>>The burden of proof in on you to show that diplomatic channels have been
>>exhausted. It IS credible that Milosevic would be amenable to a negotiated
>>cease fire. Do you think he WANTS Belgrade to be bombed? Sure, he'd
>>rather be bombed than have NATO troops occupying Kosovo, that much is
>>clear, but perhaps there are other terms he might agree to.
>
>
>There are no other terms that would protect the Kosovo population. Without
>troops, as has been proven, the population of Kosovo was only a week away
>from mass murder and expulsion. There is no assurance that Milosevic can
>give now that he has proven himself (again) a butcher.
But the terms of the agreement are an end to Serb repression in the region, aren't they? I thought it was a cease-fire agreement. If Milo fails to keep to the agreement, then fine, you've got a point. But at least we should give him a chance to abide by his word. And perhaps there ARE other options which would protect the Kosovars. What about Russian peacekeepers, or UN troops as opposed to NATO troops? Have either of these options been mentioned? Perhaps these aren't feasible for other reasons, but I seriously doubt all avenues of discussion have been exhausted.
>Saddam was never willing to negotiate leaving Kuwait. Which was fine with
>me and we should have left it in his hands. The Kuwaiti emir and the
>Kuwaiti elite were hardly legitimate in their rule of a country where most
>of the residents could not vote, and after the war, many like the
>Palestinians were expelled in a nearly criminal manner.
This is not true. What Saddam wanted to do was widen the debate over weapons of mass destruction to include Israel. Not an unreasonable position, but this was something the US rejected outright. Hussein was also willing to negotiate over some disputed oil fields on the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border (which had been long-running source of friction between Iraq and Kuwait), but we said bluntly that we expected him to withdraw to the old border. Saddam was not given the option of negotiation - we simply gave him a "get out or else" ultimatum, so it is impossible to know whether or not Saddam would have agreed to a negotiated settlement.
>The problem with the Gulf War was not process but that Kuwait was not a
>cause worth fighting for. Saddam was and is a bastard dictator, but we were
>not fighting for the rights of those like the Kurds seeking legitimate
>self-determination but only for an economic elite which served US interests
>in oil.
But can't you make the same argument over the Kosovo situation? Who is likely to be put in power if Kosovo gets its independence? The KLA, whose leaders are probably no better than Milosevic himself. I wouldn't want to be an ethnic Serb living in Kosovo under the KLA.
Besides, the issue of self-determination isn't that clear cut. Why do the Kurds in Iraq necessarily deserve the right of self-determination? What's wrong with an Iraqi gov't that simply respects their civil rights and gives them a voice in the gov't? And why isn't that the case for the Kosavars? Should we automatically support every separatist movement wherever we find one? Should the Basques be allowed to split from Spain? What about the Quebecua (sp?) in Quebec? What about the right-wing crazies in the US who want to seceed? What are the criteria that have to be met in order to have a valid claim to self-determination, and have the Kosovars met that standard? Perhaps they do meet it, but perhaps they don't.
>NO BLOOD FOR OIL and BOMBS AWAY FOR KOSOVO are perfectly compatible
>political positions for me. The Gulf War was an immoral war fought for
>immoral purposes conducted in a savage manner and followed by inhuman
>sanctions. Kosovo is being fought against an inhuman butcher on behalf of
>the overwhelming majority of the population of Kosovo with the goal of
>restoring democratic autonomy to the region.
I disagree that the goal is restoring democratic autonomy to the region. Are any of the Kosovar political factions even nominally democratic? Certainly the KLA isn't, and they seem to be the group which would be put in power in any kind of a settlement which gives Kosovo its independence.
>What is important is not intentions but how the peace movement mobilizes.
>We can have a united agreement to mobilize progressives to support a just
>peace, but that will only come through defeat of Serbia's forces in Kosovo.
>It's not that KLA terror should not be considered as a possibility, but I
>won't debate a worry about a potential problem against actually occuring
>cultural genocide.
What peace movement? I'm unaware of any peace movement that exists in either Serbia or Kosovo at the moment. And possible KLA terror is exactly the kind of thing we should be wary of - what point would the bombing serve if the KLA achieved power and started killing and driving out the Kosovar Serbs? We would merely be trading one set of monsters for another. And insofar as this is possible, it is a case against the bombing. Or for committing troops, for that matter.
Again, the burden of proof rests solely on those who favor intervention to CLEARLY DEMONSTRATE how the intervention will improve the situation, bad as it is. I have yet to see someone present a persuasive case for intervention, be it bombing or sending in ground troops. I admit that ground troops will put a stop to the killing now, but this is not enough to justify intervention.
This is not to say we need to take an isolationist position. We can use other means to put pressure on the Serbs or the KLA or whoever else we don't like. I would support any non-violent means of supporting the ethnic Albanians who are being driven from their homes and sometimes raped and/or murdered. But I will not support armed intervention without proper justification.
Brett