this fetishizing of 'the apaches' is really peculiar, as though they're the diplomatic contingent from Sovereign State of Tech- nology. the pentagonistas are still besotted with the bureaucrat- ized language of war (i doubt they know another idiom after how many generations now?), but they're not so stupid as to trip themselves up again like they did with patriots missiles in the gulf war: and thus we see that the *only* weapons system common to both wars whose reputation survived the gulf war more or less intact becomes, indeed, a sort of 'silver bullet.' and they're great things to have around, because everyone oohs and aahs at them instead of thinking about the other bullets, the gun, the marksmanship, let alone the reason for fighting. these things get more press coverage than russia.
the pentagon's supposed savvy notwithstanding, their R&D and pro- curement cultures are hopeslessly determined by the poetics of space according to the cold war: vast cartesian spaces and con- ceptually isolated models of the kind one sees in 'dramatizations' of how X or Y system will work--flat spaces, spheres of interest, etc. witness the stealth bombers that fly missions from missouri: they learned in the gulf war that the things are allergic to any weather but the dry but sandless south.
they're quite familiar with flying copters in real conditions, though, from vietnam in particular. and the know damned well even from that flat country how hard it is because they used to have to drop 2000-pound 'daisy cutter' bombs to clear landing areas from the forests (the paddies were a bit soft). and the know very well that they can fly these things wherever they want in FYU but for one thing: they're short-range systems to support troops, and support requires ground forces to guard beachheads in the field. you can destroy all the artillery you want, but the problem is the people--small arms can win a war--and they're terrified of fighting with neo-partisans, because the serbs will kick the pen- tagon's ass and the pentagon knows it. what the internal fight is about: copters mean an invasion, nothing more nothing less. and they don't want one because it would mean losing, and losing would have a pretty harrowing effect on the defense budget.
and to say that they just realized this, that it was a PR front, is ludicrous: wesley put in his order on Day One because he wants to invade. the pentagon doesn't. so they send a few--pretty decrep- it ones, it would seem, yes?--to stall for time, see which way the war goes, see which way the polls go. they monitor the FYU media quite closely for signs of fractionalism and dissent, but that's hardly the only national media they're keeping their eye on. they remember vietnam all too well, because the 'vietnam syn- drome' is their real worst nightmare: that the civil government will assert its authority over them, rather than vice versa.
how many troops were they saying an invasion needed? 200,000. does that number, plus or minus 6,000, ring a bell?
cheers, t