Autonomy? (Re: Kosovars Gained Autonomy with Fewer Losses tha n Expected)

Seth Ackerman SAckerman at FAIR.org
Mon Nov 15 10:21:10 PST 1999


Nathan wrote:


> Okay, this counteroffer existed, or so it is claimed. I've yet to see the
> exact wording. Can you post the language proposed by Milosevic? My
> understanding was that he was willing to allow only a token force, largely
> unarmed, with no serious concessions to the rights of Kosovo for autonomy
> or
> internal democratic control. But if you have definitive language from
> Milosevic and his regime stating otherwise, I would be interested in
> seeing
> the language.
>

What did Milosevic concede at Rambouillet? He agreed to the Contact Group's constitution for Kosovo, including their own parliament, schools, police, etc. The Serbian delegation announced their intention to sign the plan February 22. On the morning of February 23, they awoke to find that the draft had been changed to include a referendum on independence. They refused to sign. (That provision disappeared after the bombing.) But it is simply uncontroversial that the Serbs agreed to meaningful autonomy for Kosovo.

As for peacekeepers, there was no "official" written counter-offer to Rambouillet's military annex because the rules were that no one (presumably including the Kosovo delegation) was allowed to amend the text of the military annexes once they were presented to the parties. However, the London Times reported from France - shortly before the deadline for the end of the first round - that the Serbian delegation was busy furiously drafting counter-proposals. No one has seen these, however, since the Contact Group would not accept them.

However, the Serbian delegation did say unequivocally a few days earlier that it was willing to talk about some type of force "under the auspices" of the United Nations or OSCE. Talks on the composition of such a force did not proceed because Madeleine Albright arrived at the chateau that evening to ensure no agreement was reached. However, it is untenable to argue that this concession was merely a negotiating ploy, since, during the Rambouillet talks, Yugoslav state-run television made no secret of it, reporting -- for Seselj and everyone else to hear -- the government's decision to accept an "international security force" in Kosovo.

What specific type of force would Milosevic have agreed to at Rambouillet? Thanks to Albright's lethal intransigence, we will never know for certain. At the time, Western governments did not consider it out of the question that Milosevic would accept NATO troops. The Washington Post reported that the CIA's intelligence reports were predicting at the time that he would.

In May, word leaked out that one option for a peacekeeping force being considered by Western governments was called "glorified UNPROFOR" -- a label obviously given to it by its opponents, chiefly the Americans who hated it for undermining the US commitment to NATO supremacy. This force would have a United Nations commander but would be made up of NATO and other forces with "much stronger rules of engagement" than Bosnia's Unprofor. It was, internally, the preferred option of some NATO countries. It seems a very likely prospect that Milosevic would have accepted such a force at Rambouillet if given the option. Since it would have a UN commander, he could truthfully call it a UN peacekeeping force. (At present, his state-run media refer to the NATO troops currently in Kosovo as "UN troops.") Yet it would also have enough muscle to keep the peace in Kosovo.

Nathan, I'm surprised that someone as committed and well-informed about Kosovo as you would be unaware of what took place at Rambouillet. Perharps somewhere in the back of your mind, you think of all this as somehow secondary -- after all, the Serbs needed to get smacked, why worry about sterile "diplomacy"?

Seth



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