Invasion seemed unlikely if not unfeasable

Michael Pollak mpollak at panix.com
Tue Mar 30 23:39:48 PST 1999


[So much for my idea that there might be a hidden rationality. The numbers are kind of daunting. Serbia would not be a pushover on the ground]

To wit:

The Yugoslav army has some 90,000 men under arms, two-thirds of them

professional soldiers; 400,000 reservists are liable for call-up. It

has more than a thousand tanks and equivalent associated equipment.

The air force has 238 combat aircraft and 52 armed helicopters.

Personnel are well trained and highly motivated.

NATO would have to field a fighting force on the order of 200,000

personnel and corresponding equipment. Yugoslav air defenses may be

degraded by the bombing, but the army would fight and casualties would

be heavy on both sides. In present circumstances, this solution is not

a practical possibility.

Following is the entire article from which these paragraphs were excerpted.

Michael

Paris, Wednesday, March 31, 1999

Stop the Bombing and Negotiate Peace

_________________________________________________________________

By Frederick Bonnart International Herald Tribune

_________________________________________________________________

BRUSSELS - NATO's declared purpose in Kosovo is to stop the

humanitarian crisis from developing into a humanitarian catastrophe,

and to prevent instability from spreading in Europe. Its action has

had the opposite effects.

If bloodshed is to cease, civilized behavior to be re-established and

NATO to survive as a credible organization, it must break out of this

chain of events. It has two choices: begin a total war against Serbia,

or find a new political solution.

NATO leaders repeated time and again that all options were open. That

was heard by the sides in conflict. It was believed by one and

dismissed by the other, but both based their policies on it. Radical

elements of the Kosovo Liberation Army stepped up their attacks so as

to provoke the massive reactions that they believed would trigger a

NATO intervention. Mr. Milosevic continued his action to isolate the

Kosovar rebels, and bided his time. NATO then had to make good, and

the bomb attacks followed.

Next, Mr. Milosevic sent his murder squads to decapitate the

leadership and begin a mass ejection of ethnic Albanians from certain

areas in the province. Refugees are pouring into neighboring

countries, which are crying out for help. The humanitarian crisis is

turning into a humanitarian catastrophe.

Security guarantees were given to neighboring countries, but parties

inside them are taking sides for and against the NATO operation, and

the smell of violence is in the air. The large ethnic Albanian

elements in some of them are at risk and are radicalized. As the

bombing continues, small protests could erupt into explosions, and

governments might fall. The NATO action has already increased

instability in the region.

More telling is the break with Russia. The valuable NATO-Russian

relationship built up with extreme care by both sides has collapsed.

NATO is now changing its tactics and starting attacks on field forces.

Attacks from the air can disrupt and degrade these forces, but they

cannot alone make good General Wesley Clark's promise to devastate and

destroy them. To do so, land forces would be needed.

President Bill Clinton and NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana have

so far excluded this possibility, with reason.

Quite apart from the public resistance in allied countries, the

required forces are not readily available. Of NATO's Europeans, only

Britain, France, Turkey and possibly new member Poland would have

significant numbers available and the will to use them. Of the

remaining bigger member countries, only Germany and Italy could make

important contributions, but their governments could not overcome

political objections.

The Yugoslav army has some 90,000 men under arms, two-thirds of them

professional soldiers; 400,000 reservists are liable for call-up. It

has more than a thousand tanks and equivalent associated equipment.

The air force has 238 combat aircraft and 52 armed helicopters.

Personnel are well trained and highly motivated.

NATO would have to field a fighting force on the order of 200,000

personnel and corresponding equipment. Yugoslav air defenses may be

degraded by the bombing, but the army would fight and casualties would

be heavy on both sides. In present circumstances, this solution is not

a practical possibility.

NATO could use proxy ground forces by helping to arm, equip and train

the KLA, and supporting it from the air. At present, the KLA consists

of small groups of fighters variously armed and motivated who can lay

ambushes, kidnap or murder, or throw bombs into crowded areas. With

allied support the KLA could grow into a bigger force, drawing in

enthusiastic volunteers from Albanian communities in neighboring

countries. The result would be a Balkan war similar to those at the

beginning of the century.

The original strategy was gradually to tighten the screw by increasing

the pain of bombing attacks until Mr. Milosevic yielded and came to

Rambouillet to sign a peace deal. But he has the army, the security

services and most of the media firmly in hand. His government covers a

spectrum of political parties. The population feels outraged at the

demands and actions by the West in what it regards as a Serbian

province in which it is facing a terrorist-led revolt.

It is clear that this strategy isa failure.

A new political solution must therefore be sought. One would be to

divide Kosovo, giving the Albanian community an independent homeland

in the south and leaving a northern slice inside Serbia. NATO could

re-establish the relationship with Russia by involving its government

in such negotiations.

Only by succeeding quickly in bringing peace to the area can NATO save

its credibility.

The writer, a veteran commentator on NATO affairs, contributed this

article to the International Herald Tribune.

_________________________________________________________________

[USEMAP:top.gif]



More information about the lbo-talk mailing list