In _The Unbroken Record: Soviet Treaty Compliance_ (International 1985), Daniel Rosenberg says:
" This became known as the Moscow Test-Ban Treaty, a most significant agreement and the first arms treaty since the advent of nuclear weapons.As tensions declined, President Kennedy had made an important appraisal (five months before he was assassinated): 'let us examine our attitude toward peace itself. Too many of us think it is impossible. but that is a dangerous, defeatist belief. It leads to the conclusion that war is inevitable..' Nuclear war, said Kennedy, could not be realistically promoted by anybody. it could not be limited: ' all we have built , all we have worked for, would be destroyed in the first twenty-four hours.' The U.S. and Soviets peoples had a 'mutual abhorrence of war.' and thus had basic 'common interests.' He declared, 'Let us re-examine our attitude toward the cold war, remembering that we are not engaged in a debate, seeking to pile up debating points...We must deal with the world as it is, and not as it might have been had the history of the last ei! ghteen years been different.' " (from statements by Kennedy on February 25, 1962 and June 10, 1963).
This was not the rightwing, military-industrial complex line on these matters.
Charles Brown
>>> Doug Henwood <dhenwood at panix.com> 06/12/99 12:18PM >>>
Sam Pawlett wrote:
>Jim heartfield wrote:
>>
>> Doug is right on the Kennedy myth.
>>
>> Noam Chomsky blew this one out of the water in his book 'Rethinking
>> Camelot' (?) which was published around the time of the Oliver Stone
>> film on the assassination. Chomsky does his usual diligent job of
>> mobilising every scrap of evidence to show, beyond doubt, that Kennedy
>> was a hawk on Vietnam. As I remember it, Chomsky credits Arthur
>> Schlesinger as the originator of the myth of Kennedy's reluctance over
>> Vietnam.
>>
>
>There are two famous NSC directives[forget the numbers] showing K's
>reluctance over Vietnam. LBJ escalated the war immedietely after
>assuming power.
Chomsky's article on this is at <http://www.zmag.org/chomsky/articles/z9209-vain-hopes.html>. It has links to the longer analysis in Rethinking Camelot.
Chomsky aruges that the NSC directives - agreed to by the Joint Chiefs of Staff - predicated withdrawal of U.S. forces on victory. In the last months of JFK's life, the U.S. was plotting to overthrow the government of Vietnam (GVN) because it was perceived as an obstacle to victory. A few paragraphs from Chomsky:
<quote> Through October 1963, problems with the GVN continued to mount. Nhu called openly for the Americans to get out completely, only providing aid. Another problem was the lack of "effectiveness of GVN in its relation to its own people." Asked about this, Ambassador Lodge responded in an "Eyes only for the President" communication that "Viet-Nam is not a thoroughly strong police state...because, unlike Hitler's Germany, it is not efficient" and is thus unable to suppress the "large and well-organized underground opponent strongly and ever-freshly motivated by vigorous hatred." The Vietnamese "appear to be more than ever anxious to be left alone," and though they "are said to be capable of great violence on occasion," "there is no sight of it at the present time," another impediment to US efforts.
Small wonder that JFK was unwilling to commit himself to the McNamara-Taylor withdrawal proposal. Note that the same defects of the US clients underlie the critique of the strategic hamlet program by Kennedy doves.
Washington's coup plans continued, with Ambassador Lodge in operational command. The only hesitation was fear of failure. When the coup finally took place on November 1, replacing Diem and Nhu (who were killed) by a military regime, the President praised Lodge effusively for his "fine job" and "leadership," an "achievement...of the greatest importance." With the generals now in power, "our primary emphasis should be on effectiveness rather than upon external appearances," the President added. We must help the coup regime to confront "the real problems of winning the contest against the Communists and holding the confidence of its own people." The "ineffectiveness, loss of popular confidence, and the prospect of defeat that were decisive in shaping our relations to the Diem regime" are now a thing of the past, the President hoped, thanks to Lodge's inspired leadership and coup-management, with its gratifying outcome (Nov. 6).
Two weeks before Kennedy's assassination, there is not a phrase in the voluminous internal record that even hints at withdrawal without victory. JFK urges that everyone "focus on winning the war"; withdrawal is conditioned on victory, and motivated by domestic discontent with Kennedy's war. The stakes are considered enormous. Nothing substantial changes as the mantle passes to LBJ.
[...]
At the Honolulu meeting, a draft was written by McGeorge Bundy for what became NSAM 273, adopted after the assassination but prepared for JFK with the expectation that he would approve it in essentials, as was the norm. Top advisers agreed; Hilsman made only "minor changes." The State Department history states correctly that the draft "was almost identical to the final paper," differing only in paragraph 7.
Both documents reiterate the basic wording of the early October documents. On withdrawal, the version approved by Johnson is identical with the draft prepared for Kennedy. It reads: "The objectives of the United States with respect to the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel remain as stated in the White House statement of October 2, 1963," referring to the statement of US policy formalized without essential change as NSAM 263. As for paragraph 7, the draft and final version are, respectively, as follows:
Draft: With respect to action against North Vietnam, there should be a detailed plan for the development of additional Government of Vietnam resources, especially for sea-going activity, and such planning should indicate the time and investment necessary to achieve a wholly new level of effectiveness in this field of action.
NSAM 273: Planning should include different levels of possible increased activity, and in each instance there should be estimates of such factors as: A. Resulting damage to North Vietnam; B. The plausibility of denial; C. Possible North Vietnamese retaliation; D. Other international reaction. Plans should be submitted promptly for approval by higher authority.
There is no relevant difference between the two documents, except that the LBJ version is weaker and more evasive, dropping the call for "a wholly new level of effectiveness in this field of action"; further actions are reduced to "possible." The reason why paragraph 7 refers to "additional" or "possible increased" activity we have already seen: such operations had been underway since the Kennedy offensive of 1962, apparently with direct participation of US personnel and foreign mercenaries. </quote>