social norms are moral; they are built on, enact, and reproduce moral judgments that have evolved in a society. whether you consider them moral or not is a question to pursue, but it is clear that all social norms can be shown to have a moral impulse.
--------------
I absolutely disagree and think the reverse is the case. Social norms exist prior to and independent of any configuration of moral order. So, a system of mores is a developed and differentiated abstraction from some selected set of existing or potential social practices. The abstracted system is codified as a custom, religious code, legal proscription or philosophical position which is in turn further mediated by all sorts of other factors, such as the dominant relations of economic and political power. Perhaps in a much less differentiated society with little or no central authority, there is much less of a separation between a social norm and a moral code--but even so there is always some distinction made between custom and practice. But certainly in our society, in this context there is a complete differentiation between norms and mores.
Clearly, what is done (a social norm) and what should be done (a moral order) are different.
It is only with such a reversed sense of ontology that we can explain the disjunction between a moral code and a social reality. And furthermore, such a disjunction then can be used to explain how various forms of social oppression work and how these can be codified into law and established as political and economic practice. It is then up to the dominant class or group in power to promulgated the ideological and cultural means that define these moral orders, as social good. Then in a circular way such a top down system provides the moral justification as a good for some existing social practice, promoting the status quo--whether it is a social norm or not. This is how manufacturing consent is accomplished.
In extreme cases, whole new social practices can be invented, issuing from the interest or benefit to the ruling class and enforced by political, economic, and ultimately physical power (guns). Thus everything from prescriptive prayer in schools (Congress just pass the Ten Commandments bill) to genocide can be invented, promulgated, and enforced. Sooner or later these become a social norm--that is existing social practice, where they then appear to have both a concrete social and abstract moral foundation.
The belief that a social norm issues from a moral impulse is open to a very wide range of philosophical questions. Such a belief is the basis for Kant's categorical imperative. This is the foundational assumption that the world is fundamentally good and that the teleology of our existence is to perfect the moral side of our being. To make this assumption is not the same as saying, that when asked, most people will usually justify their actions in what they consider the best possible terms. Of course they will. Such declarations don't make it so.
But let's turn to something we may partly agree on:
"property, sociologically, is nothing but a set of social relationships [rules, norms, mores] defining what can/should and cannot/should not be done with things, ideas, people. all societies have these rules for defining property. this little insight comes from marx, initially, but was developed by anthropologists studying kinship rules..."
I obviously agree with most of this. What I am attempting to point out is that rules (laws) and mores (beliefs) are not equivalent to social practice. In fact, the discrepancy between what is done and what should be done is the whole basis of our belief that we can change society.
But, let me take your position that social norms are moral or issue from a moral impulse. What advantage does this position confer? From a social science point of view, it makes it possible to demonstrate the existence of moral codes of conduct, by extrapolating these from empirical data and derived statistical profiles. One can then point to these profiles and say that these illustrate the existing value schemes (moral code) based on the conduct of this or that group. From an analytical point of view, a demonstrated rule of conduct is not identical to a moral rule of conduct. However, by conflating these, social science retains a certain limited form of objectivity. The social scientist can claim to observe mores rather than presume, prescribe, or define them.
If on the other hand, you assume a differentiation between norms and mores, then you must turn to an analysis of a different sort of evidence--a text, a law, or statements. An analysis of this sort of evidence is much more open to questions of objectivity.
Chuck Grimes