Geopolitics of Indonesian Disintegration

Michael Pollak mpollak at panix.com
Mon May 10 02:01:27 PDT 1999


[One last element in the Stratfor contention that military-political considerations will take the upper hand in coming years, especially in Asia.]

15 March 1999

The Geopolitics of Disintegration: Indonesia and the World

Summary

It is clear that Indonesia is prepared to abandon East Timor. This is

the first of many such decisions that Indonesia will face in the

coming years. The centrifugal forces building up in Indonesia pose a

global challenge. Indonesia's waters are the most strategic in the

world, controlling movement between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

Disintegration threatens free passage, threatening Japanese oil

supplies from the Persian Gulf and shipping to Europe. The threat

comes from coastal artillery and cannot be solved with naval forces.

Neither Australia nor the United States can or will solve the problem

for Japan. We expect Indonesia to become the first major test for

Japan in the 21st century.

Analysis

It is becoming increasingly clear that Indonesia has committed itself

to retreating from East Timor. While the fate of East Timor is, by

itself, of very little consequence, the fate of Indonesia is

extraordinarily important. In our view, the reversal of the 1975

annexation of East Timor represents the first step in a profound

crisis that will redefine Indonesia and the geopolitics of the region.

It may lead over time to a general breakup or radical redefinition of

Indonesia. It is important to step back and consider the general

problem.

Indonesia is not a single nation. It is a series of extremely diverse

national and ethnic groups bound together under the governance of

Jakarta and the history of Dutch colonialism. It is bound together by

another, separate fact of geography. Indonesia is the gateway between

the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. From the Straits of Malacca

eastward to the Banda Sea, it is impossible to pass between the

Pacific and Indian Oceans without passing through what are, in

essence, coastal waters. The fact that these are coastal waters is

important because it means that it does not require a massive blue

water navy to interdict the passage of merchant ships. Much smaller

patrol craft and land based coastal artillery and missiles would be

quite sufficient to either completely block the movement of vessels or

push insurance rates so high as to undermine the economic viability of

such trade.

Pacific-Indian commerce is of vital importance for many reasons, but

the importance of one commodity alone is sufficient: oil. East Asia,

particularly Japan and Korea, are heavily dependent on the flow of oil

from the Persian Gulf. There are substitute sources available, but all

would pose massive transport and infrastructure challenges. Moreover,

Asian exports to Europe pass through the Indian Ocean and, therefore,

pass through Indonesian waters. There is no doubt that anything that

threatens the free flow of goods through Indonesian waters represents

a direct threat to fundamental East Asian interests.

The unity and stability of Indonesia are therefore foundations of

Asian economic prosperity. More than any other nation, the Asian

economic crisis has threatened Indonesia's unity and stability. There

were two reasons for this. First, Indonesia was particularly hard hit

by the crisis because its excesses substantially exceeded those of

other Asian countries and because its economy was least developed and

therefore most vulnerable. Second, the political consequences of the

crisis on Indonesia were most dramatic both because of this

vulnerability and because of the fact that, as we said, Indonesia is

not a nation-state.

Indonesia's unity is partly founded on the shared history of Dutch

colonialism, but this is clearly insufficient as a basis for national

unity. For the past twenty-five years the unity of the archipelago was

based on Jakarta's ability to deliver on the promise of growing

national prosperity. Unity made a great deal of sense when Indonesia's

economy was growing dramatically. Today, the glue of economic growth

is no longer there. Quite apart from social chaos within communities,

one of the consequences of economic decline is that the various

national and ethnic groups no longer are motivated to stand together.

East Timor is the most extreme case, of course. As a former Portuguese

colony it did not even have the shared history of Dutch colonialism to

fall back on. Annexed quite against its will, Timorese factions

struggled for independence for a generation. It was quite natural that

it would break free.

But it is important to understand that while East Timor is an extreme

case, it is not a unique case. Jakarta's hold on Indonesia is slowly

weakening as movements for independence and autonomy are

strengthening. As Indonesia's economic infrastructure continues to

decline, the ability to exert political control, which is dependent on

economic well-being, also declines. The regime will have the choice of

permitting the centrifugal forces to tear Indonesia apart or to use

direct military force. At this point, Indonesia still has that force.

However, the ability to motivate the military also depends on a degree

of economic well-being. Regional commanders and their troops will have

to be adequately supported and compensated by Jakarta. As economic

pressures increase, the ability to do this decreases. As regional

commanders are forced to rely on their own resources to maintain their

forces, their dependence on Jakarta will decrease, while their

reliance on the regions they police will increase. Thus, even if we

don't see complete, formal disintegration, we will inevitably see an

increase in regional warlords.

Whichever way this evolves, it means that the internal waters and

straits of Indonesia will become less secure. The temptation to

extract "tolls" from passing vessels will rise in the coming years, as

will the tendency of regional political forces to try to extract

maximum advantage from permitting free travel. As Indonesia

disintegrates, the consequences for northeast Asia will be dramatic

and severe. Other nations, like Singapore and Malaysia will clearly be

effected and face dangerous times, but the effect of Indonesian

disintegration on Japan and South Korea has massive implications for

the global economy.

There is an expectation that the problem will be dealt with by

Australia and the United States, but this is highly unrealistic.

Australia's naval and armed forces are completely insufficient to deal

with more than immediate problems, such as those that are arising in

East Timor and which may arise in Irian Jaya. The two brigades

Australia proudly boasts would be swallowed in Indonesia's vast

islands and populations.

The same is true for the United States. The problem of patrolling

Indonesia's waterways is not a naval problem. The threat to navigation

is posed by ground forces and their artillery. Suppressing those

forces is primarily a mission for ground forces with some air support.

Given the demographic realities, the United States is in no better

position than Australia to ensure free passage through internal

waterways. There is the possibility of occupying the southern shore of

the Straits of Malacca, but even that is an operation fraught with

risk. Moreover, given the fact that the mission is far more in the

interest of Japan and South Korea than the United States, it is not

clear that the United States would have an interest in incurring the

risk.

It is, therefore, in the general interest of Japan, the United States,

and Australia to make certain that Jakarta does not lose control over

Indonesia, either to secessionism or to warlordism. That is why

thoughtful observers in all three countries are not thrilled at the

thought of Timorese independence. However, regardless of Timor, there

is a deeper problem. If economic interests can't bind Indonesia

together, and the Army has its own centrifugal tendencies, then what

is available to hold it together?

There are two answers, neither particularly appealing. The first is

Sukarnoism, the radical nationalism heavily overlain with

anti-westernism and xenophobia that took Indonesia to independence in

the first place. Sukarnoism is represented by Sukarno's daughter,

Megawati, who is already building a strong political organization. The

second option is Islamic nationalism. Indonesia is a heavily, but not

exclusively, Moslem country. Radical Islam cannot embrace the entire

country, but can create a central core with enough energy to hold the

rest of the country under its control.

The problem with both Sukarnoism and radical Islam is, of course, that

each poses their own problems. Sukarnoism is inherently expansionist

and will use confrontation with neighboring states as glue to hold the

country together. This is particularly a threat to Singapore and

Malaysia, but also to Australia, which has bad memories of Sukarno's

challenges in New Guinea. Radical Islam in Indonesia is certainly not

something the United States wants to encourage. It has enough problems

holding the Straits of Hormuz open without having to cope with a

radical Islamic regime at the other end of the Indian Ocean.

There are no good choices in Indonesia. The ongoing deterioration in

the economy makes it unlikely that Suhartoism without Suharto, the

current Habibie government, will survive, or if it does survive, that

it will be able to control Indonesia's periphery. Sukarnoism in its

full manifestation can be as threatening as disintegration and an

Islamic government could manage to create the problems of Sukarnoism

and the disintegration of Suhartoism in one package.

The solution, of course, is a prosperous Indonesia. Even with Asia

bottoming out, a return to prosperity in Indonesia is unlikely for a

very long time. It is impossible to ignore Indonesia because of its

geographical position. None of the political choices are satisfactory.

And the United States is not likely to spend the resources needed to

stabilize the situation over the long haul.

This leaves only Japan with the potential resources and the need to do

something about it. There is a current debate in Japan over the

appropriateness of Japanese forces being used overseas. The focus is

on North Korea. We believe that this will not be the first arena of

Japanese overseas involvement. Japan must keep Indonesia's waterways

open. Its very existence as an industrial power depends on it. This is

what makes Indonesia significant from our point of view. Everything

else aside, it will be the first test of Japanese statecraft in the

21st century.

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