Death Penalty: 49-51

William S. Lear rael at zopyra.com
Fri Mar 5 15:20:48 PST 1999


On Friday, March 5, 1999 at 17:04:57 (-0500) Greg Nowell writes:
>To loosely borrow Plato's metaphor, if my mind were a
>parliament, 49% of the voting representatives be
>pro-death penalty, 51% would be against. And to borrow
>from my classics professor, who made the simple but
>profound point that any public policy issue can be
>broken down into the "practical aspects" and the "moral
>aspects" (the preferred position is to hold the
>practical and moral high ground; if a solution to a
>problem is neither pracitcal nor moral it has nothing
>to recommend it, and all the problems center on when
>the practical argues one course and moral argues
>another).

I disagree. One can conceptually perform this vectorization, but to say that "all the problems" arise when the practical and moral diverge. Intra-categorical problems are still extremely important, and in this case, the moral aspect of the death penalty, to me, makes even consideration of the "practical" aspects repugnant.


>Morally, I have no problem with the death penalty, and
>have written before on this list, that the state seems
>to have power of life and death over its citizens in a
>wide variety of arenas. ...

This is the Panglossian argument, you must certainly realize? Because the state *does* X (in other areas), you have no problem with X?

So, I'll ask the question again: you have no problem advocating the premeditated murder of a defenseless human being?

How is advocating premeditated murder of a defenseless human being not taking a giant leap morally backwards? Don't you realize some of the very best conventions we have in our society say that this is *ultra vires*, even during time of warfare?


>wide variety of arenas. It makes life and death
>decisions when putting citizens at risk in war, and
>also sometimes delegates decisions. "The mother's
>right to choose" is an example of a delegated
>decision. Automotive safety design is partially
>delegated (manufacturers can do more than they are
>required to do) but also partially mandated (safety
>belts and air bags). The state also exercises life
>and death decisions over non-citizens, in acts of war,
>but also, in deciding who does and does not qualify as
>a "political refugee" (for example). Viewed in this
>way, citizenship means the state has life and death
>power over citizens in a wide variety of contexts and
>makes political decisions as to how to use that power.

Perhaps. However, the principle that hierarchy and domination should always be challenged and minimized is also perennially at work here.


>Now, you can argue A) the state should not have any
>power over life and death of its citizens in any
>context;
>or the state should B) only be empowered to protect the
>lives of citizens, enacting maximum safety standards,
>using tranquillizing darts instead of guns for the
>police, no power to draft, and so on;
>or C) you can fight out the particular details of each
>and every arena of what should and should not properly
>be the purview of the state, which is politics as we
>know it.

Unfortunately, C is the only option. Each instance of use of force, by whatever entity, should be justified. My belief is that citizens should have a right to decline to serve in the military. They should also have a right not to pay taxes, and to not receive services (no driving on roads, no drinking water, no health care, etc.), with the caveat that they return all wealth gained through any sort of social interaction, etc. I'll say it again: if we find that we must remove an individual from society because they are to great a threat to us, we have an obligation to do so in the most humane way possible. We do not preserve our humanity by murdering defenseless people.


> ... In any case it is
>no more immoral to suggest the termination of an
>individual who has carried out a private war against
>society than it is to suggest the termination of groups
>of individuals who are waging collective international
>warfare against it. ...

Hardly. The notion of self-defense captures this. You are not allowed, under certain treaties, to simply execute prisoners of war. They are defenseless human beings, just as a prisoner in our system. To engage in warfare should only be done defensively. Murdering someone who *has* carried out a "private war" (and who is now in police custody) by saying this is the same as war is to confuse defense with offense.


>Another angle, not generally pursued, is the subjective
>component of "cruel and unusual punishment." Life
>imprisonment, buggery, boredom, etc., might be more
>cruel for many individuals than mere death, and it
>might be humane to give them the option of choosing
>life imprisonment or death and indeed, to give them the
>option of death at any time that they might choose to
>have it, should they tire of imprisonment.

Suicide is not a business the state should be in.

Bill



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