-----Original Message----- From: J. Barkley Rosser, Jr. <rosserjb at jmu.edu> To: pen-l at galaxy.csuchico.edu <pen-l at galaxy.csuchico.edu>; lbo-talk at lists.panix.com <lbo-talk at lists.panix.com> Date: Monday, May 24, 1999 1:33 PM Subject: Partition reconsidered
> Over the weekend I have reconsidered my
>strong rejection of partition as an aid to solving
>the Kosmet situation. This is partly due to looking
>at maps of the West Bank and the crazy quilt of
>zones of control there and the likely outcome of
>any "final" negotiation between the Palestinians
>and the Israelis that might arise there, not to mention
>the bizarreness of the nevertheless reasonably
>stable zones in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
> Here is how a possible partition might work
>that might allow for at least some return of Albanian
>refugees into zones of de facto Albanian control
>from which Serbian troops could be removed (I see
>no likelihood of any Albanians returning to any place
>where there are any Serbian troops or police).
> First let us review what a map of Kosmet looks like
>more or less. It is shaped approximately like a diamond,
>with points north, east, south, and west. Bordering on the
>southwest is Albania, on the southeast is Macedonia, on
>the northeast, north, and part of the northwest is Serbia
>proper, and on the west is Montenegro.
> About 80% of the prewar Albanian population was in
>a swath running across the middle of the country from the
>southwest to the northeast. An obvious base for an Albanian
>safe zone would be in the middle of this and including most
>of it, with the center to the west of the provincial center
>in the Drenica area which has long been a major base of
>the UCK/KLA and apparently still is under their control to
>some extent.
> The obvious zones for Serb control would include the
>city of Pec in the west with the Serbian Orthodox patriarchate,
>a strip running along the border to the northeast of that and
>including the far north with Mitrovica and the mines in it. Then
>most of the east would be in their zone, extending far enough
>west to include the capital of Pristina with its suburban historical
>site of the battlefield of Kosovo Polje. The far south would also
>be in, heavily populated by Serbs, with this zone also including
>Prizren with various historical sites. More problematic, but
>probably necessary would a be zone in the southeast to connect
>these southern and eastern zones. This would bring in the
>important monastery of Glaganica, but has been heavily populated
>by Albanians. However, it appears that a lot of them, possibly
>most of them, have been "cleansed" and expelled, but this
>zone is a possible bone of contention.
> The most difficult to resolve area would be in the southwest,
>the source of most of my past rejections of such an idea. It
>contains many Orthodox monasteries, the most important
>probably Decani on the Albanian border. The zone around
>Pec could perhaps extend far enough south to get it at least.
>But this zone also is the obvious link to Albania and the issue
>arises as to whether the Serbs would allow such a link. Clearly
>this area has been heavily cleansed and so for both strategic
>and historical reasons they might not want to let the Albanians
>have any of it. Where to draw the lines there and whether or
>not there would be a corridor between the Albanian zone in
>the center of Kosmet and Albania proper would be very serious
>matters for a final negotiation on all this.
> Two other difficult spots stick out in my mind. One is near
>Pec in the west. Just north of Pec is a major area of local
>UCK/KLA control with a large displaced Albanian population.
>Clearly the Serbs would demand Pec, but would this patch
>be Albanian controlled ?(it is at least partly on the ground right
>now apparently, an important fact in such negotiations). If
>that patch were granted to the Albanians, would it have a
>corridor to the main Albanian zone or not? If it did then would
>mean that the Pec patch of Serb control would be isolated
>from the rest of the Serb zones of control, which I am sure they
>would resist? There is a potential parallel here to the situation
>in Bosnia-Herzegovina where the western part of the Srpska
>Republika is connected with the rest of it by a disputed
>corridor through the city of Brcko, taken away from them
>after this war started. The same city is the corridor between
>the northern and southern zones of Muslim control as well.
>Something like this might happen in western Kosmet.
> The other problem area, although probably not as difficult,
>is in the northeast where the Albanians are very populous
>and have not been expelled as much. There is also a major
>pocket of UCK/KLA control up there near the city of Podujevic.
>Perhaps the Serbs would let this go to the Albanians as they
>would have a link through Serbia proper between their two
>main zones of control.
> A final issue is that of whether or not the Albanians would
>get any cities. It is clear that a lot of "cleansing" activity
>has been focused on the main cities such as Pristina, Pec,
>and Prizren. The two candidates for cities for the Albanian
>zone look like Podujevic in the northeast and Djakovica in
>the southwest, a very heavily contested zone. I suspect that
>the disposition of the latter would be one of the most hotly
>disputed issues and would also be linked to the existence or
>nonexistence of a corridor between Albania proper and an
>Albanian zone, Djakovica being located in an obvious spot
>for such a corridor, halfway between Pec and Prizren.
> Does anybody know where the fascists drew the line when
>they partitioned the province in WW II?
> BTW, for Serbian Orthodox monasteries or religious sites
>ending up in the Albanian zone, there might be an exception
>made for some kind of Serbian police protection. Even Albright
>has now declared this as an exception to the demand for
>removal of all Serb forces from the province. (Another btw is
>that I have seen a claim in the Wash. Post that Serb claims of
>bomb damage of religious sites are fabricated for propaganda
>purposes).
> And a final btw, propanda without truth is an empty vessel
>that leads where the former Soviet Union went, the ashcan of
>history.
> The bottom line is that partition is not necessarily as
>unreasonable as I have made out, and although problematical,
>may eventually play a role in whatever the final outcome of this
>tragic mess is.
>Barkley Rosser
>