>Rose's latest book offers a sustained critique of reductionism in both its
>scientific and ideological forms. Scientific reductionists describe
>phenomena as fundamentally mechanical.
>His stated belief that the
>social commitments of scientists affect their work leads one to assume that
>his own politics affect his work. Yet, nowhere in the text does Rose
>explicitly state these beliefs.
I sent these quick responses to Frances a few days ago.
But inspired by your criticism that Rose may hide his own ideological assumptions (Jim Heartfield's mag made a similar criticism), I want to look into that stark world of Jacques Monod.So when Rose wrote that "others of course have embraced the austere grandeur of a world view in which purpose is imposed by humanity, not read off from nature--no one more so perhaps than Jacques Monod in his book Chance and Necessity", p. 186 I knew I would have to read this book. There is a great discussion of Bergson v. Monod in a book by Loren Graham Between Facts and Values. But then Rose understands himself providing an actually sound experimental framework to ground scientifically the anti reductionism defended on irrational grounds by Bergson. This is most fascinating but it makes me wince.
You know if there are too many interacting variables and parameters are unfixed and properties are non linear--well, I won't be able to use Bauer/Grossmann's scheme to prove the inevitability of breakdown, will I?
Rose's critique of Weismann induced me to read Peter Bowler's short history for the non specialist The Mendelian Revolution. At present, I am quite uncomfortable with what seems to me to be a one sided critique of ultra darwinism and reductionism, though as you note in the review the scientific findings that Rose uses to make his argument are often beautifully developed and presented (e.g. how totipotency undermines Weismann's dogma). What he does endeavor to show is that certain methodologies and theories, retained for ideological reasons, are quite unable to provide satisfactory explanations for the actual complexity of the natural world. So he may not have an ideological axe to grind, as you suggest. But then what counts as a good explanation?
At any rate, while granting the insight gained by Maynard Smith's game theoretic derivation of evolutionarily stable strategies, Rose then presents a critique of Smith for downplaying group selection mechanisms. That leaves me me with more questions about this gene centered view--so JMS's unopened textbook on evolutionary genetics is staring at me. It's interesting that Rose cites Mayr in support here. At any rate, I just don't think this stuff breaks down by ideological lines--I mean Rose and Mayr are about as far apart ideologically as can be from what I have heard, and here they are beating up together on Maynard Smith. Plus, Galton was a reactionary, but he did create some openings for the study of heredity outside of the developmental paradigm, as Bowler notes.
For my immediate purposes, Rose's discussion of the mis use of the heritability concept was most helpful. To tell you the truth, this is why I had to read the book, and my reading has been selective: I had to turn to the biologist to see how he treats a concept used in the social sciences since that concept is not discussed in Fisher, et al's critique of the Bell Curve and it is discussed near the end of the Jacoby reader in an excellent but abstruse piece by Lazyer. By the way, Ashley Montagu has reissued Race and IQ with a fine new discussion of the heritability concept by Loring Brace and by Ned Block in the piece that I cited from Cognition--it is reprinted there.
yours, rakesh