Lifelines: Biology Beyond Determinism, by Steven Rose. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. $30.00. Pp. xv, 335.
Offering both a critique of reductionist ideological biologies and an alternative model that respects the complexity and freedom of organisms, Steven Rose's fine new book makes an important contribution to debates about biological determinism.
Since Darwin first put forth his theory of natural selection, evolutionary theory and social theory have been closely connected. Darwin was accused of supporting racism, sexism, and imperialism as well as dethroning Man as the Child of God. More recent times have seen the introduction of advanced industrial capitalism into evolutionary theory, resulting in sociobiology and its offspring, neurogenetics. Sociobiologists, apart from their biological and genetic theories, posit a theory of society which they describe as being based on evolutionary theory. Its characteristics will be familiar to people living in advanced capitalist societies. The "natural" society is: competitive, aggressive, individualistic, patriarchal, dependent upon an extreme division of labor and the nuclear family. Every generation, it seems, brings a social theory to its evolutionary theory.
Rose's latest book offers a sustained critique of reductionism in both its scientific and ideological forms. Scientific reductionists describe phenomena as fundamentally mechanical. They do not take into account environmental or social contingencies. Reductionism also serves an ideological function. It conflates the social and the genetic when it privileges genetics and the biochemical process, and it ignores the possibility of environmental influences.
This critique of ideological reductionism, in the chapter "The Poverty of Reductionism," is perhaps the most compelling part of the book. Rose highlights the insidious consequences of the neurogenetic determinist argument. If problems are genetic rather than social, we should be looking for genetic rather than social solutions. In this view, violence is not caused by inner-city squalor, unemployment, inadequate education, and extreme economic stratification. Rather, it is the result of a "genetic problem." Such arguments have wide appeal, in part stemming from the fact that many social solutions thus far seem to have been unsuccessful.
To counter the scientific reductionist view that only mechanical process is meaningful, Rose argues for an alternative scientific model that takes seriously the complexity and freedom of an organism. Rose compellingly argues that genes do play a role in ontogeny, but not necessarily the starring role. Organisms are constantly changing in reaction to their environments. Each level within an organism in and of itself possesses great complexity. Every part of an organism is engaged in a dialectical relationship with its environment, from the cat interacting with the tree in which it climbs to the DNA interacting with the proteins that make up the DNA within the cat. Rose shows that even something as seemingly simple as a protein is held together by electrochemical forces and is linked to other proteins into higher-order proteins, or attached to DNA or RNA. He argues that not even a protein can be seen as existing in isolation: it has a primary, secondary and tertiary structure, and it has ions and molecules attached to its surface. We are, Rose argues, social down to the most fundamental components of our selves.
Rose states in his preface that this book should be seen as a "within biology" debate. That statement might put off readers who fear a long, dry, difficult argument. Such fears may be put to rest. Rose has succeeded in making this work accessible to those without a background in biology. Scientific terms are well defined, and there is a helpful and engaging history of genetics. His arguments are challenging, but highly readable. At the same time, they have not been oversimplified for a general audience.
While Rose's biological argument is compelling, a troubling question remains. Rose claims in his preface that this is a "within biology" debate, that this is not a book about the ideology, social origins, or social consequences of "ultra-Darwinism." It is also clear that his own biological theory might be best characterized as Marxist. His stated belief that the social commitments of scientists affect their work leads one to assume that his own politics affect his work. Yet, nowhere in the text does Rose explicitly state these beliefs. Seeing that he makes such a strong claim for the interaction between social theory and biological theory, one wishes that he were more forthcoming with his own social commitments. They may easily be inferred, but that is insufficient; given the claims he makes about the connection between social and biological theory, one is left wondering why he did not make his own commitments explicit. This absence is especially troubling since he explicitly describes the social effects of sociobiology. It results in the book seeming somewhat one-sided and ideologically motivated.
The only other disappointment is the endnotes. Rose has cited the tide and author of books and articles, but only rarely does he cite a page number. This will be a problem for scholars who are interested in following Rose's arguments closely.
All in all, Lifelines is a fine book and an important contribution to the continuing debate surrounding sociobiology. It will be of interest to anyone in the life sciences, historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science, as well as anyone with an interest in the continuing science wars.
FRANCES BOLTON
Department of Philosophy University of South Florida 4202 East Fowler Avenue, CPR 107 Tampa, FL 33620-5550