>The battle will be shaped into a global struggle
>between anti-spearatist forces of the existing world order and post Cold
>War Western exploitation of separatist movements for global geopolitical
>advantage.
well put. but i would add that the exploitation of separatist movements also has as its presupposition the existence of nationalist integrationist pressures: greater serbia, for instance, a compulsion to regain that which was stolen.
>The only concession the US can make that can defuse the domestic
>pressure on Chinese leaders is a fundamental shift of US policy of
>supporting separatist movements from Taiwan to Tibet and Xinjiang.
and here I think you hit the nail on the head. the question could easily be transplanted onto the terrain of Belgrade, and the pressures on milosevich that led him to staking the country, and his political life, on reintegrating kosovo, which has also raised the issue of a reintegration of Montenegro. but on china, to what extent is a shift in US policy likely? and, in a different sense, to what extent is the discontent in china necessarily tied to nationalism, and so, able to be dampened by any such shift?
Angela --- rcollins at netlink.com.au