[So much for my idea that there might be a hidden rationality. The numbers are kind of daunting. Serbia would not be a pushover on the ground]
To wit:
The Yugoslav army has some 90,000 men under arms, two-thirds of them
professional soldiers; 400,000 reservists are liable for call-up. It
has more than a thousand tanks and equivalent associated equipment.
The air force has 238 combat aircraft and 52 armed helicopters.
Personnel are well trained and highly motivated.
NATO would have to field a fighting force on the order of 200,000
personnel and corresponding equipment. Yugoslav air defenses may be
degraded by the bombing, but the army would fight and casualties would
be heavy on both sides. In present circumstances, this solution is not
a practical possibility.
Following is the entire article from which these paragraphs were excerpted.
Michael
Paris, Wednesday, March 31, 1999
Stop the Bombing and Negotiate Peace
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By Frederick Bonnart International Herald Tribune
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BRUSSELS - NATO's declared purpose in Kosovo is to stop the
humanitarian crisis from developing into a humanitarian catastrophe,
and to prevent instability from spreading in Europe. Its action has
had the opposite effects.
If bloodshed is to cease, civilized behavior to be re-established and
NATO to survive as a credible organization, it must break out of this
chain of events. It has two choices: begin a total war against Serbia,
or find a new political solution.
NATO leaders repeated time and again that all options were open. That
was heard by the sides in conflict. It was believed by one and
dismissed by the other, but both based their policies on it. Radical
elements of the Kosovo Liberation Army stepped up their attacks so as
to provoke the massive reactions that they believed would trigger a
NATO intervention. Mr. Milosevic continued his action to isolate the
Kosovar rebels, and bided his time. NATO then had to make good, and
the bomb attacks followed.
Next, Mr. Milosevic sent his murder squads to decapitate the
leadership and begin a mass ejection of ethnic Albanians from certain
areas in the province. Refugees are pouring into neighboring
countries, which are crying out for help. The humanitarian crisis is
turning into a humanitarian catastrophe.
Security guarantees were given to neighboring countries, but parties
inside them are taking sides for and against the NATO operation, and
the smell of violence is in the air. The large ethnic Albanian
elements in some of them are at risk and are radicalized. As the
bombing continues, small protests could erupt into explosions, and
governments might fall. The NATO action has already increased
instability in the region.
More telling is the break with Russia. The valuable NATO-Russian
relationship built up with extreme care by both sides has collapsed.
NATO is now changing its tactics and starting attacks on field forces.
Attacks from the air can disrupt and degrade these forces, but they
cannot alone make good General Wesley Clark's promise to devastate and
destroy them. To do so, land forces would be needed.
President Bill Clinton and NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana have
so far excluded this possibility, with reason.
Quite apart from the public resistance in allied countries, the
required forces are not readily available. Of NATO's Europeans, only
Britain, France, Turkey and possibly new member Poland would have
significant numbers available and the will to use them. Of the
remaining bigger member countries, only Germany and Italy could make
important contributions, but their governments could not overcome
political objections.
The Yugoslav army has some 90,000 men under arms, two-thirds of them
professional soldiers; 400,000 reservists are liable for call-up. It
has more than a thousand tanks and equivalent associated equipment.
The air force has 238 combat aircraft and 52 armed helicopters.
Personnel are well trained and highly motivated.
NATO would have to field a fighting force on the order of 200,000
personnel and corresponding equipment. Yugoslav air defenses may be
degraded by the bombing, but the army would fight and casualties would
be heavy on both sides. In present circumstances, this solution is not
a practical possibility.
NATO could use proxy ground forces by helping to arm, equip and train
the KLA, and supporting it from the air. At present, the KLA consists
of small groups of fighters variously armed and motivated who can lay
ambushes, kidnap or murder, or throw bombs into crowded areas. With
allied support the KLA could grow into a bigger force, drawing in
enthusiastic volunteers from Albanian communities in neighboring
countries. The result would be a Balkan war similar to those at the
beginning of the century.
The original strategy was gradually to tighten the screw by increasing
the pain of bombing attacks until Mr. Milosevic yielded and came to
Rambouillet to sign a peace deal. But he has the army, the security
services and most of the media firmly in hand. His government covers a
spectrum of political parties. The population feels outraged at the
demands and actions by the West in what it regards as a Serbian
province in which it is facing a terrorist-led revolt.
It is clear that this strategy isa failure.
A new political solution must therefore be sought. One would be to
divide Kosovo, giving the Albanian community an independent homeland
in the south and leaving a northern slice inside Serbia. NATO could
re-establish the relationship with Russia by involving its government
in such negotiations.
Only by succeeding quickly in bringing peace to the area can NATO save
its credibility.
The writer, a veteran commentator on NATO affairs, contributed this
article to the International Herald Tribune.
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