> The above becomes (again) an absolute prohibition of the questioning of the
> origin & legitimacy of the state power in Kant's political philosophy:
> ***** A people should not _inquire_ with any practical aim in view into
> the origin of the supreme authority to which it is subject, that is, a
> subject _ought not to reason subtly_ for the sake of action about the
> origin of this authority, as a right that can still be called into question
> (_jus controversum_) with regard to the obedience he owes
it...
The unpardonable sin? - blasphemy against God? It is still a radical evil... but in Kant's view, an unforgivable one. But it still isn't diabolical evil. Kant is relying on Augustine's privation of the good argument. For Kant, evil does not exist as PURE evil, such a think is unthinkable. So, the questioning of authority, the origin of the categorical imperative, is the 'ultimate evil' but not devilish being. Kant's categorical imperative relies on an asymetry with good and evil. This presupposition can no longer be taken seriously.
> The 'ultimate evil' appears in a footnote to _The Metaphysics of Morals_:
> ***** Now the criminal can commit his misdeed either by adopting a maxim
> based on an assumed objective law (as if it were universally valid), or
> merely as an exception to the rule (by exempting himself from it as the
> occasion requires). In the _latter_ case, he merely _deviates_ (albeit
> deliberately) from the law, for he may at the same time deplore his own
> transgression and simply wish to get round the law without formally
> terminating his obedience to it. But in the _former_ case, he rejects the
> authority of the law itself..., and makes it his rule to act in opposition
> to it; it is actually _contrary_ to the law..., or...diametrically opposed
> to it as a contradiction.... So far as can be seen, it is impossible for
> men to commit a crime of such formal and completely futile malice, although
> no system of morality should omit to consider it, if only as a pure idea
> representing ultimate evil.
Yes, the "criminal" diametrically opposes the law, as a contradiction. But the law itself does not become its reversal. The law is truth, even when the criminal rejects it, questions it, contradicts it completely. The moral law still does not become the immoral law, the evil categorical imperative.
> So, the ultimate evil is eminently thinkable, theoretically or historically
> (Kant himself mentions the fate of Charles I and Louis XVI in the same
> footnote); it's just that thinking of it (the ultimate evil = a
> revolutionary rejection of the authority of the law) destroys the Kantian
> system of morality and political philosophy.
It destroys it, but does not replace its truth. Devilish being actually replaces the truth of the categorical imperative, which is why it is forbidden, not simply on moral grounds (Kant says we "shouldn't" not that we "cannot"), but on metaphysical grounds. Kant's system runs like this: "I can't because I musn't" - not "I can't because I can't."
ken