On the motivations behind the war:
Charles' reference to Marx' thesis
>social being determine social consciousness
is spot on. But the way I read it, Marx did not mean (as he is often
vulgarised) that economics determines thinking. For Marx economics is
after all only fetishistic expression of social being. And, just as
important, social being includes social consciousness as well as
determining it.
Social being can be analysed at the level of capital accumulation, but this necessarily leaves out of account those more removed levels of abstraction, the state, politics, international relations etc. To treat these as simply a linear extension of the more fundamental dynamics of the economy would mean failing to analyse them in their own terms.
In the very broadest sense it can be said that the maintenance of the conditions of the reproduction of the ruling class globally is the goal of great power policy. But that says very little about the actual modulations of foreign policy.
The important events in international relations are determined principally by the need to politically remotivate the ruling elites after the end of the Cold War. It was the Cold War that acted as the higher purpose through which elites could rise above their private concerns and assume the responsibility of world leadership.
Ever since the Soviet Union collapsed, the ruling elites have been suffering a crisis of legitimacy. The political parties that were created under Cold War conditions were disoriented by the change. The structure of political engagement no longer made any sense. Publics turned away from the Establishment and its institutions.
Since 1989, the ruling classes' principal concern has been to re- motivate Western societies and their own institutions and organisations. This has been attempted in many ways, but the most important has been the politicising of international conflicts, and the demonisation of third world dictators.
The refugee camps of Kosovo are so important for Western leaders, because it is the one place where people cheer them, call their babies after them, hold up placards applauding them. In international conflicts, Blair, Clinton and the rest achieve the level of success and support that eludes them at home.
For the emerging elites of the next century, fighting Milosevic is their Cold War, or their Spain (in their own version). It is the political international conflict that is the test of a generation. For them this is the fight that counts. It is the one through which they re-motivate their own project, as a humanitarian policy.
That's what makes it so destructive. If you are looking for an historical parallel, think of White Supremacy, before it had ever occurred to anyone that there was something wrong with discriminating on the grounds of race. Or colonialism, before it had settled down to a matter of ripping off natives, but a field on which the ruling elites trained their up and coming administrators.
In message <s74e6962.036 at mail.ci.detroit.mi.us>, Charles Brown <CharlesB at CNCL.ci.detroit.mi.us> writes
>Chas.: Yes, but ultimately doesn't social being determine social consciousness,
>and shouldn't that be reflected in a historical materialist explanation, despite
>Engels letter to Bloch and all that ?
>
>What is the matter with finding that the world bourgeoisie have complex economic
>motives which are both narrow and specific to the region AND ,as your analysis
>below suggests, broader in maintaining a world dominant military force to police
>for global capitalism all over the world ? In this case, can't we say both are
>motives ?
>
>I agree with much of your analysis regarding assemblyline "dictator" production.
>It really is getting ridiculous. The end of the Cold War has really screwed up
>the U.S. fundamental military propaganda story.
In message <v04011706b373d11c0a63@[166.84.250.86]>, Doug Henwood <dhenwood at panix.com> writes
>James, this wasn't "the left" speaking, it was a prominent liberal
>imperialist pundit who has the ear of the president of the U.S. Besides,
>the Caspian angle doesn't preclude all the other explanations of the
>glorious war.
>
>What's your theory of the Gulf War, anyway?
>
>Doug
-- Jim heartfield