[One last element in the Stratfor contention that military-political considerations will take the upper hand in coming years, especially in Asia.]
15 March 1999
The Geopolitics of Disintegration: Indonesia and the World
Summary
It is clear that Indonesia is prepared to abandon East Timor. This is
the first of many such decisions that Indonesia will face in the
coming years. The centrifugal forces building up in Indonesia pose a
global challenge. Indonesia's waters are the most strategic in the
world, controlling movement between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
Disintegration threatens free passage, threatening Japanese oil
supplies from the Persian Gulf and shipping to Europe. The threat
comes from coastal artillery and cannot be solved with naval forces.
Neither Australia nor the United States can or will solve the problem
for Japan. We expect Indonesia to become the first major test for
Japan in the 21st century.
Analysis
It is becoming increasingly clear that Indonesia has committed itself
to retreating from East Timor. While the fate of East Timor is, by
itself, of very little consequence, the fate of Indonesia is
extraordinarily important. In our view, the reversal of the 1975
annexation of East Timor represents the first step in a profound
crisis that will redefine Indonesia and the geopolitics of the region.
It may lead over time to a general breakup or radical redefinition of
Indonesia. It is important to step back and consider the general
problem.
Indonesia is not a single nation. It is a series of extremely diverse
national and ethnic groups bound together under the governance of
Jakarta and the history of Dutch colonialism. It is bound together by
another, separate fact of geography. Indonesia is the gateway between
the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. From the Straits of Malacca
eastward to the Banda Sea, it is impossible to pass between the
Pacific and Indian Oceans without passing through what are, in
essence, coastal waters. The fact that these are coastal waters is
important because it means that it does not require a massive blue
water navy to interdict the passage of merchant ships. Much smaller
patrol craft and land based coastal artillery and missiles would be
quite sufficient to either completely block the movement of vessels or
push insurance rates so high as to undermine the economic viability of
such trade.
Pacific-Indian commerce is of vital importance for many reasons, but
the importance of one commodity alone is sufficient: oil. East Asia,
particularly Japan and Korea, are heavily dependent on the flow of oil
from the Persian Gulf. There are substitute sources available, but all
would pose massive transport and infrastructure challenges. Moreover,
Asian exports to Europe pass through the Indian Ocean and, therefore,
pass through Indonesian waters. There is no doubt that anything that
threatens the free flow of goods through Indonesian waters represents
a direct threat to fundamental East Asian interests.
The unity and stability of Indonesia are therefore foundations of
Asian economic prosperity. More than any other nation, the Asian
economic crisis has threatened Indonesia's unity and stability. There
were two reasons for this. First, Indonesia was particularly hard hit
by the crisis because its excesses substantially exceeded those of
other Asian countries and because its economy was least developed and
therefore most vulnerable. Second, the political consequences of the
crisis on Indonesia were most dramatic both because of this
vulnerability and because of the fact that, as we said, Indonesia is
not a nation-state.
Indonesia's unity is partly founded on the shared history of Dutch
colonialism, but this is clearly insufficient as a basis for national
unity. For the past twenty-five years the unity of the archipelago was
based on Jakarta's ability to deliver on the promise of growing
national prosperity. Unity made a great deal of sense when Indonesia's
economy was growing dramatically. Today, the glue of economic growth
is no longer there. Quite apart from social chaos within communities,
one of the consequences of economic decline is that the various
national and ethnic groups no longer are motivated to stand together.
East Timor is the most extreme case, of course. As a former Portuguese
colony it did not even have the shared history of Dutch colonialism to
fall back on. Annexed quite against its will, Timorese factions
struggled for independence for a generation. It was quite natural that
it would break free.
But it is important to understand that while East Timor is an extreme
case, it is not a unique case. Jakarta's hold on Indonesia is slowly
weakening as movements for independence and autonomy are
strengthening. As Indonesia's economic infrastructure continues to
decline, the ability to exert political control, which is dependent on
economic well-being, also declines. The regime will have the choice of
permitting the centrifugal forces to tear Indonesia apart or to use
direct military force. At this point, Indonesia still has that force.
However, the ability to motivate the military also depends on a degree
of economic well-being. Regional commanders and their troops will have
to be adequately supported and compensated by Jakarta. As economic
pressures increase, the ability to do this decreases. As regional
commanders are forced to rely on their own resources to maintain their
forces, their dependence on Jakarta will decrease, while their
reliance on the regions they police will increase. Thus, even if we
don't see complete, formal disintegration, we will inevitably see an
increase in regional warlords.
Whichever way this evolves, it means that the internal waters and
straits of Indonesia will become less secure. The temptation to
extract "tolls" from passing vessels will rise in the coming years, as
will the tendency of regional political forces to try to extract
maximum advantage from permitting free travel. As Indonesia
disintegrates, the consequences for northeast Asia will be dramatic
and severe. Other nations, like Singapore and Malaysia will clearly be
effected and face dangerous times, but the effect of Indonesian
disintegration on Japan and South Korea has massive implications for
the global economy.
There is an expectation that the problem will be dealt with by
Australia and the United States, but this is highly unrealistic.
Australia's naval and armed forces are completely insufficient to deal
with more than immediate problems, such as those that are arising in
East Timor and which may arise in Irian Jaya. The two brigades
Australia proudly boasts would be swallowed in Indonesia's vast
islands and populations.
The same is true for the United States. The problem of patrolling
Indonesia's waterways is not a naval problem. The threat to navigation
is posed by ground forces and their artillery. Suppressing those
forces is primarily a mission for ground forces with some air support.
Given the demographic realities, the United States is in no better
position than Australia to ensure free passage through internal
waterways. There is the possibility of occupying the southern shore of
the Straits of Malacca, but even that is an operation fraught with
risk. Moreover, given the fact that the mission is far more in the
interest of Japan and South Korea than the United States, it is not
clear that the United States would have an interest in incurring the
risk.
It is, therefore, in the general interest of Japan, the United States,
and Australia to make certain that Jakarta does not lose control over
Indonesia, either to secessionism or to warlordism. That is why
thoughtful observers in all three countries are not thrilled at the
thought of Timorese independence. However, regardless of Timor, there
is a deeper problem. If economic interests can't bind Indonesia
together, and the Army has its own centrifugal tendencies, then what
is available to hold it together?
There are two answers, neither particularly appealing. The first is
Sukarnoism, the radical nationalism heavily overlain with
anti-westernism and xenophobia that took Indonesia to independence in
the first place. Sukarnoism is represented by Sukarno's daughter,
Megawati, who is already building a strong political organization. The
second option is Islamic nationalism. Indonesia is a heavily, but not
exclusively, Moslem country. Radical Islam cannot embrace the entire
country, but can create a central core with enough energy to hold the
rest of the country under its control.
The problem with both Sukarnoism and radical Islam is, of course, that
each poses their own problems. Sukarnoism is inherently expansionist
and will use confrontation with neighboring states as glue to hold the
country together. This is particularly a threat to Singapore and
Malaysia, but also to Australia, which has bad memories of Sukarno's
challenges in New Guinea. Radical Islam in Indonesia is certainly not
something the United States wants to encourage. It has enough problems
holding the Straits of Hormuz open without having to cope with a
radical Islamic regime at the other end of the Indian Ocean.
There are no good choices in Indonesia. The ongoing deterioration in
the economy makes it unlikely that Suhartoism without Suharto, the
current Habibie government, will survive, or if it does survive, that
it will be able to control Indonesia's periphery. Sukarnoism in its
full manifestation can be as threatening as disintegration and an
Islamic government could manage to create the problems of Sukarnoism
and the disintegration of Suhartoism in one package.
The solution, of course, is a prosperous Indonesia. Even with Asia
bottoming out, a return to prosperity in Indonesia is unlikely for a
very long time. It is impossible to ignore Indonesia because of its
geographical position. None of the political choices are satisfactory.
And the United States is not likely to spend the resources needed to
stabilize the situation over the long haul.
This leaves only Japan with the potential resources and the need to do
something about it. There is a current debate in Japan over the
appropriateness of Japanese forces being used overseas. The focus is
on North Korea. We believe that this will not be the first arena of
Japanese overseas involvement. Japan must keep Indonesia's waterways
open. Its very existence as an industrial power depends on it. This is
what makes Indonesia significant from our point of view. Everything
else aside, it will be the first test of Japanese statecraft in the
21st century.
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