside
>>and lead the peasants to overthrow the government. If you of the PLA
>>will not follow me, the I shall find a Red Army. But I believe that the
>>PLA will follow me."
>>On August 16, 1959, Peng and his followers were condemned as an "anti
>>Party clique" by a resolution passed by the Eighth Plenum.
>>On September 17, Peng was dismissed as Defense Minister.
>>In late 1959, several natural disasters and bad weather condition were
>>reported in the press. Floods and drought brought about the "three
>>bitter years" of 1959-1962. After 1962, the economy recovered, but the
>>politic was shifting toward a struggle against revisionism which brought
>>on the Cultural Revolution four years later.
>>While Mao was the leader of the CPC, leadership was and still is based
>>on mass support. The Chairmanship of the CPC before 1979 was similar to
>>the position of Pope in the Catholic Church, powerful in moral authority
>>but highly circumscribed in operational power.
>>The GLF was the product of mass movement, not that of a single person.
>>Mao's leadership was toward the organization of the Party and it policy
>>formulation procedures, not the dictation of particular programs.
>>To describe Mao as a dictator merely reflects an ignorance of the CPC
>>power structure. The failures of the GLF and the People's Commune were
>>caused more by implementation flaws rather than conceptual error. Bad
>>luck and US embargo had also something to do with it.
>>These programs resulted in much suffering, but the claim that 30 million
>>people were murdered by Mao with evil intent does not deserve a
>>courteous response.
>>Henry C.K. Liu
>>Michael Perelman wrote:
>>> We do not need to be calling each other ultra-rightist idiots. I do not Brad
>>> agree with Brad. William Hinton blames the famine on conflicts within the
>>> government that immobilized it, but that is beside the point.
>>>
>>> We must keep a modicum of courtesy here.
>>>
>>> "Craven, Jim" wrote:
>>>
>>> > Who is this ultra-rightist idiot Delong? First of all, the use of the
>>> > disingenuous Kirkpatrickian term "Totalitarian" versus "Authoritarian" is
>>> > the first give away. If you have a society of despots and death squads that
>>> > is anti-communist, monopoly or dependent monopoly capitalist and a
>>> > whore/toady of US imperialism, it is "Authoritarian"; if it is nominally
>>> > socialist, even more advanced in respect for basic human rights, it is
>>> > "Totalitarian."
>>> >
>>> > Next, let's explore the logic. Jews of the Warsaw ghetto employed violence
>>> > to resist genocide and the nazis employed violence to conduct genocide
>>> > therefore Jews = Nazis because they both employed "violence"? Or Mao
>>> > "killed" over 30 million Chinese (assumption to be summarily
>>> > asserted/accepted) and Hitler "killed" over 20 million "therefore" Evil of
>>> > Mao > Evil of Hitler?
>>> >
>>> > This is a good example of why the Cultural Revolution in China, depsite its
>>> > excesses and crimes, was fundamentally a sound idea--send hacks, toadies,
>>> > sycophants and ideologues/scholar despots like this Delong to the
>>> > countryside to slop hogs; get some of the scholar despot/whore profs off
>>> > their asses to do a decent days work. Since the poor have to work hard and
>>> > produce surpluses for the Philosopher Kings, it is legitimate to ask what of
>>> > value the Philosopher Kings and Scholar Despots are producing.
>>> >
>>> > And what makes this Delong worth even reading? Why does a long CV
>>> > automatically qualify someone (quantity versus quality) as an "established
>>> > scholar" or "notable scholar" without any reference to the quality of the
>>> > work or the experiencial-as well as theoretical--basis for any purported
>>> > quality or work.
>>> >
>>> > A Cold Warrior without an enemy is like a hooker without a motel or space to
>>> > sell his/her wares. And the sad part is that the universities are full of
>>> > these petiti-bourgeois self-appointed "scholars" and "experts" who turn out
>>> > even worse shit than this Delong is apparently turning out.
>>> >
>>> > As they say in Kerala: "In the land of the people with no nose, the one with
>>> > half a nose is king".
>>> >
>>> > Jim Craven
>>>
>>> --
>>> Michael Perelman
>>> Economics Department
>>> California State University
>>> Chico, CA 95929
>>>
>>> Tel. 530-898-5321
>>> E-Mail michael at ecst.csuchico.edu