It meets most of the objections to a massive NATO bombing campaign and its ineffectiveness in helping the Kosovars. It could also contain objections to cluster bombs. If Nato action had been more directly focussed on helping Kosovans inside Kosovo it would have avoided Nato having to consider silencing the one-sided Serb tv broadcasts.
Chris Burford
London
23rd April 1999
" "Tribune has argued consistently that the international community should be defending Bosnia by force of arms and that the failure to do so has been a political capitulation to militarist expansion unprecedented since the thirties."
This was the view taken by Tribune, in the summer of 1993, as Slobodan Milosevic's paramilitaries set about dismembering multi-ethnic Bosnia, whose only crime had been to seek an opt out from a Greater Serbia.
It had also been the view taken by this newspaper in 1991, when President Milosevic answered the Croatian call for independence by instigating the ethnic cleansing of the Croatian city of Vukovar. It should, therefore, come as no surprise that Tribune feels as strongly over the right of the Kosovars to self-determination - especially as there is the added impetus to enable people to return to their burned-out homes.
So, Tribune is in a strong position to argue the case for defending the Kosovars and to offer criticism about the way this war is being conducted. While the Spectator may wax lyrically about ending this 'liberal war' and the New Statesman may blithely exhort others to 'let evil go unpunished', this newspaper's support for Kosovan self-determination is utterly consistent with its internationalist traditions.
>From the outset of the current crisis, Tribune argued that the threat of
air power alone would not force President Milosevic to accept the
Rambouillet accords. Nor was the case for the Kosovars helped once the
Serbian leadership had been told by Bill Clinton and Tony Blair that there
was no threat of land forces. Now, we know that President Milosevic
prepared for 'Operation Horshoe' - the scorched earth policy for Kosovo -
as his lieutenants were pretending to negotiate at Rambouillet.
It has also become apparent that estimates for the numbers of NATO troops needed to return Kosovo to its people were based on an additional option of invading Serbia. It must be assumed that President Clinton and Prime Minister Blair knew of the Yugoslav high command's plans for Kosovo at the same time as they were deliberately exaggerating the number of ground troops that would be required in the Balkans in order to rule out their use. Hence the reliance on bombing raids and the 'no risk' strategy for all but the Serb military and Kosovo's bedraggled refugees.
If Mr Clinton and Mr Blair have underestimated President Milosevic's resilience, it may follow that they can be accused of other serious errors. Nato's strategy is theirs. It is built solely on air strikes, which have been ineffective in halting the suffering of the Kosovars. Having decided not to risk the lives of servicemen and women, the air attacks are set to intensify.
Yet, it is difficult to see how the humanitarian objectives of this war can be met while the risk of Serbian civilian casualties continues to grow. It is time that the bombing raids were replaced by preparations for a land invasion of Kosovo, while continuing to seek every possibility for a negotiated settlement.
>From the beginning of the present crisis, Tribune has argued that the
Russians could play a pivotal role in bringing President Milosevic to heel.
With the threat of land forces, diplomacy could be dealt an even stronger
hand. It must be incumbent on Mr Clinton and Mr Blair to follow this
twin-track policy before all sides are driven into an intractable war
psychosis.
If the humanitarian objectives of this campaign are displaced by that of seeing the credibility of Nato as the overriding objective, the Kosovars will be forgotten and public support for action to defend them may collapse. "