>I'd say the problem is not that it's too reformist, but it's too unfocused.
Yes I think that is a relevant criticism. This resolution was a legitimate emergency (late) resolution because DL's conference took place only days after the first statement of apparent agreement on peace. But as it openly states, opinion was divided in DL about the war, and its comments about the aftermath are unfocussed.
>Rather than argue about what should have been done and not done
>four months ago, why not have a debate on self-determination for
>Kosova?
The issue is similar to that faced under Tito's Yugoslavia: how to allow regional autonomy for majorities but also rights for minorities. I do not know the details but the British TV series "The Death of Yugoslavia" alleged that these were muddled up in Tito's constitution and never really put to the test. One of the fine details which sounds impossible to work was that Milosevic was insisting that in Kosova Serbs should have Serb law separate from the Albanian law of the majority. Since in Marxist perspectives between two rights force decides, that approach sounds disastrous.
The Nato, liberal Helsinki human rights sort of solution will be to support delegated confederal arrangements, with a fluid civil society supporting human rights, and free enterprise for capitalism. I repeat I think a socialist approach to human rights does not ignore individual differences but stresses the social, especially the social right for control over the environment and social and economic fabric of life.
What sort of status will be given to village commitees struggling to clear their rubble and rebuild their lives? How will Serbs or at least non Albanian minorities be supported in taking part in these? Will they have as much access to financial resources as giant strategic think tanks sponsorsed by multi-national enterprises wanting to get their name stamped on Kosovo and prime sites in the centre of Pristina at knock down prices? Who will publish the first Albanian language material on circulation again in Kosovo? What will the editorial policy be? Will their be radio stations, and what will their policy be? (Because the TV sets will have been smashed or stolen. Would NATO or some other agency help the genuinely democratic currents of the new Yugoslavia provide such aid? Could B92 help a new Kosovo radio station for example?
Yes, whose fingers will be on the drafts for the reconstruction of Pristina? Will the bus companies be cooperatives with access to capital, or will they be privatised concerns? We can guess the answer, but we should still ask the question. Everything that helps the purposeful and constructive responsibility of the people is positive. Everything that keeps them passive recipients of good will from NATO or the IMF is negative.
>The settlement with Milo precludes this at least in literal
>terms, but one could imagine scenarios where it could come about.
>NATO's there doing something useful -- protecting Kosovars -- so
>it might as well be urged to contribute to the self-government of the region.
The sidelining of the KLA instead of negotiating with them (including toughly) from the beginning of this year, is one of the imperialist and foolish features of the west's policy. The KLA needs to have a leading responsible, and accountable role.
>Secondly, a discussion of strengthening international law regarding
>interventions. It should be possible for these to be carried out in a
>relevant time period and not be vulnerable to one or two countries'
>vetoes. On the other hand, they shouldn't be too easy either. Right
>now they are obviously too easy since they are subject to the whims
>of the U.S. president, not even restrained by existing U.S. law.
There will be no single answer, which does not mean that the debate and argument are not important. They are crucial to shaping a new conception of world governance. Nato as an alliance of 19 countries is essentially of a defensive size. It is cumbersome for a tight punitive force. This was ironically one of the reasons that the policy was of massive bombing as the lowest common denominator. There clearly is a role for a smaller force that could include ground troops, and that is preferable on an all Europe basis rather than on a transatlantic basis.
Meanwhile all adventures are rightly subject to critism.
>Third, I'd look to the operations of the EU in terms of strengthening
>its capabilities to build a Social Europe. This would entail progress
>in the field of tax coordination, EU-based fiscal equalization for
>poor regions (incl the Balkans), and democratizing the ECB, for
>starters.
Why tax-coordination? Without pork barrel politics, Europe has a problem of how to disperse government sources of capital across the electoral area, to reverse the centralising tendencies of private capital. One of the few far-sighted things Hague has said is that Britain should stay out of the Euro partly in order to compete with other parts of Europe with lower taxes.
What would democratizing the ECB mean? Setting up a panel to debate its next move in public each month, like Gordon Brown did for the Bank of England, thereby making public policy as much as possible a matter of administrative expertise rather than of political might?
Chris Burford
London