Washington Post Magazine - June 20, 1999
The glare of congressional and media scrutiny complicated Bush's deliberations about the Persian Gulf crisis. In January 1991, Bush met with his national security team to discuss what to do about Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait the previous August.
"So if he gets out without a war, that's okay?" Bush asked his chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell.
"Yes, sir," Powell replied. That was the goal of both the United States and the United Nations - Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. If there was no war, no U.S. servicemen would be killed, Powell stated, speaking like a good military leader looking out for his troops.
Secretary of State James A. Baker III, a talented, ambitious close friend from Texas and a subtle rival of the president's, said he agreed. Baker wanted to bring home victory through diplomacy. If he could negotiate an Iraqi withdrawal, it would be a monumental personal achievement.
Next Bush and Scowcroft, almost together, jumped on Powell and Baker.
"Don't you realize that if he pulls out, it will be impossible for us to stay," Scowcroft asked. Bush nodded in agreement as Scowcroft spoke. The massive U.S. force - 500,000 troops in all - could not remain in the region indefinitely, Scowcroft said. It would be politically and logistically impossible - and politically insupportable in the United States - to keep the troops there for an extended period. The nightmare would be for Saddam to pull out of Kuwait and move back into Iraq but stay on the border. His army could wait indefinitely, threatening to invade again. The allied coalition needed the chance to destroy Saddam's army or at least to devastate it so it would not be a threat in the near future.
It was sobering, the president agreed, the most sobering reality of the crisis. He had to play all the diplomatic cards. But, he made clear, a diplomatic solution would in fact bring about a larger crisis. Looking squarely at his advisers, the president said plainly, "We have to have a war."
Scowcroft was aware that this understanding could never be stated publicly or be permitted to leak out. Americans were peacemakers, not warmongers. An American president who declared the necessity of war would probably be thrown out of office. But the president's words reflected the stark reality of the Gulf confrontation.
Baker met with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz on January 9 in Geneva for more than six hours. Bush feared the Iraqis would come up with some kind of gimmicky proposal or maneuver. He was nervous; it was one of his toughest and tensest times as president. Finally Baker called on the secure telephone.
"It's over," Baker told him. The Iraqis would not budge.
In part, Bush was jubilant because it was the best news possible, although he would have to conceal it publicly. But Bush was also totally drained and full of anxiety because he knew the failure of negotiations meant war.
The massive air war directed against Iraq and its military forces lasted 38 days, and the ground war four days. It was a stunning victory for U.S. forces and their commander-in-chief.
Bush was viewed as a president who had been forced into war by Saddam's total refusal to negotiate. That was true, but Bush and Scowcroft knew that by January 1991 it was a war they had to have. The big secret went undisclosed.
Bush didn't want the turmoil of after-action analysis, and he declined to talk in-depth to reporters or authors about the Gulf crisis or the war while in office.
"This is not something I want second-guessing on," Bush told Fitzwater. He wanted the war judged on the outcome, not the process of how he got there, or on who said what to whom. "Hell, they'll be writing about this and before you know it, they'll have us losing the war."
Bush did not trust the Congress or the media to sort out or explain his dilemma and responsibility without sensationalizing. Watergate had made a sober account of the truth by the president almost impossible.
Bush's moment of triumph quickly soured. On March 13, 1991, he complained to his diary about criticism that he had failed to march to Baghdad and bring down Saddam. Bush confided that the press drumbeat about the Gulf War continued - what he called the "sniping, carping, bitching, predictable editorial complaints." It was, the president dictated, "the cynical liberalism that comes down on any president," even though the march-to-Baghdad critique was coming from the right. He said he resented cartoonist Garry Trudeau, a fellow Yale graduate who routinely ridiculed Bush in his "Doonesbury" comic strip. He called Trudeau "a little elitist who is spoiled, derisive, ugly and nasty."
To his dictation machine, Bush added, "Sometimes I really like the spotlight, but I'm tired of it. I've been at the head table for many years, and now I wonder what else is out there."