Fwd: Behind the Rambouillet talks

Doug Henwood dhenwood at panix.com
Wed May 12 10:45:09 PDT 1999


LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE - May 1999

WAR IN THE BALKANS

Behind the Rambouillet talks

______________________________________________________________

The (official) motive for the attack on Serbia was Belgrade's

refusal to sign the Rambouillet agreement. Yet the Yugoslav leaders

had accepted its main provisions. The only outstanding issue was

the nature of the force to be deployed in Kosovo. And although the

Serbs rejected any Nato presence, they had envisaged some other

formula.

by PAUL-MARIE DE LA GORCE *

______________________________________________________________

The failure of the Rambouillet negotiations on the status of Kosovo

was the end of a long story that began last summer when United States'

strategists seized on clashes between the Yugoslav army and Albanian

guerrillas as the starting point for an attempt at a political

settlement. It ended when the Contact Group, responsible for managing

the Yugoslav crisis, presented to both parties the plan whose

rejection led to the outbreak of war.

In early summer 1998 former Assistant Secretary of State Richard

Holbrooke, the US special envoy to former Yugoslavia, went to Belgrade

with Ambassador Christopher Hill to demand that Slobodan Milosevic

open talks with "representative authorities" of the Albanian community

in Kosovo. In practice this could only mean Ibrahim Rugova, the

undisputed winner of the elections held in the Albanian community on

22 March. The negotiators designated by Belgrade moved into the main

hotel of Pristina, the capital of the province of Kosovo, where they

waited for a considerable time for their counterparts to show up.

Finally, Milosevic and Rugova met in Belgrade but failed to reach a

political agreement.

The reason for the delay was the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation

Army (KLA) as a force representing the majority of the Albanian

community. It had appeared on the scene in December 1995, immediately

after the Dayton agreement on Bosnia, and from the outset its stated

aim was armed struggle for the independence of Kosovo. It hit the

headlines in February 1996 when, in its first communiqué, it claimed

responsibility for an attack on a Bosnian Serb refugee camp.

Increasing its activities steadily over the next two years, the KLA

achieved a strategic and probably decisive breakthrough in spring 1998

when it took control of the Drenica plateau in the heart of Kosovo,

establishing a rear base for raids throughout the province.

This was followed by fierce competition between Rugova and KLA leader

Adem Demaci. While both men agree on the aim of independence for

Kosovo, they differ widely in temperament and methods. As a staunch

advocate of negotiation, Rugova was convinced that Kosovo could

achieve independence in stages, without recourse to force. Demaci

comes from a generation of Kosovars determined - after the

dismemberment of former Yugoslavia - to secure independence through

armed struggle with the help of foreign powers. As clashes broke out

between Yugoslav forces and KLA guerrillas, the Albanian community

predictably shifted towards the KLA's radical stance and solidarity

with its fighters. Inevitably the supporters of Rugova and Demaci each

hardened their attitudes, almost paralysing the negotiations with the

representatives of the Yugoslav Federation that had been so difficult

to get off the ground.

Meanwhile American diplomacy had not been idle. Without waiting for

the two sides to meet and perhaps reach agreement, Holbrooke

instructed Hill to draft a political settlement. The principles were

laid down in advance of any approach to the parties: the frontiers of

Yugoslavia would be maintained as a political framework, to avoid

setting a precedent for challenges to other borders in the region,

especially those of Macedonia; within those frontiers Kosovo would be

granted "substantial autonomy", which would in practice give it all

the internal attributes of a state; and the province would be occupied

by Nato forces to ensure the agreement was implemented. In short, the

plan later submitted at Rambouillet was already present in its

entirety in Hill's draft. Nothing was changed, as can be seen from the

text of the draft published in February in the Albanian daily Kohe

Ditore..

After the Racak massacre on 15 January this year, the governments of

the countries in the Contact Group (the US, United Kingdom, Germany,

France, Italy and Russia) announced their intention to draw up a plan

for a political settlement of the Kosovo crisis. They invited the

Belgrade government and the representatives of the Albanian community

in Kosovo to acquaint themselves with it with a view to negotiations.

The invitation was in the form of an ultimatum, at least as far as the

Yugoslav Federation was concerned, since it was threatened with

military reprisals if it refused to comply. The Contact Group then

agreed a set of principles which were to govern the plan to be

submitted to the two parties.

There were ten principles: the violence was to be ended quickly and a

ceasefire established; the conflict was to be settled peacefully

through talks between the opposing sides; interim arrangements were to

be agreed for a period of three years while a final settlement was

worked out; the interim status of the province was not to be changed

unilaterally; the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, and hence that

of the neighbouring states, was to be maintained; the rights of all

communities, particularly with regard to language, religious

institutions and education, was to be respected; free elections were

to be held and supervised by the Organisation for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); no legal action was to be taken in

respect of acts committed in the course of the Kosovo conflict, except

for war crimes or crimes against humanity; an amnesty was to be

declared and all political prisoners released; the future settlement

was to be implemented through international participation and

cooperation by both parties.

For the Contact Group these principles were not negotiable. The first

draft was accepted by the Yugoslav side but not by the representatives

of the Albanian community, who found the reference to a final

settlement after a three-year interim period too vague and sought an

explicit commitment that the people of Kosovo would be able to opt for

independence.

At Rambouillet, where the final text of a settlement was presented,

there was little movement on either side. The KLA leadership, now

considered to be representing the Kosovar Albanians, stood by its

refusal to accept any settlement that did not clearly provide for the

right to independence in due course.

The Yugoslav delegation raised no objections to the political aspects

of the settlement but rejected the military provisions. As envisaged

in the Hill plan, the text stipulated that Kosovo would be occupied by

Nato forces.

The Belgrade government's representative in Rambouillet, Serbian

President Milan Milutinovic, hinted at a possible compromise involving

an "international" presence in Kosovo. It was clear to all parties

that what he had in mind were forces from countries such as Russia,

Greece or the states of Western Europe, but excluding troops

officially and directly subordinate to Nato, that is troops governed

by an American command structure itself subordinate to the US

president. This overture was ignored by the Western countries.

Turning Kosovo into a protectorate

American diplomacy had adopted a different approach. From the outset

it had counted on acceptance of the settlement plan by the Albanians

and rejection by Belgrade, which would justify an ultimatum to

Milosevic and, if that ultimatum was rejected, the start of a bombing

campaign against Yugoslavia. Now Secretary of State Madeleine Albright

arrived in Rambouillet to take matters in hand, pushing into the

background the European ministers who had been conducting the

negotiations so far. When even Albright failed to convince the

Albanian representatives to sign the agreement, the Rambouillet

meeting had to be suspended.

But direct talks with the KLA leadership began straight away - first

in Albania, through former Republican presidential candidate Robert

Dole and then, more discreetly, with a KLA delegation in Washington.

For these talks to succeed, Demaci had to be removed from the scene.

His duties were partly taken over by Hacim Taci, who seized the

opportunity to set himself up at the head of a "provisional

government".

Once these manoeuvres had been completed, the US gave a commitment on

four points considered essential by the KLA: the elections in Kosovo

would be held as soon as possible, so that the leaders of the Albanian

community could take over the government of the province without

delay; the disarming of militias stipulated in the Rambouillet

settlement would not in practice apply to individual weapons, which

would be considered private property; the effective presence of Nato

forces would prevent any Yugoslav challenge to the interim or final

status of Kosovo; at the end of the three-year interim period, the

eventuality of independence for the province would be examined if the

regional and international context permitted.

And so the signature of the "other party", as the Albanian delegation

was called in the official document, was obtained at the Rue Kleber

conference centre in Paris to which the Rambouillet meeting had been

transferred. But there was no longer any chance of the Yugoslav side

giving its agreement. What is more, the Russian representatives on the

Contact Group failed to endorse a number of points in the final

document (1) which was not submitted to the parties until the last day

of the conference. So the document did not reflect a joint position of

the whole Group.

The points in question, numbered 2, 5 and 7, were of considerable

importance in the light of the military clauses of the agreement,

which continued to provide for the permanent presence of Nato forces

in Kosovo. Point 2 dealt with OSCE supervision of the police and

judiciary. Point 5 directly concerned implementation of the military

provisions. Point 7 stated explicitly that any dispute between the

parties should be referred to Nato and Nato alone. Could anyone have

imagined the Yugoslav leaders would agree to a settlement which, in

their opinion, turned Kosovo into a protectorate of the Atlantic

military alliance? Especially as the settlement plan submitted at

Rambouillet stipulated that the status of Kosovo took precedence over

all constitutional or legislative provisions of the Yugoslav

Federation, which would therefore not apply in the province.

In these circumstances the negotiations were bound to fail. The road

to war was open.

* Journalist. Latest book: Le dernier empire : le XXIe siecle

sera-t-il americain?, Grasset, Paris, 1996

Translated by Barry Smerin

(1) For full English text see Le Monde diplomatique's web site:

http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/dossiers/kosovo/rambouillet.html

_________________________________________________________________

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED © 1999 Le Monde diplomatique

<http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/inside/1999/05/05gorce.html>



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