THE WINNERS AND LOSERS IN THE BALKAN WAR By Bernard E. Trainor
ho are the winners and losers in the Kosovo conflict?
A clear winner is Russia, whose envoy, Viktor Chernomyrdin, adroitly played the role of friend of the Slavs, honest broker, and finally endorser of NATO. In this last role, he sealed Serbian fate when he withdrew Russian support from Belgrade and joined Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari in presenting what amounted to NATO's ultimatum for peace. Slobodan Milosevic then realized he had lost his only supporter, that he was totally isolated, with his country in ruins, so he caved in. Despite the pathetic domestic and economic situation at home, Russia showed that it still could be a major player on the international scene. In the process, Russia's prestige was enhanced as well as its likelihood for further Western aid. At the same time, Russia embarrassed its old foe NATO by being the indispensable element in the peace process.
Another clear winner is the Kosovo Liberation Army. Its sole goal from the outset has been an independent Kosovo. They are close to achieving it. Notwithstanding NATO confirmation of Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo and agreement that Albanian Kosovars will only enjoy autonomy status within Yugoslavia, for all practical purposes they have gained their independence. Despite NATO assurances of protection, most of the minority Serbs living in Kosovo who fear retribution will exit the province along with the Serb army, police and paramilitaries. At least for the immediate future, none will come back to claim their homeland. For all practical purposes Kosovo will be Albanian. Whether the KLA disarms, as they agreed to do at Rambouillet, remains to be seen. At any rate, the KLA will be a force to be reckoned with in the months to come.
Who were the clear losers in the drama?
Obviously, the Serbian people. They became pariahs within the civilized world. They suffered tremendous damage from their psychological well-being to their national infra-structure. On top of that, they lost a province that has great emotional and spiritual meaning to them. And they are still saddled with the scoundrel who led them down the path of destruction. For them, there is no redeeming virtue in the war despite their patriotic bravado.
The Kosovar Albanians are also losers. It is true that they would have suffered at the hands of the Serbs' ''ethnic cleansing'' campaign if NATO had not intervened. Still, the air campaign failed to prevent Milosevic from carrying it out and probably increased its viciousness. The Kosovars have lost lives and homes at the hands of the Serbs, and their cities, bridges, railroads, and slender industrial base in the bomb sights of NATO bombers. Most will return under NATO protection, but their loss is incalculable.
Others may claim a victory, but, in fact, they may experience a long-term loss. For example, Milosovic remains firmly in power despite being an indicted war criminal and technically, Kosovo remains a Serb province. For him, this is some sort of win. How long he lasts is an entirely different matter. Once the wartime nationalist sentiment subsides in Serbia, he may be called to account for the disaster he visited upon his people and ultimately find himself in the dock.
Proponents of air power will also see this as a victory. Ever since the early days of military aircraft, ''victory through air power'' has been the Air Force's goal in war. It failed in World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm, and critics predicted it would fail in the Balkans; it didn't. Two factors led to success: Precision-guided bombs performed as advertised, despite periodic but embarrassing and costly exceptions, such as mistakenly bombing civilians. And high-tech weaponry permitted pilots to fly high out of harm's way while visiting destruction below. An estimated 5,000 to 10,000 Serbs were killed in the bombing at no cost to the airmen. This has troubling moral and political implications. Despite the accuracy of the air attacks, too many civilians were killed while allied combatants avoided risk. This turns a principle of a just war on its head, specifically the obligation to protect the innocent at the expense of the warrior.
Another troubling and similar aspect of the so-called ''immaculate'' air campaign is the ability to drive an enemy to his knees without shedding a drop of the bomber's blood. Normally, the litmus test of going to war was the willingness to suffer casualties in pursuit of its objective. To dispatch a foe clinically at no cost to one's self may set a dangerous precedent by making resorting to bombing in a crisis too attractive an option. Air-power advocates should also recognize that their victory, as impressive as it seems to be, was not as clear cut as they might claim. It was not until the Russians abandoned the Serbian cause and the threat of a real ground war began to emerge, that bombing became intolerable to Milosovic.
NATO members can rightly claim victory in the face of Milosevic's capitulation. But that which the alliance set out to do was not achieved, i.e. protecting the Kosovars. The most satisfaction that can be derived from almost 80 days of contentious bombing is that NATO held together and rescued the survivors of Serb cruelty. Unfortunately, the Balkan problem has not been solved, just suspended. Ethnic hatred seethes throughout the region. NATO forces will be in the Balkans for a long time. Even then, they may not be able to keep the lid on the boiling cauldron. The idea that NATO's post-Cold War mission was to insure stability in Europe has been a costly failure. It is not likely that NATO will have an appetite for similar adventures in the future. The Germans, Italians, and Greeks will see to that. Thus, Kosovo may do to NATO what the Soviets couldn't do - destroy it.
The apparent big winner, may turn out to be the biggest loser, the United States. President Clinton masterminded the victory so he gets the lion's share of the credit, but in the long run, he and the United States may suffer from unintended consequences. Few will argue that the decision to threaten force and then bomb to bring Milosevic to heel was a major miscalculation that led to destruction and loss of life, in Kosovo and Serbia. The president gets the blame for that. As the bombing progressed, civilians began to die and the Chinese Embassy was bombed. Confidence in Washington eroded within NATO and criticism mounted around the world.
Clinton was already under fire for his bombing policy in Iraq and the ill-conceived missile attacks on Sudan and Afghanistan, as well for some of his economic policies. A ground swell of anti-Americanism is now growing. America is being viewed as a bully who brags of being ''the world's only remaining superpower.'' Relations with Russia and China have suffered a severe setback. The cumulative effect of resentment and loss of confidence in the United States means a serious loss of prestige and influence. The United States can expect coalitions to form opposing American foreign policy objectives and means. Europeans are already loosening their dependence upon the American-dominated NATO alliance and looking inward. Last Thursday, leaders of the 15 European Union countries agreed to create their own military force and invited Javier Solana, the secretary general of NATO, to be its security and foreign policy minister when he steps down from his post.
Domestically, neo-isolationism is on the rise. The public has grown weary of the indecisive moral crusades that have led us into Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The age of what can be described as American humanitarian imperialism is coming to a close. It will be replaced with hard-nosed realpolitik. Hereafter, the American people, who have never fully understood or supported our interventions around the world, will demand that military deployments be tied to concrete and narrowly defined national interests.
Well intentioned as he may be, Clinton's inept policies have been a blow to internationalists and could be a victory for those who would turn their backs on the world.
Bernard E. Trainor is a retired Marine general and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.