LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE - May 1999
WAR IN THE BALKANS
Behind the Rambouillet talks
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The (official) motive for the attack on Serbia was Belgrade's
refusal to sign the Rambouillet agreement. Yet the Yugoslav leaders
had accepted its main provisions. The only outstanding issue was
the nature of the force to be deployed in Kosovo. And although the
Serbs rejected any Nato presence, they had envisaged some other
formula.
by PAUL-MARIE DE LA GORCE *
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The failure of the Rambouillet negotiations on the status of Kosovo
was the end of a long story that began last summer when United States'
strategists seized on clashes between the Yugoslav army and Albanian
guerrillas as the starting point for an attempt at a political
settlement. It ended when the Contact Group, responsible for managing
the Yugoslav crisis, presented to both parties the plan whose
rejection led to the outbreak of war.
In early summer 1998 former Assistant Secretary of State Richard
Holbrooke, the US special envoy to former Yugoslavia, went to Belgrade
with Ambassador Christopher Hill to demand that Slobodan Milosevic
open talks with "representative authorities" of the Albanian community
in Kosovo. In practice this could only mean Ibrahim Rugova, the
undisputed winner of the elections held in the Albanian community on
22 March. The negotiators designated by Belgrade moved into the main
hotel of Pristina, the capital of the province of Kosovo, where they
waited for a considerable time for their counterparts to show up.
Finally, Milosevic and Rugova met in Belgrade but failed to reach a
political agreement.
The reason for the delay was the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA) as a force representing the majority of the Albanian
community. It had appeared on the scene in December 1995, immediately
after the Dayton agreement on Bosnia, and from the outset its stated
aim was armed struggle for the independence of Kosovo. It hit the
headlines in February 1996 when, in its first communiqué, it claimed
responsibility for an attack on a Bosnian Serb refugee camp.
Increasing its activities steadily over the next two years, the KLA
achieved a strategic and probably decisive breakthrough in spring 1998
when it took control of the Drenica plateau in the heart of Kosovo,
establishing a rear base for raids throughout the province.
This was followed by fierce competition between Rugova and KLA leader
Adem Demaci. While both men agree on the aim of independence for
Kosovo, they differ widely in temperament and methods. As a staunch
advocate of negotiation, Rugova was convinced that Kosovo could
achieve independence in stages, without recourse to force. Demaci
comes from a generation of Kosovars determined - after the
dismemberment of former Yugoslavia - to secure independence through
armed struggle with the help of foreign powers. As clashes broke out
between Yugoslav forces and KLA guerrillas, the Albanian community
predictably shifted towards the KLA's radical stance and solidarity
with its fighters. Inevitably the supporters of Rugova and Demaci each
hardened their attitudes, almost paralysing the negotiations with the
representatives of the Yugoslav Federation that had been so difficult
to get off the ground.
Meanwhile American diplomacy had not been idle. Without waiting for
the two sides to meet and perhaps reach agreement, Holbrooke
instructed Hill to draft a political settlement. The principles were
laid down in advance of any approach to the parties: the frontiers of
Yugoslavia would be maintained as a political framework, to avoid
setting a precedent for challenges to other borders in the region,
especially those of Macedonia; within those frontiers Kosovo would be
granted "substantial autonomy", which would in practice give it all
the internal attributes of a state; and the province would be occupied
by Nato forces to ensure the agreement was implemented. In short, the
plan later submitted at Rambouillet was already present in its
entirety in Hill's draft. Nothing was changed, as can be seen from the
text of the draft published in February in the Albanian daily Kohe
Ditore..
After the Racak massacre on 15 January this year, the governments of
the countries in the Contact Group (the US, United Kingdom, Germany,
France, Italy and Russia) announced their intention to draw up a plan
for a political settlement of the Kosovo crisis. They invited the
Belgrade government and the representatives of the Albanian community
in Kosovo to acquaint themselves with it with a view to negotiations.
The invitation was in the form of an ultimatum, at least as far as the
Yugoslav Federation was concerned, since it was threatened with
military reprisals if it refused to comply. The Contact Group then
agreed a set of principles which were to govern the plan to be
submitted to the two parties.
There were ten principles: the violence was to be ended quickly and a
ceasefire established; the conflict was to be settled peacefully
through talks between the opposing sides; interim arrangements were to
be agreed for a period of three years while a final settlement was
worked out; the interim status of the province was not to be changed
unilaterally; the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, and hence that
of the neighbouring states, was to be maintained; the rights of all
communities, particularly with regard to language, religious
institutions and education, was to be respected; free elections were
to be held and supervised by the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); no legal action was to be taken in
respect of acts committed in the course of the Kosovo conflict, except
for war crimes or crimes against humanity; an amnesty was to be
declared and all political prisoners released; the future settlement
was to be implemented through international participation and
cooperation by both parties.
For the Contact Group these principles were not negotiable. The first
draft was accepted by the Yugoslav side but not by the representatives
of the Albanian community, who found the reference to a final
settlement after a three-year interim period too vague and sought an
explicit commitment that the people of Kosovo would be able to opt for
independence.
At Rambouillet, where the final text of a settlement was presented,
there was little movement on either side. The KLA leadership, now
considered to be representing the Kosovar Albanians, stood by its
refusal to accept any settlement that did not clearly provide for the
right to independence in due course.
The Yugoslav delegation raised no objections to the political aspects
of the settlement but rejected the military provisions. As envisaged
in the Hill plan, the text stipulated that Kosovo would be occupied by
Nato forces.
The Belgrade government's representative in Rambouillet, Serbian
President Milan Milutinovic, hinted at a possible compromise involving
an "international" presence in Kosovo. It was clear to all parties
that what he had in mind were forces from countries such as Russia,
Greece or the states of Western Europe, but excluding troops
officially and directly subordinate to Nato, that is troops governed
by an American command structure itself subordinate to the US
president. This overture was ignored by the Western countries.
Turning Kosovo into a protectorate
American diplomacy had adopted a different approach. From the outset
it had counted on acceptance of the settlement plan by the Albanians
and rejection by Belgrade, which would justify an ultimatum to
Milosevic and, if that ultimatum was rejected, the start of a bombing
campaign against Yugoslavia. Now Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
arrived in Rambouillet to take matters in hand, pushing into the
background the European ministers who had been conducting the
negotiations so far. When even Albright failed to convince the
Albanian representatives to sign the agreement, the Rambouillet
meeting had to be suspended.
But direct talks with the KLA leadership began straight away - first
in Albania, through former Republican presidential candidate Robert
Dole and then, more discreetly, with a KLA delegation in Washington.
For these talks to succeed, Demaci had to be removed from the scene.
His duties were partly taken over by Hacim Taci, who seized the
opportunity to set himself up at the head of a "provisional
government".
Once these manoeuvres had been completed, the US gave a commitment on
four points considered essential by the KLA: the elections in Kosovo
would be held as soon as possible, so that the leaders of the Albanian
community could take over the government of the province without
delay; the disarming of militias stipulated in the Rambouillet
settlement would not in practice apply to individual weapons, which
would be considered private property; the effective presence of Nato
forces would prevent any Yugoslav challenge to the interim or final
status of Kosovo; at the end of the three-year interim period, the
eventuality of independence for the province would be examined if the
regional and international context permitted.
And so the signature of the "other party", as the Albanian delegation
was called in the official document, was obtained at the Rue Kleber
conference centre in Paris to which the Rambouillet meeting had been
transferred. But there was no longer any chance of the Yugoslav side
giving its agreement. What is more, the Russian representatives on the
Contact Group failed to endorse a number of points in the final
document (1) which was not submitted to the parties until the last day
of the conference. So the document did not reflect a joint position of
the whole Group.
The points in question, numbered 2, 5 and 7, were of considerable
importance in the light of the military clauses of the agreement,
which continued to provide for the permanent presence of Nato forces
in Kosovo. Point 2 dealt with OSCE supervision of the police and
judiciary. Point 5 directly concerned implementation of the military
provisions. Point 7 stated explicitly that any dispute between the
parties should be referred to Nato and Nato alone. Could anyone have
imagined the Yugoslav leaders would agree to a settlement which, in
their opinion, turned Kosovo into a protectorate of the Atlantic
military alliance? Especially as the settlement plan submitted at
Rambouillet stipulated that the status of Kosovo took precedence over
all constitutional or legislative provisions of the Yugoslav
Federation, which would therefore not apply in the province.
In these circumstances the negotiations were bound to fail. The road
to war was open.
* Journalist. Latest book: Le dernier empire : le XXIe siecle
sera-t-il americain?, Grasset, Paris, 1996
Translated by Barry Smerin
(1) For full English text see Le Monde diplomatique's web site:
http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/dossiers/kosovo/rambouillet.html
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